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Abstract 
This research recognises a conflict between climate change mitigation and a lock-in 
of carbon-intense lifestyles. The concern is that, in the short term, policies to aid the 
transition to Low Carbon Vehicles (LCVs) may bring about unacceptable impacts on 
those amongst the worst-off. The approach that is taken is interdisciplinary, and 
suggests a novel approach to policy appraisal through combining ethics with a 
system dynamic model.  
 
An ethical framework is established that claims coercive LCV policies are permitted 
due to the harms of climate change, but certain groups require protection from 
impacts on car ownership. This protection could be similar to policy in other sectors, 
such as tax exemptions for the worst-off. The framework also improves on current 
practise by offering a new perspective on the limitations of models in policy-making. 
 
Two model case studies examine LCV policies, focused on subsidies and market 
regulation of electric vehicles. The first is relatively simple and develops basic skills 
and understanding, but still gives policy insight and explores the sensitivity of 
results. A more complex second model is used to understand the policy impacts in 
more detail, and in relation to ethical concerns. Combining the findings of both 
models suggests that subsidies are only successful in reducing emissions under a 
failing market and although regulation is more successful it raises the cost of all 
vehicles, disproportionately impacting the poorest in society. Combining these 
policies will allow a more even distribution of burdens. 
 
From this, recommendations are made that suggest the policy-maker needs to 
ensure affordability, protect the vulnerable and distribute burdens. Finally, a 
framework for an improved approach to modelling and policy appraisal, which 
incorporates ethics, is proposed. Although the focus of this work is on LCVs, the 
fundamental approach is transferable to other areas of transport and energy use. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Across the world, countries have made political commitments to mitigate climate 
change through reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. The UK has a legally 
binding target to reduce emissions by at least 80% from 1990 levels by 2050. As 
part of this, there is a policy to substantially decarbonise the transport system, an 
ambitious target that will have an impact practically every UK citizen’s mobility, daily 
lifestyle and travel decisions. In achieving this, the government envisage a 
technology transition in passenger cars from the current conventionally-fuelled 
Internal Combustion Engine Vehicle (cICEV) to Low Carbon Vehicles (LCV)1, which 
may use alternative powertrains and fuels. To this end, there are a number of policy 
measures designed to stimulate an LCV market. Proposed policies target both 
manufacturers on the supply side and the public on the demand side. However, the 
effectiveness of such policies and the pathway of technological development are 
both uncertain and interlinked.  
 
Considering this, and the current cultural and infrastructural lock-in to car ownership 
for access and mobility, it is the concern of this thesis that, from the perspective of 
distributional justice, such policies may unfairly burden the worst-off in society and 
increase existing inequalities. As such, this research engages in philosophical 
discussion regarding the morality of the situation, in order to develop and justify an 
ethical framework in which policies should operate. Furthermore, an attempt is 
made to incorporate this framework into an LCV policy modelling process, so that 
distributional impacts can be identified in addition to the potential success of LCV 
uptake and carbon emission reduction. Combining the ethical and empirical 
approach is a novel and useful addition to the existing suite of policy appraisal 
tools, which, if adopted by policy makers, could lead to better designed, more 
holistic and ultimately successful policies. 
 
This introductory chapter first of all sets the context of climate change, transport 
and the role of the private car in reducing carbon emissions before defining the 
scope, limitations and objectives of the research, and finally sets out the 
methodology that has been employed. 
                                               
1 In this work LCV encompasses any vehicle with substantially lower carbon emissions than 
current conventional ICEV. 
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1.1 Background to Climate Change  
The underlying science of climate change has been extensively studied by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who produce regular 
assessment reports on all aspects of the subject. In their latest published report, the 
IPCC concluded that “warming of the climate is unequivocal” (IPCC, 2007a). 2  
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in our atmosphere are necessary for sustaining a 
climate on earth necessary for life, by trapping the heat from the sun that is 
reflected back from the earth. The most notable of these are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).3
 The link between the concentration of 
these gases in the atmosphere and global temperature has been recognised since 
the 19th Century (Jacobsun, 2002).  
 
Following this, climate scientists have also proven a link between global 
temperature and climate or weather patterns (Weart, 2013). Although there is a 
natural variation in atmospheric GHG concentrations and corresponding global 
temperature, varying within a 2oC range, the last time the polar regions of the earth 
were significantly warmer (3-5oC) was about 125,000 years ago (Solomon et al., 
2007). Average temperatures have gradually risen by about 1oC since records 
began in 1850 and 11 out of the 12 years previous to the 2007 IPCC report were 
the warmest witnessed in that period.  GHG concentration has risen rapidly over the 
past 250 years to unprecedented amounts, and is now over 400ppm (NOAA, 2013), 
the highest in 10,000 years of human existence. This has been determined through 
analysing ice cores that have trapped atmospheric gases such as CO2 for millennia, 
demonstrated in Figure 1.1.  The cause of this rise in GHG concentration has been 
largely due to anthropogenic emissions and the IPCC concluded that; 
The observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th 
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations. (IPCC, 2007b, p.10)4 
 
                                               
2 Although a final draft of a new report is available, it has not been officially published at the 
time of writing. A released summary for policymakers (IPCC, 2013) suggests that this 
report reinforces the findings of the 2007 report. 
3 CO2 dominates GHGs thus exerts the greatest influence on climate change, therefore 
most attention is paid to CO2 emissions, which are often referred to simply as carbon 
emissions. Despite this, non-CO2 GHG emissions are also important. 
4 The 2013 IPCC summary for policymakers suggests that the certainty in this has grown. 
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Figure 1.1: Change in atmospheric CO2 (IPCC, 2007b, p.3)5 
 
 
A recent meta-analysis of peer-reviewed journal papers examining climate change 
found that of those that took a stance if climate change was due to anthropogenic 
emissions, 97% concluded in favour (Cook et al., 2013). According to the 
International Energy Agency (2009a) global anthropogenic GHG emissions grew by 
61% from 1970 to 2005 (1.4% p.a.), and the IPCC estimates that in a business as 
usual situation there will be at least a 25% increase from 2000 to 2030, which would 
likely result in a global temperature change between 2.5 and 4oC.  
 
It is generally agreed that we are already committed to an increase over 1oC and 
the Copenhagen Summit of 2009 agreed that we should limit this to 2oC (though a 
process for doing so has not yet been settled). Temperature has a significant 
influence over the earth’s climate systems. An increase may cause sea level rises 
through thermal expansion and melting ice caps and sheets, which in turn causes 
widespread changes in: 
Precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme 
weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity 
of tropical cyclones. (IPCC, 2007b, p.7) 
 
From these changes, there will be a non-linear response to eco-system damage 
due to the unknown effects of feedback systems (Rogner et al., 2007). The effects 
of this are likely to include: 
 
 
                                               
5 From ice core studies (purple, blue, green) and atmospheric samples (red). 
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 Massive loss of human life; 
 Significant biodiversity loss, including habitats and species extinction; 
 Migration of large volumes of people between regions and countries;  
 Spread of climate related disease such as malaria; 
 Wide spread damage to existing infrastructure; 
 Crop and agricultural impacts resulting in famine. 
 
If current trends continue, GHG emissions could double by 2050, leading to a 
possible 6oC temperature rise (IEA, 2012a). It is widely recognized that to prevent 
unprecedented changes to life on earth we must limit the concentration of GHGs in 
our atmosphere by reducing our emissions through new technologies and lifestyle 
changes.  
 
1.1.1 Political Movement 
 
The first international movement on climate change was the 1992 Rio Earth Summit 
and subsequent creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Article Two of the UNFCCC states the ultimate objective to be; 
Stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. (UN, 1992) 
 
As such, the Kyoto Protocol, which has been ratified by 192 countries, is an 
agreement to set internationally binding emission reduction targets (UN, 2013). 
Notable exceptions to ratified countries are the United States, and Canada (who left 
in 2011). Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries bear the heaviest burden 
under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. It was adopted in 
1997, and came into force in 2005, divided into commitment periods. During the first 
period, 2008-2012, the reduction target was an average of 5% below 1990 levels, 
and for the second commitment period of 2013-2020 it is 18%. These reductions 
are to be achieved through three main mechanisms; International Emission Trading 
(currently just certain industries), Clean Development Mechanism (assisting 
developing countries with emission reduction projects) and Joint Implementation 
(partnered emission reductions between countries). A set of 15 EU member states 
had a joint target of an 8% overall reduction under the first period and as part of this 
the UK target was set for 12.5%. The latest reported figures were for 2011 and the 
EU-15 had achieved a 14.7% reduction with the UK reducing emissions by 28%, 
the greatest of any of the EU countries (EEA, 2012).  
5 
  
UN Members meet regularly to discuss progress and extension to the UNFCCC. 
Other than the Kyoto Protocol, other notable agreements include: 
 Bali Roadmap (2007), charting the negotiating process; 
 Cancun Agreements (2010), recognising the need to limit temperature 
increase to 2oC; 
 Durban Outcomes (2011), committing to a legally binding plan after 2020, and; 
 Doha Climate Gateway (2012), establishing financial and technological 
support and a target to make post-2020 agreements by 2015.  
 
Further to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol commitments, the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) was established by the European Commission in 
2000. Through this programme, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS) was 
launched in 2005. The EUETS operates a cap and trade mechanism covering 
emissions from power stations and heavy industries, accounting for 40% of 
Europe’s GHG emissions, and it is set to expand to include further emission 
sources. In 2009, a Climate and Energy Package became law, setting the “20-20-
20” targets of a 20% increase in both the share of renewable energies and overall 
energy efficiency, and 20% reduction in GHG by 2020 (EC, 2010). 
 
The UK Climate Change Act 2008 sets a legal obligation to achieve an 80% 
emission reduction from 1990 levels by 2050, through a series of three carbon 
budgets, and a non-legal target of a 34% reduction by 2020. In order to achieve 
these targets, the UK is subject to a number of high level policies, which are 
managed by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), and set out in 
‘The Carbon Plan’ (DECC, 2011a). More recently a fourth carbon budget has set a 
50% reduction target for the 2023-2027 period (DECC, 2011b).  
 
1.1.2 Transport and Private Cars 
 
Globally, the transport sector accounts for around 30% of energy use, according to 
the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012b) and, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, is the 
largest single user of fossil fuels. In 2009, transport was the third largest source of 
GHG emissions (after energy and industry), accounting for approximately 15% of 
overall GHG emissions (IEA, 2012a). This had grown by 45% from 1990 to 2007 
(ITF, 2010). Within this, road transport makes the most significant contribution to 
transport GHG emissions (ITF, 2010), and in most OECD countries, these 
emissions are dominated by passenger cars.  
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Figure 1.2: The global energy system, 2010 (Mt oil equivalent) (IEA, 2012b, p.62)6 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1.3, following the energy sector, transport (not including 
international aviation and shipping) is the second largest source of CO2 emissions 
in the UK (DECC, 2013a). Transport emissions peaked in 2007 but are now only 
marginally higher than 1990 levels. By end user, transport contributes a similar 
percentage to total GHG emissions (24%) and has decreased by 1% since 1990. 
Passenger cars alone account for nearly 12% of UK GHG emissions (DfT, 2012a). 
Additionally, approximately 75% of UK households have a car, which is the 
transport mode used most frequently by over half of the population (DfT, 2010). 
 
  
Figure 1.3: UK GHG emissions (Mt), 2012 provisional figures (data from DECC, 2013a) 
 
                                               
6 * Transformation of fossil fuels from primary energy into a form that can be used in the 
final consuming sectors. ** Includes losses and fuel consumed in oil and gas production, 
transformation losses and own use, generation lost or consumed in the process of electricity 
production, and transmission and distribution losses. 
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Conventional ICEV relies on petrol and diesel, fractions of petroleum (crude oil) that 
can be separated by their different boiling points through a series of processes 
known as refining (Speight, 2011). Crude oil is produced from reserves across the 
world at a current rate of around 84 million barrels a day (mb/d), which is expected 
to rise to almost 100 mb/d by 2035, in response to rising demand (IEA, 2012b). The 
majority of the increase in production will come from unconventional sources and 
production efficiencies, as shown in Figure 1.4. Currently, around 50% of crude oil 
is used in transportation. Most of this is for road transport, and the demand growth 
in future years will come mainly from transport in non-OECD countries. The amount 
of proven oil reserves is a much debated issue (Owen et al., 2010), but could be 
over 1,500 billion barrels, which under current consumption patterns would last just 
over 54 years (BP, 2012). However, when accounting for unconventional, 
undiscovered and currently unrecoverable sources of oil actual reserves could 
reach toward 6000 billion barrels (IEA, 2012b).  
 
 
Figure 1.4: World oil supply by type in IEA New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2012b, p.103) 
 
When considering a projected three to four-fold increase in global passenger 
mobility by 2050 (ITF, 2010), and in particular the well-recognised increase in 
demand for personal passenger vehicles as economies emerge, this is an area of 
huge potential for meeting emission reduction targets, or indeed, preventing 
emissions increases. It is more prudently so when one considers the wealth of 
options, with significant opportunities to reduce emissions through new 
technologies, modal shift and behavioural change.  
 
Official predictions vary on the increase in CO2 emissions from transport, dependent 
on technologies and policies which are considered. The International Transport 
Forum (ITF) have suggested that under a business-as-usual scenario, by 2050 total 
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emissions will increase by up to three times, with an increasing proportion (going 
over 50%) from light duty passenger vehicles (ITF, 2011a). Non-OECD country 
emissions are suggested to grow by up to 5 times. To avoid this, a large proportion 
of vehicles will need to use alternative energy carriers, such as electricity and 
hydrogen, alongside decarbonisation of power supplies (ITF, 2011a). This would 
need to be in the order of at least three quarters of vehicle sales in the market by 
2050 in order to limit temperature increases to 2oC (IEA, 2012a). The 2010 
European White Paper on transport envisages zero emission urban transport by 
2050, and under UK policy, transport emissions are projected to decrease by 
around 15% between 2009 and 2030, with almost all cars being “Ultra Low 
Emission” by 2050 (DECC, 2011a). This presents a significant challenge, as by the 
end of 2012, less than 3000 pure electric vehicles had been registered in the UK 
(SMMT, 2013a). 
1.2 Scope and Limitations of the Research 
This thesis utilises system dynamics modelling to explore policies for the 
development and uptake of low carbon passenger vehicle technologies. In doing 
so, there is a specific focus on ethical concerns, from the point of view of climate 
change and distributional justice. There are however, many other drivers and 
concerns related to LCVs and alternative decarbonisation options that are not 
directly considered in this thesis, but it is prudent to be aware of. 
 
1.2.1 Other drivers for LCVs 
 
Climate change is not the only driver for changing the current automobile regime, 
but policy makers and engineers alike must consider other externalities of the 
passenger car when introducing new technologies.  
 
Fuel and energy scarcity, security and independence 
Most energy and fuel used in the UK is non-renewable, and supply forecasts vary 
immensely, hence the move towards increasing renewable energy supplies, such 
as solar, wind and hydro electricity plants and the production of biofuels. Transport 
already accounts for 30% of world non-renewable energy needs (IEA, 2012b). 
Crude oil reserves are not distributed equally across nations, but much of it lies in 
just a few countries. Although this unbalance can promote a fair competitive 
advantage for these countries, some are politically unstable. In such cases, not only 
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could this risk exploitation of vulnerable nations but also compel engagement with 
corrupt regimes. A move away from crude oil as a primary fuel for transport towards 
a fuel or energy supply that can be both produced and managed within a home 
nation would allow international relations to be more independent from resource 
needs. The IEA suggest that low carbon energy can lead to greater energy security. 
 
Local pollution  
Not all transport related emissions reach the atmosphere and contribute to climate 
change, but some remain closer to their sources and result in local air pollution, 
such as photochemical smog. This pollution can be damaging to both the local 
environment and human health. Current ICEVs also have the problems of noise 
from vehicles adversely affecting human health, and the toxic effects of petroleum if 
mishandled. Although LCVs may avoid these issues of local pollution, they may 
contribute in different ways. For example, upstream emissions should still be 
considered in terms of their impacts of local pollution and alternative ICEV fuels 
may have significant particulate and non-GHG emissions impacts, as well as 
uncertain environmental impacts.  
 
Manufacturers  
Although the automobile industry in the UK is comparatively small and the country 
relies on imports from foreign manufacturers, it is well placed to expand as our 
vehicle fleet evolves. Many players in the UK automotive industry and supply chain 
believe that the UK has the opportunity to be a world leader in LCV technologies.  
 
1.2.2 Other Concerns of LCVs 
 
Changing the make-up and attributes of mobility and accessibility by introducing 
LCVs may bring about new concerns or extend existing ones. From a more 
forward-looking perspective, addressing these concerns and introducing 
sustainable solutions may prevent a replication of destructive western travel habits 
in some currently developing countries. 
 
Wider sustainability impacts  
Some aspects of LCV technologies may be unfeasible for long term use due to 
impacts on environment, society and economics. These concerns include nuclear 
safety and waste, resource extraction, habitat degradation and lifestyle choices.7 
                                               
7 See Literature Review Part A for more details. 
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Road safety and congestion. 
There were almost 2000 road deaths in the UK in 2012, the lowest figure since 
records began and the rate of road deaths per vehicle miles travelled has halved 
over the past decade (DfT, 2013a). Any replacement powertrain or fuel must be as 
safe, if not more so, for passengers, pedestrians and other road users, as at 
present. One concern is due to the lack of noise related to the EV to warn 
pedestrians (particularly those with hearing impediments), 8  and another is the safe 
handling of highly explosive H2. Further to this, with increasing numbers of cars on 
the roads, average speeds are decreasing, making journey times longer. For 
instance 19 seconds were lost per mile due to congestion in 2010 (CBI, 2012). 
Ways to avoid encouraging further congestion should be considered in LCV 
technology development. 
 
Economics  
In the UK, transport is the highest household expenditure (ONS, 2012) indicating 
the importance of transport and our dependence on it. Any substantial or too rapid 
change in how much it costs to own and run a vehicle may have an adverse impact 
on daily life, which if widespread, could disrupt the economy as we struggle to 
reallocate our spending or amend our travel habits. In addition, a large income to 
the UK government currently comes from duties on fuel and vehicles, and improved 
vehicle efficiency alone is expected to reduce government income in the region of 
1% of GDP pa by 2030 (CBI, 2012). This could require a substantial shift in tax 
burdens or contribute to further economic uncertainty and crisis. 
 
1.2.3 Alternative Policies 
 
The focus of this work is specifically on the replacement of conventional ICEV in the 
private passenger car fleet by LCVs to decarbonise the transport system in 
developed countries. The impact of non-passenger vehicles, used car markets, 
fleets and company car schemes will not be explicitly considered.9  
                                               
8 This may be in conflict with noise pollution concerns, so a careful balance must be sought. 
9  Although this restriction may appear distorting as fleet vehicle sales make up 
approximately 50% of new car sales, and used car sales make up approximately 70% of all 
sales (SMMT, 2013a), it is assumed that any benefits arising from LCV policies will help 
build the used car market and learning can be transferred to fleet related policies. Though 
there exists significant uncertainty regarding the residual values of new LCV technologies 
and markets it is clear that a strong used LCV demand is needed for high residual values 
that sustain the new LCV market (Element Energy, 2013). The implications of this will be 
briefly discussed in the model conclusions.  
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In developed countries like the UK, at the heart of transport carbon reduction policy 
is a desire to influence a change in travel and behaviour habits across the nation to 
reduce the amount we travel and choose alternative modes of transport when we 
do (DECC, 2009; 2011a; DfT, 2009b; EC, 2011). These so-called ‘softer’ policies 
are an important element to the wider context of transport decarbonisation (Gross 
et al, 2009) that this work does not directly address. As such, it is an assumption of 
this research that LCV policies divert no funding or resources away from these 
other legitimate policy options, particularly those detailed below. This may be a 
somewhat simplistic assumption as the policy objectives may be in competition, so 
the practicalities should be addressed in future research. 
 
Modal shift   
It is widely recognised that a move away from single occupancy vehicles towards 
public transport (buses, trains and ferries run on low carbon fuels), and active 
modes (walking and cycling) is an important part of decarbonising transport 
emissions. Evidence suggests that investment in public transport and infrastructure 
for active modes, leads to greater participation as public perceptions of 
convenience, utility and safety are raised (Atkins, 2009). Although it is difficult to 
determine the cost effectiveness of this policy option (Schroten et al., 2011), a 
recent UK project that improved travel awareness and planning in three towns led 
to a 9% reduction in car driver trips over a four year period (Sloman et al., 2010). 
 
ICT and land use planning 
Road transport emissions can be reduced by better use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) to plan traffic routes, manage congestion and 
introducing novel techniques such as Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) (Grant-
Muller and Usher, 2013). ICT can also be applied to encourage use and integration 
of alternative modes of travel, for example through the increasingly wide-spread 
provision of smartphone applications for route-planning, cycle hire and public 
transport information, or displaying environmental information to assist in decision 
making (Brazil and Caulfield, 2013).  
 
Eco-driving and maintenance 
Fuel consumption can be reduced by up to 20% by better driving styles and vehicle 
maintenance at a relative low abatement cost (Schade et al., 2011). Educating 
drivers on the importance of this and the most effective techniques, as well as 
introducing supportive technologies and understanding the impact of real-world 
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driving conditions (Ropkins et al., 2009), is already prevalent in business fleets, who 
have witnessed noticeable reductions in fuel use (DfT, 2009b). This does have 
implications to be managed regarding rebound effects as cost savings can translate 
into increased travel (Atkins, 2009).  
 
Reducing the need to travel 
Encouraging people to consider alternatives to making a trip of any sort may 
prevent hundreds of unnecessary journeys, and is one of the core areas considered 
in knowledge reviews of low carbon policies (Gross et al., 2009; Skinner et al., 
2011). For example, ICT can reduce the need to travel through teleconferencing 
facilities, internet shopping and home-working (DfT, 2009b). Though this has 
potential benefits of increased social inclusion for groups with mobility difficulties, 
care should be taken to avoid further social isolation for those without internet 
access and a decline in important face-to-face human relationships (Kenyon et al., 
2002). 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The overarching objective of this research was to investigate an approach to 
modelling LCV uptake policies, which incorporates an ethical framework that 
identifies distributional impacts. Sub-objectives in achieving this were to: 
 
1. Evaluate current and projected LCV technologies and uptake policies;  
2. Examine and critique existing LCV uptake models; 
3. Develop arguments related to the associated distributive issues to LCV 
uptake and set out an ethical framework for LCV policy appraisal;  
4. Consider the permissibility of modelling in policy appraisal; 
5. Propose an alternative policy modelling and appraisal framework that 
integrates the findings of Objectives 1-4; 
6. Provide recommendations for LCV policy prescription. 
1.4 Learning Objectives 
To complement the above objectives, the following learning objectives were also 
required: 
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1. Develop skills and understanding in technological review, policy appraisal, 
modelling techniques and applied ethics, and; 
2. Develop case study examples by adapting system dynamic models to 
explore issues set out in the research objectives. 
1.5 Research Focus and Originality 
This research takes a unique inter-disciplinary approach integrating technological 
review, policy appraisal, modelling techniques and applied ethics. It contributes to 
policy development by proposing a novel approach to modelling LCV uptake 
policies that incorporates an ethical framework, aiding researchers, policy makers 
and automobile manufacturers. Although models of LCV uptake exist, there are no 
known studies that explicitly appreciate the wider ethical implications of findings in 
the way that is proposed in this research. Further to this, very few compare or 
combine supply and demand policies within the same study as is performed here. 
Drawing from the work carried out in this research, an improved policy appraisal 
framework has been proposed, which is transferable to other areas of public policy. 
In addition, this work will make an original contribution that will help advance 
philosophical discussion in the burgeoning fields of both climate and transport 
ethics, specifically regarding the practical aspects of policy making in relation to 
LCVs and modelling.  
1.6 Methodology 
What follows is a high level description of the methodological process carried out in 
order to achieve the objectives set out for this thesis, as presented in Figure 1.5. 
This is designed to give the reader an understanding of how the areas of work 
integrate and what methods were applied to carry out the necessary work. The 
strands of the research were carried out in parallel, and findings fed back into each 
to refine observations and methods. Furthermore, the skills and understanding of 
the multi-disciplinary areas of research also had to be developed in parallel. Thus, 
methodology has evolved throughout the research, culminating in the chapters 
presented later. Further details on specific methodologies are provided in the 
separate chapters. 
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Figure 1.5: Methodological overview 
 
The research commenced with a literature review that was required to build 
knowledge and develop skills in the four main disciplines of this research; 
technology, policy, modelling and ethics. To begin, the relative potential of different 
LCV technologies and barriers to their uptake were explored. Following this, 
policies that were being implemented to overcome uptake barriers were identified, 
and existing evidence based studies of such policies were reviewed. Scrutiny of 
policies led to the generic categorisation of policies using a deductive thematic 
analysis, allowing a more manageable assessment. This evaluation of technologies 
and policies elucidated the research gaps to focus on in the remainder of the 
research. Once the understanding of LCV technologies and policies was 
established, a literature review of modelling techniques and existing studies of LCV 
uptake was carried out. This involved detailed criticism of the studies in order to 
further refine the research focus and methods. Finally, understanding of ethics, 
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theories of distributional justice and equity in transport was acquired through 
literature review of philosophical material, providing a firm background for the 
development of the ethical framework. 
 
The implications of LCV technologies and policies were then considered from the 
point of view of distributional justice, in order to form the basic structure of 
arguments that create the ethical framework. Applying a philosophical approach, 
claims were explored by presenting logical arguments and drawing from 
established related work. The question of what is an appropriate practical approach 
to appraising policies for the uptake of low carbon vehicles was addressed. In 
answering this question, it was necessary to establish the issues of distributive 
justice that may arise from such policies, and an appropriate method of deciding 
which policies to implement. The issues of justice were addressed by defending two 
claims; 1) that coercive policies are permissible due to the harms of climate change, 
and 2) that there are special groups that require protection from these policies.  
Further to this, philosophical examination of the application and limitation of using 
models for policy appraisal was carried out. Once the ethical framework was 
established, it was felt that it would be further strengthened by evaluation of the 
approach being taken. Thus, a workshop and expert survey were arranged to 
establish what, if any, interdisciplinary consensus there may be on these issues. 
The outcomes of these were subjected to basic qualitative and quantitative 
analyses.  
 
As the focus of the research was to carry out policy modelling, a case study 
exploration exercise of a basic system dynamic model of LCV uptake was carried 
out while the basic ethical arguments were being established. There was a dual 
advantage in this in that basic modelling skills could be developed alongside 
establishing understanding of sensitivities of modelling and low carbon vehicle 
attributes. Being able to do this before the ethical framework was ready for 
implementation meant that more basic issues could be explored.  A simple model of 
LCV uptake, focusing on the demand side (and specifically customer interactions), 
which was discovered in the literature review, was adapted and expanded in order 
to do this. The model, which included ICEV and two pro-electric vehicles types, was 
calibrated to UK data and run over a time frame of 40 years. Two policies of 
interest, subsidies and manufacturer regulation, were subjected to initial sensitivity 
testing in this model, looking at the impacts on carbon emissions, vehicle sales, 
government spending and revenue. 
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The findings from the first case study then led to the development of a second case 
study. In this case study another existing model, which was based in California and 
also identified in the literature review, was chosen for development. In order to 
account for the distributional impacts highlighted within the fully established ethical 
framework, a key requirement of this model was to be able to have within the model 
some indication of segments of society. In Case Study Two, vehicles (ICEV and 
three pro-electric models) are available in four segment sizes (from extra small to 
large). An approach was taken that these size segments are proxies for income, so 
this model could be used to explore the impacts of LCV policies on specific 
segments of society, which particularly included the poorest. A further advantage 
compared to the first case study was the inclusion within the model of detailed 
manufacturer regulations which were identified in literature review and framework 
evaluation as being a policy to explore. Specific scenarios of subsidies and 
manufacturer regulations were developed and tested within the ethical framework 
through impact on carbon emission and opportunity for car ownership. 
 
Finally, findings from the literature review, the development and evaluation of the 
ethical framework, and from both case studies were then fully integrated in order to 
make recommendations for policies and to propose an alternative methodology for 
policy appraisal.   
 
The remainder of this thesis reflects this methodological process, and is set out as 
follows, and described in Figure 1.6.  
 Chapter Two is the literature review of relevant studies to provide further 
background and identify research gaps relevant to this research. This is 
divided into four parts, covering technology, policy, modelling and ethics.  
 There are two parts to Chapter Three. In the first, an ethical framework for 
LCV policy appraisal is established. Issues of distributive justice relating to 
climate change, car ownership and the impact on the worst-off are explored, 
defending two claims. Arguments are presented for the permissible use of 
modelling in policy prescriptions. The second part presents descriptive 
results from a survey and workshop of experts in the field of low carbon 
vehicles across the disciplines of technology, ethics and policy that was 
carried out to evaluate the ethical framework.  
 Chapter Four is the first case study of LCV uptake. This is a simple model 
that explores basic sensitivities and attributes to help build skills and 
understanding.  
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 The second case study is presented in Chapter Five. It is more complex 
than the first case study and incorporates the ethical framework developed 
in Chapter Three, as policies on both supply and demand sides are 
modelled, with a proxy indicator of impact on the poor through changes in 
purchase cost in vehicle segments. 
 Finally, Chapter Six is the Conclusion. This brings together the discussions 
held in each Chapter. A proposal for an improved modelling approach that 
incorporates the ethical framework is presented, as well as advice to policy 
makers and suggestions for future work. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Chapter overview 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This Chapter is divided into five sections. The first four cover each element that 
forms the foundation of this interdisciplinary research. The conclusions from each 
are then brought together in the final section that sets out the research gaps and 
objectives. This review establishes that the period of study is limited to the near to 
mid-term, and as such focuses on pro-electric vehicles. Five generic policies for 
LCV uptake are identified and existing models of LCV uptake are explored. The 
findings show that there are none with explicit consideration of distributional 
impacts, and few that compare policies on the supply and demand sides. Literature 
on ethics and equity in transport reveals that there is little philosophical dialogue 
related to transport, and no previous work related to LCVs, though it is discussed 
more fully from a sociological viewpoint.  
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PART A: TECHNOLOGIES AND FUELS 
2A.1   Overview 
 
This section summarises the main Low Carbon Vehicle (LCV) technology and fuel 
options currently being researched, trialled or developed. In order to reduce 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (and address other drivers discussed in the 
introduction Chapter), the conventionally-fuelled Internal Combustion Engine 
Vehicle (cICEV) must be made more fuel efficient or replaced by an Alternative Fuel 
Vehicle (AFV). 
 
The conventional fuels for ICEV10  are petrol or diesel, derived from crude oil. 
Alternatives that may be used (with some engine modifications) are other 
combustible hydrocarbon liquids and gases. This includes natural or synthetic gas 
and its derivatives or biofuels produced from plants and waste materials. The 
alternative powertrain to an ICE is the electric motor. Electric Vehicles (EV) can be 
powered by either a rechargeable electric battery (Battery Electric Vehicle - BEV) or 
a hydrogen fuel cell (HFCV). These are also termed Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEV), 
as they do not have tailpipe emissions when in operation. It should be noted, 
however, that this term is misleading, as there are still emissions related to the 
generation of the electricity or hydrogen, as well as to the production and 
dismantling of the vehicle itself. Additionally, we currently have on our roads hybrid 
electric vehicles (HEV), which have both electric motors and ICE, some of which 
can be plugged in to charge the battery (PiHEV). Figure 2.1 shows predictions for 
changes in sales of these technologies up to 2050. 
 
These alternative fuels and technologies are not new. For example, it is widely 
known that the diesel ICE was designed to be run on peanut oil, the electric vehicle 
(EV) was a market leader at the turn of the 20th century (Struben and Sterman, 
2008), steam powered cars held early land speed records (Riley, 2004) and a 
number of other alternative ICEV fuels emerged following the 1973-74 oil embargo.  
                                               
10 Note the distinction between the generic ICEV (that may be fuelled by various fuels) and 
the specific cICEV which is only fuelled by petrol or diesel. Where ICE is used this 
refers to the powertrain itself rather than as part a vehicle. 
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Figure 2.1: Predicted sales of passenger car technologies to 2050 (IEA, 2012a, p.443) 
TOP:  Capped 4
o
C rise scenario of existing and upcoming policies  
BOTTOM: Capped 2
o
C rise scenario with technological improvements 
2A.2 The Internal Combustion Engine 
The Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) has dominated road transport for over a 
century. It was originally derived from the steam engine, and its fundamental 
operation has had little change over time (van Basshuysen and Schafer, 2004). In 
an ICE, rotational motion is created by pistons driving a crankshaft. The pistons 
operate through a four-stroke cycle powered by combustion of a fuel in compressed 
hot air. There are two types of ICE, Spark Ignition (SI) and Compression. SI 
engines are fuelled by petrol, and operate at a constant volume with combustion 
ignited by a spark generated in the engine. Diesel fuels the compression engine, 
which operates at constant pressure and a higher compression ratio than SI 
engines, relying on auto-ignition of the fuel. These differences are due to differing 
chemical properties of the two fuels that determine the fuel’s characteristics such as 
compression, knock resistance, density and combustion. Therefore, each has 
provided different opportunities for engine optimisation and efficiency. 
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2A.2.1 Conventional ICE Fuels 
 
The dominant vehicle fuels at present are petrol for an SI engine (commonly known 
as gasoline in the USA) and diesel for the compression engine. Both fuels are 
widely available at filling stations across the world. There are almost 9000 in the 
UK, and 98% of postcodes are within a 10 minute drive time of one (Deloitte, 2012). 
Depending on the size of the vehicle a typical range is between 300 and 600 miles, 
with diesel vehicles being slightly higher due to higher energy content and better 
fuel efficiency.  
 
Both Petrol and Diesel engines produce harmful emissions that are sent directly 
into the atmosphere as a result of the combustion process. The emissions include 
CO2, CO, NOx, unburnt hydrocarbons (HCs) and particulate matter (PM). Current 
legislation and new fleet averages are shown in Table 2.1. In the UK the current 
split of conventional fuelled ICEV on our roads is generally accepted as 70% petrol 
to 30% diesel, though a recent study suggests that this is closer to 60:40 (Tate, 
2010). New car sales of diesels are now just over 50% of market share (SMMT, 
2013a), and this is reflected in the fact that petrol sales have fallen at around 5% 
per annum since 2005 whilst diesel sales have grown around 1.5% pa (DECC, 
2013b).  It is likely that this shift towards Diesel has been partly due to its better fuel 
economy during a period of rapidly rising fuel prices, and also a growing public 
awareness of its lower GHG emissions coupled with increasing climate conscience. 
 
GHG 
EU legislation (EURO 5)
a                     
g/km (tailpipe) 
UK fleet new car average
c
                     
g/km (tailpipe) 
Diesel Petrol Diesel Petrol 
CO2
 
130 by 2015
b  
and 95 by 2020
b 
133.1
d
 
CO 0.5 1.0 0.22 0.36 
NOx 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.03 
HC 0.05 0.1 0.01 0.03 
PM 0.005 0.005 0.001 Negligible 
Table 2.1: ICEV emissions11  
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 
a
(EC, 2007), 
b
(EC, 2009a), 
c
(VCA, 2011), 
d
(SMMT, 2013a). CO2 is a fleet average, all 
others are per vehicle. 
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Low Carbon cICEV 
Carbon emissions from cICEV have been reduced since EU legislation was 
introduced in the early 1990’s (Andrews, 2009). Non-carbon emissions have also 
been drastically reduced due to the introduction of unleaded petrol and the advent 
of emission controls such as catalytic convertors, three way catalysts and 
particulate traps (Riley, 2004). In addition, cICEV emissions continue to be reduced 
through increasing fuel efficiency of the vehicle or producing cleaner burning fuels. 
Incremental powertrain improvements, as set out in Table 2.2, have the potential to 
increase overall efficiency by up to 30% in the short term (King, 2007).  
 
Technology 
Efficiency 
Saving (%) 
Cost per 
vehicle (£) 
Direct injection and lean burn 10-13 200-400 
Variable valve actuation 5-7 175-250 
Downsizing engine capacity  10-15 150-300 
Dual clutch transmission 4-5 400-600 
Stop-start 3-4 100-200 
Stop-start with regenerative breaking 7 350-450 
Electric motor assist 7 1000 
Reduced mechanical friction components 3-5 Negligible 
Lightweighting chassis 10 250-500 
Low rolling resistance tyres 2-4 50-100 
Improved aerodynamics 2-4 unknown 
Table 2.2: Technologies to improve ICE fuel efficiency (King, 2007) 
 
Fuel efficiency can be increased through either engine or chassis improvements, 
both of which lead to less fuel being used thus reducing the associated emissions. 
Many improvements in the combustion efficiency of fuel can be made through 
engine control modifications such as variable valve timings and direct injection. 
Other improvements can be made in thermal efficiency and friction losses. 
Efficiency improvements can lead to downsizing of vehicles, but may also lead to 
undesired effects such as increased vehicles miles travelled. The new techniques 
are often highly computerised, making engine maintenance more difficult. Further 
improvements can be made through modifying the vehicle with after-treatments in 
the exhaust, reducing weight and frictional drag (e.g. aerodynamics and tyre 
resistance), and through the application of soft hybrid technologies, such as 
regenerative breaking. These improvements have cross over with AFVs, which 
could also benefit from requiring less energy to drive the vehicle forward. Finally, 
conventional fuels can be further cleaned by processing and refining crude oil with 
improved methods to produce fuels with more efficient compositions for 
combustion, and free of impurities (Lane, 2006). 
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2A.2.2 Alternative ICE Fuels 
 
A number of alternative fuels are being used in the ICE today. Although there is lots 
of potential for emission reduction, as will be explored in the following sections 
there are many problems to overcome. Together these mean more expensive 
vehicles, with often reduced utilities compared to cICEV. These problems include: 
 Reduced energy content compared to conventional fuels; 
 Lack of supportive infrastructure for delivery and storage;  
 Modifications to the engine required due to chemical properties, and; 
 Environmental and safety impacts, in both production and use. 
 
Biofuels 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) predict under their “BLUE Map” scenario 
that 27% of transport energy will come from biofuels by 2050 (IEA, 2011). Biofuels 
are currently the most used alternative ICEV fuel across the world, with many 
countries having in place mandates or targets for biofuel blends in their cICEV fuels 
(IEA, 2011). As such, global production of biofuels in 2011 was almost 60 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) (BP, 2012) growing rapidly over the previous decade 
(from around 10mtoe). North America is the highest producing region, and globally 
bioethanol production dominates that of biodiesel.  
 
There are various types of biofuels, depending on feedstock and production (Singh, 
2011). First generation are those which are prepared from a biomass that is usually 
part of a food chain, forming bio-ethanol from sugars, starches and cellulose. 
Common examples of these are wheat, corn or sugarbeet. Second generation 
biofuels can be prepared from cellulosic non-food crops, such as waste products 
(e.g. wood chippings, municipal waste or cooking oil), and can produce alcohols or 
synthetic fuels (notably bio-diesel) using advanced technologies. Conventional 
biofuels are first generation bioethanol, and some second generation biodiesel and 
biogas. Finally, the newest of biofuels are 3rd generation, formed from algae. In 
addition to the advantage that algae is not a food crop, it has a number of other 
potential benefits, as it can grow on marginal non-agricultural land, absorb 
significant quantities of CO2 (e.g. from power stations or industrial processes), and 
purify water. Algae are also extremely fast growing and a high yield crop for 
biodiesel, with great potential for scale up to industrial quantities. However, it 
requires abundant quantities of sun or synthetic light and is not yet commercially 
viable (Campbell, 2008). 
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Biofuels are thought to have substantially lower GHG emissions than petrol or 
diesel on a life cycle basis (Scacchi et al., 2010) as CO2 is captured in the growth 
phase. As such, it is envisaged that biofuels could contribute 20% of transport 
emissions savings by 2050 (IEA, 2011). However, there is much uncertainty due to 
the effects of indirect land use change (RFA, 2008) and because life cycle 
emissions are dependent on the production process (MacLean and Lave, 2003). 
This uncertainty is demonstrated in Figure 2.2, which also suggests that some 
forms of biofuel may actually lead to an increase in emissions compared to 
conventional fuels.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Lifecycle GHG balance of biofuels (IEA, 2011, p.16)12 
 
Biofuels are renewable, can potentially provide energy security to individual 
countries, and are generally less toxic than conventional fuels (Singaram, 2009). 
However, despite this, there are a number of negative effects of biofuels on long 
term sustainability. These include the direct effects of degradation of habitats and 
local environment, the societal impact on labourers, and of most concern are the 
human rights regarding food security and changes in land use (NCB, 2011). 
Additionally the land area required to grow enough crops to replace all transport 
fuels would be significant (MacKay, 2008). These concerns are mainly (though not 
exclusively) related to first generation biofuels. The Gallagher Review (RFA, 2008) 
concluded that there is a future for biofuels in the UK but we shouldn’t aim for more 
than 5.75% of supply until more sustainable processing technologies are widely 
available.  
 
                                               
12 The assessments exclude emissions from indirect land-use change. Emission reductions 
of more than 100% (i.e. leading to negative emissions, or carbon absorption) are 
possible through use of co-products. Bio-SG: Bio-synthetic gas, BtL: biomass to liquids, 
FAME: fatty acid methyl esters, HVO: hydrogenated vegetable oil. 
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Biofuels tend to have a lower energy content (around 20-30MJ/l) than petrol or 
diesel (30-40MJ/l), leading to less power and lower ranges than cICEV (Singh, 
2011). The costs associated with biofuels are concerning, with carbon abatement 
costs predicted to be in the region of 80 - 600 £/tCO2e (set against an appraisal 
price of £87/tCO2e), and the cost to UK motorists by 2020 in meeting EU 
obligations (10% of transport energy from renewable sources) is predicted to be 
around £1.3b/year (Bailey, 2013).   
 
All biofuels are subject to the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO), which 
has evolved since it entered into force in 2008, and EU Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) (DfT, 2012b). Currently, large fuel suppliers in the UK must have 
5% by volume of their road transport fuel as biofuels in 2013/14 and meet up to 
25% of this obligation with Renewable Transport Fuels Certificates (RTFCs) or pay 
into buy-out funds. Under the RED, biofuels must achieve at least a 35% GHG 
emission savings (compared to conventional fuels) and not be made from land with 
high biodiversity value or materials with high carbon stock. From the introduction of 
the RTFO in April 2008 to April 2013, over 7 billion litres of biofuels have been 
supplied in the UK and 4 billion RTFCs have been issued.13 The proportion of 
bioethanol has increased over time, as have the percentage from the UK and the 
GHG savings.  
 
Gaseous Fuels 
Hydrogen gas, Natural Gas (NG) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) can all be 
used to fuel modified spark ignition ICEV with potentially lower carbon emissions 
than petrol. The first attempt to use an ICE for road transport was actually designed 
to be run on a Hydrogen/Oxygen mix (Eckermann, 2001). Nowadays, a standard 
ICEV can run on hydrogen gas with little modification though with some problems, 
including reduced power and embrittlement of iron in the combustion chamber 
(Andrews, 2009). There is a slightly higher thermal efficiency than for NG, and this 
has the advantage of no need for after-treatment with the only emission being water 
and trace amounts of hydrocarbons from the lubrication oil (Riley, 2004). Further 
information on Hydrogen as a fuel is provided in Section 2A.3.2. 
 
NG (mainly methane) and LPG (mainly propane) are hydrocarbon fuels with a lower 
carbon content than petrol and their gaseous forms ensure more complete 
                                               
13  Compiled by the author from DfT biofuel statistical releases available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-transport/series/biofuels-
statistics. 
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combustion. However, their “well-to-wheels” (WTW) GHG emissions are similar 
(Edwards et al., 2011). Most NG or LPG cars are dual-fuel operation that may also 
be fuelled by petrol. No dedicated vehicles are mass produced and many vehicles 
have been converted from regular petrol engines (Riley, 2004). Only 0.2% of 
licensed vehicles in the UK are fuelled by NG (DfT, 2012c). NG is utilised as 
compressed, liquefied or adsorbent natural gas. There are thought to be abundant 
reserves of methane, predicted to last up to 230 years at current rates (IEA, 2012b), 
and the supplies are evenly distributed across different nations (Yeh, 2007). There 
are currently around 16 million NG vehicles globally (ENGVA, 2012), and it is most 
widespread in Pakistan and Latin America, accounting for 70% and 25% of fleet 
respectively (EC, 2011a). LPG was the first mass produced alternative fuel (EC, 
2011a) and is already widely used, especially in heavy duty vehicles, and the UK 
saw a noticeable uptake by business with subsides introduced in the early 2000s. 
Since subsidies ended and due to a lack of infrastructure, many companies did not 
continue their use. In 2013 there were 1,500 forecourts selling LPG in the UK 
(NGC, 2013). LPG is most popular in Armenia where it accounts for up to 30% of 
vehicle fuels (IEA, 2010). 
2A.3   The Electric Motor 
An alternative to the ICE is the electric motor, which generates power through 
electro-magnetic fields – converting electrical energy into mechanical energy to 
create rotational motion for the vehicle’s wheels. Electric motors are already widely 
used in many applications (EC, 2011a). This is much more simple mechanically 
than the ICE but requires a more complex operating system for the vehicle (Riley, 
2004), though ICEV is becoming increasingly more electrified. The electrical current 
for the motor can be obtained by onboard electro-chemical batteries or fuel cells. 
The former will require re-charging from grid electricity, whereas the latter is 
powered by hydrogen. Technically these are not ‘fuels’ but energy carriers.  
 
Development of electric vehicles (EV) began at the same time as the ICEV, and it 
was a market leader at the turn of the 20th century (Struben and Sterman, 2008). 
However, despite its advantages over the ICEV in ease of operation, quietness, 
cleanliness and power transmission, ICEV secured the dominant position in the 
early 20th century as it was less expensive, fuel was more readily available, had a 
longer range, and also gained a reputation as being more ‘manly’ than the then EV 
(men were the majority of early adopters) (Mom, 2004). Over the past century, 
there were many EV ventures, none of which achieved more than a niche market 
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position before eventually failing. There were particular periods of interest during 
the two world wars as ICEV were commandeered for the war effort, the 50’s and 
60’s as electricity became more widely available and environmental conscience 
more prevalent then in the 70’s due to the oil crisis. As no GHG or local pollution 
emissions are produced on board EVs, and they do not necessarily rely on fossil 
fuels (though this is dependent on electricity source), interest has been renewed in 
recent years. Currently, there are over 320 R,D &D projects, with nearly  €2b of 
funding, related to EVs in the EU alone (Zubaryeva and Thiel, 2013). 
 
2A.3.1 Battery Electric Vehicles 
 
A Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) has an on-board battery, which is rechargeable 
through an external electricity supply, to power the electric motor. As such, although 
there are no emissions at the point of vehicle use, upstream emissions associated 
with operation from the electricity supply are dependent upon power generation 
mix. As we move towards a decarbonised or decentralised electricity supply, this 
should become less of a problem. For example, a carbon intensity of 300g 
CO2/kWh (similar to a gas power station) could save 10tCO2 over a lifetime of a 
vehicle compared to cICEV, whereas the same vehicle with an extreme carbon 
intensity of 600gCO2/kWh (similar to coal power plants) would actually increase 
emissions by about the same amount (ITF, 2011a).  
 
Typically, BEVs have a range of up to 100 miles on a full charge of 6-8 hours at 
present. This is a major disadvantage when compared to cICEV, and causes ‘range 
anxiety’14  for drivers, especially when considering the current lack of available 
recharging infrastructure. The BEV therefore is not a direct replacement for the 
ICEV as it would require a change in driver behaviour and practises. Although the 
range would be within a usual daily commute, and cars are often idle overnight 
when they can be charged, those without off-street parking or atypical driving 
patterns may be disadvantaged. Other options to overcome this are fast charge 
technology or battery swapping. Fast chargers can cut recharge time to between 1 
and 3 hours, and there were nearly 2,000 installed in the UK by 2013, but they are 
not generally suitable for home charging. Rapid charge, of up to 80% of the battery 
in 15 minutes to an hour, is being increasingly introduced but is expensive and the 
long term impact on battery life is uncertain (Rowney and Straw, 2013). A final 
                                               
14 “The fear people have about the distance an EV can drive and the concern that the range 
may not be enough to reach their destination.” (SMMT, 2011) 
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option for charging is in-motion wireless charging, which allows battery charging 
through inductive coils under the road surface, but several challenges exist for this 
including technological development and health and safety risks, as well as the 
infrastructural requirement for road electrification (Wu et al., 2011). This is the most 
immature and uncertain option for charging. Battery swap is an alternative to 
charging, but faces problems of safety (particularly in the transfer process) and 
compatibility with different manufacturers approach to battery placement. Although 
this option is favoured by a leading US electric vehicle firm, Tesla, who offer a 90 
second battery swap (Rogowsky, 2013), there are concerns over economic 
feasibility following the bankruptcy of the leading swap station provider (Steinberg, 
2013). Another issue to be explored further is understanding the impact that 
charging will have on the electricity grid, as no new generation capacity is expected 
for at least twenty years, due to construction timelag (EC, 2011a). As such, there is 
much research being carried out to understand this impact and drivers’ charging 
habits, such as the EA Technology “I2EV” project.15  
 
The other major barrier to BEV adoption is its relatively high purchase cost 
compared to an ICEV counterpart. This is due largely to the cost of batteries. As 
such, developing a battery which is both small and light enough to fit in a passenger 
car and provide enough power to the motor to allow comparable speeds and range 
has been the focus of much research and the greatest advance has been in the use 
of lithium ion batteries (EC, 2011a). Rechargeable batteries have been in 
development for over 150 years, but it has only been in recent times that they have 
become suitable for mass production of BEVs (Larminie and Lowry, 2012). Newer 
battery materials, including nickel, lithium or sodium, have a large range of specific 
power and energy (IEA, 2012a). More recent experimental developments include 
metal-air batteries which are non-rechargeable but instead electrodes are changed, 
giving a potentially similar range for BEV to cICEV (Yang and Knickle, 2002).  
 
Assuming that it is likely that battery technology will continue to develop, cost 
reductions would be expected. As this occurs, new challenges are likely to develop, 
such as improving battery life time and supply chain issues. Most notably, 
limitations in raw materials may be a major limitation to EV production. Though 
natural reserves (e.g. Lithium) should be sufficient until recycling techniques are 
improved or alternative materials are developed (EC, 2011a), concerns remain over 
potential exploitation of countries where these natural resources are located. 
                                               
15 
Known commercially as ‘My Electric Avenue’: http://myelectricavenue.info/ 
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Nevertheless, automobile manufacturers are taking the opportunity to capture the 
BEV market as early as possible, with a number of models becoming available. 
Manufacturers have opted for different approaches to capturing the market. For 
example, Renault reduce purchase cost by leasing the battery to the customer 
separately and Nissan have produced a high-end specification BEV to specifically 
attract early adopters of technology. 
 
2A.3.2  Hydrogen Fuel Cell 
 
Hydrogen is the most abundant element in the universe and has a very high energy 
density. In its chemical reaction with oxygen it creates only energy and water 
vapour. This makes hydrogen an attractive prospect as a clean fuel. However, as 
hydrogen is very reactive, it does not exist naturally on its own, and requires a great 
deal of energy to release it from any compound. The hydrogen fuel cell, shown in 
Figure 2.3, was invented in the mid 19th century and creates an electric current by 
chemically combining hydrogen and oxygen. There is a wide range of fuel cell types 
with great potential as an energy device, though only low temperature Proton 
Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells are suitable for vehicles (Pistoia, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Hydrogen fuel cell (Larminie and Lowry, 2012, p.90)  
 
Numerous barriers exist in the commercial viability of Hydrogen Fuel Cell Electric 
Vehicles (HFCV). As such, there are currently only prototype vehicles in production, 
even though the first was built in the early 1990s (Sperling and Cannon, 2004). 
Most automobile manufacturers have produced demonstration models, and the 
Honda FCX Clarity was introduced in small numbers for leasing (not purchase) in 
California and Japan in 2008, though is not yet mass produced. HFCVs have a 
similar performance and range to cICEV, increasing its attractiveness to drivers. 
When first introduced, purchase cost is expected to be high. This is due to the 
manufacturing costs of fuel cells, accounting for almost half the predicted costs of a 
HFCV (Martin; et al., 2010).  
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The more prevalent barrier for HFCV (and Hydrogen ICEV) is the lack of an 
established hydrogen economy with low cost and low carbon hydrogen production, 
transport and storage. This ‘hydrogen economy’ is unlikely to emerge before 2030 
(IEA, 2012a). The production of hydrogen requires large amounts of energy from 
electricity, making its place as a low carbon fuel reliant on a decarbonised electrical 
network. Currently most hydrogen is produced from hydrocarbons (usually natural 
gas, but also other fossil fuels or biomass) or through electrolysis of water. This is 
not an efficient use of the resources as more CO2 would be produced in the 
production of hydrogen from natural gas than if it were burnt directly, or from the 
electricity required in electrolysis (Riley, 2004).  There is currently a lot of research 
being given to the latter using solar cells – zero carbon photolytic splitting of water 
to create hydrogen. At present there is a very large spread in WTW energy and 
GHG balance between hydrogen production pathways (Edwards et al., 2011). 
 
Although hydrogen can be delivered at filling stations in a similar method to petrol 
or diesel, there is no transportation infrastructure. Southern California has a small 
refuelling network and by 2013 the UK had only one station, though refuelling at 
home may be an option. Storage of hydrogen also remains to be a problem. In a 
gas phase it occupies a lot of space, so the energy required to store it at reduced 
volumes is up to 40% of the energy content of hydrogen itself (DuPont, 2010). This 
requires storage at higher pressures or in larger tanks than conventional fuels. 
These issues may be overcome by onboard reforming of hydrocarbons or water 
electrolysis, but these technologies are still relatively immature. There are also a 
number of safety concerns and perceptions regarding transport and storage of 
hydrogen, as it is so reactive. One of the reasons for this is the relative low ignition 
energy of 20mJ, compared to that of petrol which is 240mJ (Foley, 2001). 
2A.4  Hybrid Electric Vehicles 
As a bridge between ICEV and BEV, there are a number of Hybrid Electric Vehicles 
(HEV) on our roads. These reduce the range anxiety associated with BEV and 
allow familiarisation with new technologies, having both an ICE fuelled by 
conventional fuels and an electric motor powered by a battery. Although these 
vehicles require more power as they tend to be heavier than other vehicles, 
reduced tailpipe emissions are realised due to the times when the car is driven by 
the electric motor, and the application of soft hybrid technologies (such as 
regenerative breaking and stop/start). Types of HEV in comparison to the ICEV and 
BEV, are shown in Figure 2.4. 
32 
  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Schematics of vehicle types (OLEV, 2011, p.13) 
 
The dominant, conventional, hybrid vehicle is the parallel hybrid, where either the 
electric motor or ICE can deliver power to the wheels through a mechanical 
transmission. There are a number of commercially available full hybrids, including 
the Toyota Prius, which was released in 1997 and is now the biggest selling car in 
California (Ohnsman, 2013) and has achieved over 5 million sales worldwide 
(Toyota, 2013). The battery is charged by the ICE and when it has enough charge it 
can direct the motor to drive the vehicle. Due to the size of the battery this is usually 
just at low speeds and for short distances, such as in urban driving. The more 
sophisticated hybrid operating systems power and efficiency can be optimised by 
drawing from both the motor and ICE in accordance with driving conditions 
(Larminie and Lowry, 2012).  
 
Recently there has been the introduction of the Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle 
(PiHEV), where the battery can also be charged through an external supply, similar 
to a BEV. This means that further fuel efficiencies and emission reductions may be 
realised, reducing dependence on fuel. For example, if a PiHEV is charged every 
night and short journeys are typical, refuelling may be very infrequent as the engine 
would only be used in longer journeys. Efficiencies of PiHEV are sensitive to the 
range of the battery (IEA, 2012a). 
 
In a series hybrid, which is less typical (Larminie and Lowry, 2012) the vehicle is 
only driven by an electric motor that can be powered by an ICE or an on board 
battery recharged from an external electrical supply. A variation on this that is 
commercially available is the Extended Range Electric Vehicle (EREV), the 
Vauxhall Ampere / Chevrolet Volt. In this, the motor is only powered by the battery, 
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which in turn may be recharged externally or by an ICE generator. It has a larger 
battery than other PiHEV, with a pure electric range of 40 miles, and can operate as 
a pure electric vehicle, series hybrid or parallel hybrid, depending on driving 
conditions (Larminie and Lowry, 2012).  
 
As hybrid vehicles essentially have two powertrains (and operating systems), this 
makes them heavier than their ICEV or EV counterparts. This extra weight requires 
more energy to power the vehicle forward. This means that a small, light fuel-
efficient ICEV, which requires much less energy, could be more fuel efficient and 
have lower emissions (and likely a lower overall environmental impact as it is 
simpler and requires fewer raw materials). Such considerations need to be 
appreciated when developing new technologies, and will be addressed in the case 
studies of this research.  
2A.5  Other Technologies 
There are a number of other technology options that are being developed by niche 
manufacturers as concept cars but are not considered further in this research.  
Examples of these are the Jaguar C-X75 (Jaguar, 2013), which has a separate 
electric motor for each wheel and the batteries are driven by diesel fuelled gas 
turbines rather than an ICE, and the novel fuel ‘liquid air’ which is already used 
extensively in industrial applications (CLCF, 2013; Lewis, 2013). This is air that has 
been cryogenically cooled into a liquid that then drives an engine as the liquid heats 
up and expands into a gas. There are also some BEVs being developed with 
integrated solar panels to charge the battery but it is limited by the development of 
solar cell technology, and reliability of solar radiation, meaning that it may only be 
realistic as an auxiliary power source (Giannouli and Yianoulis, 2012). 
2A.6  Comparative Emissions 
From the point of view of this research, the driving interest is the reduction of the 
overall amount of GHG emissions associated with our passenger cars. The 
alternative technologies and fuels discussed here have potential for lower GHG 
emissions than cICEV related to their operation. This includes WTW emissions 
(both tailpipe and fuel production), as well as those related to vehicle production 
and disposal. Actual emissions are dependent on various technology and policy 
pathways that also include behavioural change. McKinsey (2009) suggest a 
potential abatement of 50% of 2005 emissions by 2030, shown in Figure 2.5. As is 
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seen against the no-action baseline, although behavoirial changes and low carbon 
fuels can make signficant reductions on WTW emissions technological change is 
required to reduce emissions from current levels. This can account for half of 
abated emissions by 2010 and over 70% by 2030. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Potential abatement from vehicle technologies (McKinsey, 2009, p.6) 
 
There have been numerous studies to determine WTW emissions, and there is a 
large variety in the findings. An overview of the variation of some estimates has 
been compiled and is shown in Figure 2.6. These studies consider present or near 
future technologies, in terms of GHG or CO2eq, with comparisons of more than one 
fuel/technology and most were based on single mid-sized vehicles. Variations are 
due to the variety of assumptions and methods employed, but not all studies were 
explicit in their methodologies to all the relevant factors. This makes it difficult to 
explain the ranges in detail or draw comparisons and a complex meta-analysis of 
these studies is beyond the scope of this research. This is why there is such a large 
range evident in Figure 2.6, for instance Hydrogen ICEV has a range of 300 
gGHG/km (though only over three studies).  
 
Some general reasons for this are nation specific data (e.g. on energy mix/fuel 
production, fuel feedstock, fuel efficiency, age and use), determination of emissions 
through standard drive cycles or real world tests, data units (e.g. GHG, CO2, C, 
CO2eq), wider objectives of study (e.g. life cycle analysis, economics) and size or 
age of vehicle used. For instance, Beer and Grant (2007) considered just bio-
ethanol and had twenty six variations from just three feedstocks (wheat, molasses 
and woodwaste) and emissions varied between 42 and 1,469 gGHG/km. A mean 
average has been added to the graph to give a feel for the comparison between 
fuels and technologies, but should not be taken as definitive as any weighting 
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variables are not accounted for. It would suggest that the alternative fuels and 
technologies are low carbon compared to cICEV, and that BEV currently is the 
greatest prospect for reducing emissions. Though in considering this, it is important 
to remember the variation that was found in the studies. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Previous studies of vehicle WTW GHG emissions.16 
 
 
Vehicle manufacture and scrappage emissions should also be included in order to 
consider the whole vehicle life cycle. This was covered in a number of the previous 
studies, but not all. It is not within the scope of this project to produce a Life Cycle 
Assessment (LCA) of GHG emissions for each of these technologies/fuels. 
However, the results of two recent UK-based studies by Element Energy and 
Ricardo considering life cycle emissions for passenger car technologies are 
presented in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8.  
                                               
16 Compiled by author from the following studies: (a) Baptista et al. (2010); (b) Beer and 
Grant (2007); (c) BERR/DfT (2008); (d) Funk and Rabl (1999); (e) Gao and Winfield (2012); 
(f) Hekkert et al. (2005); (g) Ma et al. (2012); (h) MacLean and Lave (2003); (i) Michaelis 
and Davidson (1996); (j) Samaras and Meisterling (2008); (k) Schafer et al. (2006); (l) 
Stanciulescu and Fleming (2006); (m) van Vliet et al. (2010); (n) Wagner et al. (2006); (o) 
Yan and Crookes (2010). For biofuels, the studies presented numerous feedstocks, 
processes and fuel contribution. Only the lowest emission is given for illustrative purposes. 
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Figure 2.7: Powertrain life cycle emissions17 (Element Energy, 2011, p.68) 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Powertrain life cycle emissions18
 
 (Ricardo, 2011, p.49) 
 
These studies would appear to be relatively consistent when taking into account the 
fact that Element Energy consider a partially decarbonised grid and Ricardo do not. 
They both suggest that BEVs have notably greater embedded emissions in 
production and dismantling than other vehicles, despite having less over a whole 
life. In fact BEV embedded emissions are 40% greater than cICEV. This indicates 
that life cycle savings potential of BEV are dependent on car use, and may be even 
more of a concern when taking into account uncertain battery lifetimes (both studies 
                                               
17  C&D segments including production and fuel, 2025, partially decarbonised grid, 
150,000km, 10 year lifetime. 
18 2015 roadmap projections, technology and fuel, including E10, B7 and 500gCO2kWh 
electricity, 150,000km mileage. 
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assumed the battery lasts the vehicle lifetime). These extra emissions are related to 
production of batteries, coming from extraction/processing of the raw materials and 
the manufacturing process. Interestingly, both studies report that there is little 
difference between BEV and PIHEV/EREV. This suggests that BEV may only have 
carbon reduction advantages once electricity is decarbonised. 
 
The difficulty of comparing studies has already been discussed regarding the WTW 
emissions. As an LCA takes into account production and dismantling in addition, 
there are further assumptions and data gathering issues that can further complicate 
study comparison. Thus, it would be a great advantage if a central body were to 
develop a standard method. Further to this, studies suggest that test-bed values 
often underestimate emissions compared to “real-world” testing, due to driving 
habits and traffic conditions (Hardy et al., 2010; Ropkins, 2009). The EU is 
developing a new test procedure based on real world emissions to replace the 
current standard test-bed drive cycle (JRC, 2013) and the RAC advocates a move 
towards LCA emission rating (Kay et al., 2013) One method, proposed by Ricardo 
(2011), which was used to calculate the data in Figure 2.8, is shown in Figure 2.9. 
This shows the many considerations to take place in each phase of a vehicle life 
cycle, including vehicle production, fuel production and distribution, how the vehicle 
is actually used, and vehicle disposal. For each point in these (condensed) lists, 
detailed justification and methodologies need to be carried out to calculate 
associated emissions and ensure accuracy and consistency. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Proposed considerations of a passenger vehicle life cycle emissions 
assessment (adapted by author from Ricardo, 2011) 
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2A.7   Abatement Costs 
Although there is abatement potential at low or negative cost through just 
efficiencies in cICEV (as summarised in 2A.2.1), the carbon abatement options with 
most emission reduction potential come at much higher costs. These costs are 
major barriers to adoption of new technology, as total costs of ownership and thus 
payback times are much greater for the consumer and high investment is needed 
from the manufacturer. McKinsey (2000), shown in Figure 2.10, found that 
efficiencies in conventional technologies achieve emission reduction at negative 
cost (i.e. savings outweigh benefits) whereas advanced technologies (PiHEV, EV, 
HFCV) could be at quite significant expense. Biofuels appear to be around cost 
neutral in both studies. Similar to the emissions accounting, costs are dependent 
upon methodologies used and aspects of the vehicle technologies that are 
assumed or considered. For instance, in a similar study by the IEA it was found that 
doubling the cost of oil has a significant impact on savings potential, and could 
more than halve the payback time for new technologies (IEA, 2009a). 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Abatement cost curve for passenger vehicle technologies (McKinsey, 
2009, p.9)19 
 
                                               
19 P1-1 refers to packages of increasing fuel efficiency. For more information see McKinsey 
(2009). 
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2A.8   Conclusion and Research Focus 
As has been laid out in this section, although there are many alternative fuels and 
technologies available, there is not one clear ‘winner’ when it comes to the 
introduction of LCVs.  Each option still has a number of barriers in technological 
development, infrastructural provision and/or competitive economics, as well as 
uncertainties around their emissions and other impacts on sustainability. In order to 
avoid the GHG emissions that will cause dangerous climate change, this transition 
must occur despite these concerns. As behavioural change is generally slow and 
the pace of technology development is uncertain, policies are required to stimulate 
both of these transitional barriers. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
technologies are summarised in Table 2.3.Only H2ICEV, BEV and HFCV can 
potentially be ‘zero carbon’,20 though biofuels could have substantially lower WTW 
GHG emissions than current cICEV at a much lower cost than the newer 
technologies. 
 
First generation biofuels are already contributing to the fuel supply, but are unlikely 
to become a dominant fuel in the long term. This is due to land resource 
constraints, ethical implications of the use of food crops/land and although biofuels 
have lower WTW emissions than fossil fuels, they still have similar levels of tailpipe 
emissions, which should be avoided. However, they do fulfil a necessary 
component of the transition whilst travel behaviours alter and other technologies 
mature. Second and third generation biofuels, which overcome some of the ethical 
issues of first generation biofuels, should continue to be developed in the medium 
term and take increasing proportions of the fuel used in the ICEV. Natural Gas and 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas would only contribute marginally to carbon emissions 
reductions and resource security issues, and so should not occupy more than a 
niche position within the passenger vehicle market. This could be limited to regions 
with particular access to supplies over the medium term. Perhaps the only viable 
long term option for ICEV would be hydrogen, which is not yet available at low cost 
or low carbon, and has no supportive infrastructure. It is much more likely that if a 
viable ‘hydrogen economy’ developed it would be to support HFCV rather than 
ICEV. However, it may be that even if this is the case remaining ICEV in the fleet at 
the time could benefit and occupy a small proportion of passenger vehicles. 
                                               
20
 Though tailpipe emissions will be zero it is highly unlikely any vehicle could ever be zero 
carbon considering the overall manufacturing process. Also, renewable energy sources 
are likely to have embedded emissions somewhere in their lifecycle. 
40 
  
Table 2.3: Vehicle technologies comparison 
 
                                               
21 Illustrative ‘Well to Wheels’ GHG from studies presented in Figure 2.6. 
 FUEL 
WTW21 
gGHG/ km  
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
In
te
rn
a
l 
C
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s
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o
n
 E
n
g
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e
 
Petrol 168-333 
Current market leader 
that drivers are 
accustomed to, high 
range and relatively 
cheap to own and run. 
High GHG emissions and local 
pollution, use of fossil fuels 
which are non-renewable and 
increasingly scarce.  
Diesel 128-266 
More fuel efficient so 
slightly cheaper to run 
than petrol, and lower 
GHG emissions. 
Higher non-GHG emissions 
and more expensive to 
purchase. 
NG 70-263 
Slightly lower GHG 
emissions than cICEV 
and more abundant fossil 
fuel than crude oil. 
Uncertain non-GHG emissions, 
no dedicated vehicles or 
fuelling structure, non-
renewable source. 
LPG 168-206 
Hydrogen 88-380 
No tailpipe emissions 
other than water, can 
work in cICEV 
Currently high energy needs for 
production of hydrogen, no 
delivery infrastructure and 
difficult to store. 
Biofuels 110-190 
Low GHG emissions due 
to CO2 capture in growth 
phrase. Could use waste 
products. Algae can be 
used in water purification. 
Could lead to resources 
security but dependent on 
land or waste availability. 
Uncertainty around real world 
emissions, concerns for 
sustainability due to land use 
change and competition with 
food crops.  Unknown local 
pollution impact. 
E
le
c
tr
ic
 M
o
to
r 
Electricity 69-208 
No tailpipe emissions, 
cheap to run. Reduced 
noise pollution (though 
this may also cause 
safety problems). 
High purchase cost. GHG 
emission reductions dependent 
on electricity mix and battery 
production. Requires change in 
driving behaviours due to 
limited range, no recharging 
infrastructure, and long 
recharging times. Battery 
materials may be 
unsustainable.  
H2 Fuel 
Cell 
57-230 
No tailpipe emissions 
other than water, similar 
attributes to ICEV. 
High energy needs for 
production of hydrogen, no 
delivery infrastructure and 
difficult to store. Not yet mass 
produced, but likely to be 
expensive. Resource security 
and sustainability dependent 
on feedstocks, and fuel cell 
materials. 
H
y
b
ri
d
 
Standard 92-230 
More fuel efficient so 
reduced GHG emissions 
and running costs 
compared to ICEV.   
Dependent on fossil fuels. 
Heavier than ICEV so requires 
more energy. PiHEV may still 
have long recharge times for 
battery, and emissions 
dependant on electricity 
production. Higher purchase 
cost than the ICEV. 
Plug-in 106-180 
Small pure electric ranges 
possible with zero tailpipe 
emissions with the 
PiHEV. 
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In the short-medium term, BEV need to take a more dominant role, with this 
transition supported by PiHEV as individuals behaviour patterns adapt to a resource 
and carbon constraint society. BEV should secure a position as an urban or short-
distance vehicle, which would suit the needs of many individuals that choose other 
transport modes for longer journeys. For this to occur, decarbonisation of electricity 
supplies, provision of a public charging infrastructure and significant advances in 
battery costs and energy density are required. In the longer term, HFCV offers the 
most promising option for a similar level of mobility to cICEV today. This does not 
however mean that BEVs should be thought of as transitional, as they could still 
play a major long term role in urban driving or short trips when needed. However, in 
addition to the barriers of hydrogen production, distribution and storage, fuel cells 
also require significant advancement. For HFCV to achieve a dominant place in 
private vehicle technology, a timely technological breakthrough is likely to be 
required. However, as this is uncertain, reliance should not be on HFCV.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that not all technologies are currently available and 
advances are expected to occur over time. The New Automotive Innovation and 
Growth Team (NAIGT) have developed a roadmap of vehicle technologies in the 
UK, to help support the UK motor industry. This is shown in Figure 2.11.  
 
 
Figure 2.11: NAIGT high level technology roadmap (BERR, 2009, p.45) 
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There are already HEV, PiHEV and BEV on the roads, and charging infrastructure 
is being implemented. Technological development and market penetration are 
closely related as they are both dependent on economies of scale, which are in turn 
dependent on policy instruments to encourage the uptake, and are interrelated with 
changes in behaviours and habits regarding mobility and non-personal transport. 
Also recognised by the NAIGT is the importance of technology breakthroughs in 
energy storage, fuel cell and hydrogen. The timing of these cannot be predicted or 
assured. 
 
Having a clear road map such as this in place provides automotive engineers with 
targets to reach for and allows policy makers to plan for developments in 
technology. However, the roadmap is specifically aimed at the UK industry, and 
may not account for the majority of manufacturers, which are outside the country. 
Although further detail is provided in the common research agenda accompanying 
the roadmap, ensuring that industry and academia continue to work towards 
realising the targets is important. It does not by itself provide guidance on what 
areas to concentrate investment and R&D, and makes assumptions on external 
influences, such as provision and reliability of infrastructure, supply chain 
management and public acceptance of new technologies. Therefore, it would be 
advantageous if similar roadmaps could be developed for these aspects to be 
combined into a high-level roadmap. In the context of global passenger vehicle 
trends, developed countries should encourage developing societies that aspire 
towards car ownership to adopt a similar pathway, but one that can bypass the 
problems we face now by avoiding a cICEV dominance. 
 
With this in mind the NAIGT roadmap does appear to be a desirable pathway for 
passenger vehicle technology in the UK, or any car dominated country. This opinion 
only holds within a wider framework that sees an overall reduction in car ownership 
and/or car vehicle miles travelled, and a decarbonisation of the electricity network. If 
we are to avoid dangerous climate change it will be necessary that in addition to 
modal shift by 2050 the majority of vehicles in the UK are near zero emission. 
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PART B:  POLICIES 
2B.1  Overview 
As set out in the introduction, climate change agreements developed through the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have led to 
a focus on private passenger cars in many individual state policies. Following this, 
one of the main goals in the EU White Paper on Transport is achieving a 60% GHG 
emission reduction, through halving the use of urban ICEV by 2030 then to fully 
phase-out by 2050 (EC, 2011b). This section provides some wider context on the 
governance of transport policies related to climate change mitigation then focuses 
on those regulations, policies and strategies targeted at encouraging the uptake of 
LCVs. Following this, a review of findings from evidence-based studies regarding 
these policies is presented and in the conclusion the policies are categorised into 
generic types. These policies are required to overcome the barriers that currently 
prevent or deter widespread deployment and purchase of LCVs that were outlined 
in Part A of this Literature Review.  
2B.2  Governance 
Regulations, policies and strategies regarding LCV uptake are determined, 
developed and implemented by political bodies and institutions. Generally (though 
not exclusively) they are formed at an international or regional level, to be then 
filtered down and interpreted by countries or local authorities. There are a multitude 
of agents involved, both governmental and non-governmental, who must work 
together to achieve this resulting in a complex political environment, as described in 
this section. 
 
2B.2.1 International 
 
In addition to the UNFCCC and UN Division for Sustainable Development 
(UNDSD), which manage climate change mitigation and GHG emissions reductions 
(UNDSD, 2013), LCV policy at an international level is managed by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Forum on the 
Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations (WFHVR). The UNEP leads the UN’s efforts 
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on reducing the climate change impact of transport through the Clean Fuel and 
Vehicle Partnership to support developing countries and the Global Fuel Economy 
Initiative (50by50), which includes carbon pricing, fuel economy standards, 
subsidies, and providing information (UNEP, 2013). The WFHVR (which are 
managed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) seeks to 
globally align regulation on all types of vehicles, looking at test procedures, safety 
and environmental concerns, energy efficiency, measurement and production of 
alternative energy sources (UNECE, 2013b).  
 
Autonomous international research, publications and policy discussion is carried out 
through the International Transport Forum (ITF), an intergovernmental forum lead 
through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
which acts as a think tank and research centre for global transport policy (ITF, 
2013). The OECD’s International Energy Agency (IEA) also adds to this debate, 
due to its interest in reducing oil dependency and GHG emissions (IEA, 2013a). 
The Clean Energy Ministerial provides a further platform on which to promote and 
share policies, programmes and best practice (CEM, 2013). It hosts the Electric 
Vehicle Initiative with the goal of achieving 20 million EVs on the road by 2020. Also 
overseeing international automobile activity are the International Council on Clean 
Transportation (ICCT), Federation International de l’Automobile (FIA) and the 
International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA). 
 
2B.2.2 Europe 
 
The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe aligns international agendas 
regarding climate change and transport in a European and North American context, 
through innovative vehicle technologies, sustainable biofuels, ICT, consumer 
information and legal instruments (UNECE, 2013a). Coordination of information and 
assistance in decision making is carried out by the European Environment Agency 
on behalf of the EU (EEA, 2013).  
 
The European Commission manages the regulatory environment for transport of 
the European Union, through the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
(DG MOVE). DG MOVE develops transport policy for the EU through managing the 
internal transport market, agenda for technological innovation, building the core 
infrastructure network and representing EU transport interests on a world stage (EC, 
2013a). In the case of LCVs it is assisted by the European Agency for 
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Competiveness and Innovation and works with the DG’s for Energy and Climate 
Action. Scientific research to support policy development is carried out in-house by 
the EC Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport, which is funded 
through the EC Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (to be known 
as Horizon 2020 from 2014) (EC, 2013b). 
 
EU LCV policy has been further informed by CARS 21 (Competitive Automotive 
Research System for the 21st century), European Green Car Initiative (EGCI) and 
European Technology Platforms (ETPs). CARS 21 was a stakeholder forum making 
recommendations to policy and regulatory frameworks for a sustainable and 
competitive European automotive industry, and within this considered CO2 
emissions and new mobility solutions (EC, 2012a). CARS 2020 aims to continue 
the forum and follow up the recommendations (EC, 2013c). The EGCI is a public-
private partnership which supports R&D for LCV technologies and infrastructure, 
through facilitating workshops, collaborative projects and an electrification roadmap 
(EGCI, 2013). ETPs are industry-led forums recognized by the EC, which define 
research priorities and enhance competitiveness. The European Road Transport 
Research Advisory Council (ERTRAC) is the ETP for road transport and there is a 
separate ETP for Biofuels. In addition, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association (ACEA) represents the interests of the European car industry. 
 
2B.2.3 UK  
 
The political structure for transport issues in the UK involves a number of 
governmental departments, including the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), Department of Transport (DfT) and Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS). Together these co-sponsor the recently created Office 
of Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV), and non-governmental bodies such as the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and the Committee on Climate Change (CCC). 
Her Majesty’s Revenues and Customs (HMRC – the UK tax authority) and Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (HMT – ministry controlling public spending) also influence LCV 
policy as they are responsible for setting and managing both Vehicle Excise Duty 
(VED) and fuel duties. A House of Commons Select Committee on transport meets 
regularly to discuss all issues related to transport policy. OLEV leads on national 
policy regarding Ultra Low Emission Vehicles (ULEV – emissions below 75g/km) on 
behalf of its co-sponsors. These are discussed in more detail later in this section 
but include the plug-in vehicle infrastructure strategy, grants for vehicles and 
46 
  
charging points, research programmes and awareness raising. In addition OLEV 
supports the manufacturing and supply chain and R&D of LCV technologies, and as 
part of this, improvement of efficiencies of conventional technologies (OLEV, 
2013a). The DfT coordinates all other regulation relating to LCVs, including fuel 
duties and taxation, biofuel research, car labelling, advertising, and social research. 
It is also responsible for reduction of carbon emissions from transport via other 
means, including modal shift, smarter choices, travel plans, freight, aviation and 
shipping. In addition, local authorities have some degree of devolved responsibility 
for encouraging LCV uptake, though mainly through local air pollution drivers, for 
example through low emission and congestion zones (DfT, 2013b). 
 
The UK Automotive Council (UKAC) brings together senior level industry and 
government players to  oversee the development of a coordinated approach to the 
automotive sector, within two groups - supply chain and technology, aiming to 
create a business environment to encourage investment, develop roadmaps, create 
sustainable supply chains, provide a public voice, and achieve a government and 
industry partnership (UKAC, 2013). Alongside this, the Technology Strategy Board 
(TSB) is the UK national innovation agency, working across government, business 
and research to remove barriers to technological advancement through the Ultra 
Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation Platform, which invests in and promotes UK-led 
R&D and supply chains (TSB, 2013).  Both the UKAC and the TSB are supported 
by the Society for Motor Manufacturers and Tradesmen (SMMT), an industry led 
organisation which coordinates research and response to regulation to support and 
promote interests of UK motor industry, both home and abroad (SMMT, 2013b).  
 
Further support for LCVs comes from other government-backed and non-
governmental organizations. CENEX (Center of Excellence for Low Carbon and 
Fuel Cell Technologies), are sponsored by BIS and are a delivery agency designed 
to promote the market development of fuel cell and low carbon technologies for 
transport applications (CENEX, 2013a). The Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership 
(LCVP) who facilitate engagement between industry and other stakeholders to 
develop markets, build consensus on optimal pathways, influence policies, and 
encourage R&D and commercialisation of technologies (LCVP, 2013). Research in 
LCVs is facilitated and reported through industry, government and private agencies, 
such as the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), Royal 
Automobile Association Foundation (RAC), UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), 
Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) and Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR). 
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2B.2.4 Summary 
 
As has been outlined in this section, there are many agencies involved in the 
development of LCV policy. This demonstrates the immense co-ordinated support 
for the introduction of LCVs and the recognition for the need of such policies in 
doing so. Furthermore, it emphasises the intervention that is being made to 
encourage both manufacturers to develop LCVs and the public acceptance and 
purchase of the new technologies. The following section looks at the regulations, 
policies and strategies that have arisen through these efforts. 
2B.3  Regulations, Policies and Strategies 
At present, high level LCV policies are generally designed to be technology neutral. 
In reality, many policies tend to focus specifically on the introduction of plug-in 
vehicles. Previous policy attempts have been made in the past for natural gas (and 
its variations) but are largely discontinued in regions where they were unsuccessful. 
More recently there have been many policies focused on the R&D of biofuels and 
related synthetic fuels, (which has applications other than transport) but these are 
marred by the sustainability issues discussed in the previous part of this Chapter, 
which are yet to be resolved. However, other than R&D support, little is currently 
being promoted regarding hydrogen fuel cars, with the reason being that both fuel 
cell technology and sustainable hydrogen production is in its infancy. Longer term 
policies do however recognise the importance of HFCVs. 
 
2B.3.1 Europe 
 
Creating a common transport policy has always been at the centre of European 
Commission activities, since its inception through the Treaty of Rome in 1958 (van 
Reeven, 2005). The European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) was 
established by the European Commission in 2000, and launched its second 
programme in 2005 with “CO2 and Cars” as one of its six working groups (EC, 
2013d). Through this programme, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
was also launched in 2005, but to date does not cover road transport emissions. As 
described previously, the 2009 Climate and Energy Package, which includes 
transport concerns, set targets to increase both the share of renewable energies 
and overall energy efficiency by 2020 (EC, 2013e).  
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Legislation specifically designed to stimulate the LCV Market are brought together 
under the Common Transport Policy and the White Paper on Transport: Roadmap 
to a Single European Transport Area (EC, 2011b). Within the white paper, there is a 
vision for 2050 with a 60% cut in transport emissions, a substantial modal shift from 
road and cities free from conventionally fuelled cars. To support and develop the 
legislation, there have also been a number of other policy strategy documents 
produced over the recent past, as set out in Table 2.4. 
 
Document Description Outputs (relevant to LCVs) 
European Strategy on 
Transport and 
Environment (EC, 
1999a) 
A council report on the 
integration of environment 
and sustainable 
development into transport 
policy. 
 ‘Polluter Pays’ infrastructure 
charging 
 Average vehicle emissions of 
120gkm 
White Paper: European 
Transport Policy for 
2010 (EC, 2001) 
Based on the 1999 strategy, 
sets out 60 transport policy 
measures to be adopted by 
the EC and an action 
programme to 2010. 
 Harmonisation of road taxation 
 Introduction of external costs 
 Research framework 
programme 
 Diversifying transport energy 
 Rationalisation of private car use 
An EU Strategy for 
Biofuels (EC, 2006) 
Sets out seven policy areas 
for the development of 
production and use of 
biofuels in the EC. 
 Stimulate demand 
 Ensure environmental benefits 
 Develop production and 
distribution 
 Expand feedstock supplies 
 Enhance trade opportunities 
 Support developing countries 
 Support research and innovation 
The Cost and 
Effectiveness of 
Policies to Reduce 
Vehicle Emissions 
(JTRC, 2008) 
Round table discussion on 
the combination of 
instruments currently used, 
if they are in line with goals 
and how goals ought to be 
defined. 
 GHG abatement in transport 
should be done by combining 
carbon or fuel taxes with 
standards. 
 There is a need for more 
research 
EU Transport GHG: 
Routes to 2050 
(Skinner et al., 2010) 
(Hill et al., 2012) 
Project to engage European 
stakeholder and experts in 
identifying, prioritising and 
developing key future policy 
measures. 
 Both technical and non-technical 
solutions are required 
 A wide range of policy 
instruments and early action is 
necessary. 
Multi-annual roadmap 
and long-term strategy 
(EC, 2011c) and 
European Roadmap for 
the Electrification of 
Road Transport 
(ERTRAC, 2012) 
Defines road map and 
common R&D objectives of 
EGCI stakeholders. 
 Energy storage systems 
 Drive train technologies 
 Vehicle system integration 
 Grid integration 
 Safety systems 
 Transport system integration 
 International cooperation 
Research and 
innovation for Europe's 
future mobility: 
Developing a European 
transport-technology 
strategy (EC, 2012b) 
Summarises and reviews 
research and innovation in 
the EU transport sector. 
 Better align research and 
innovation with policy goals 
 Pioneer innovative sustainable 
technology 
 Find an appropriate balance 
between policy instruments 
Table 2.4: European policy strategy documents 
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These documents have all recognised the importance of reducing transport, 
particularly road transport, carbon emissions. In order to do this a co-ordinated and 
long-term approach must be taken. The level of detail or focus has varied. For 
example, the emphasis on electrification has increased over more recent years, and 
the strong need for research and innovation (specifically by manufacturers) has 
been increasingly recognised. Relevant legislation arising from EU policies and 
strategies includes the following: 
 
Fuel Quality Directive (EC, 1998; EC, 1991; EC, 2009b) 
This sets quality standards for petrol and diesel, including emission standards for 
vehicles. These standards commenced in 1993 with ‘Euro 1’ set in the 1991 
Directive 91/441/EEC. The 1998 Directive set out Euro 4 and the current standard 
is ‘Euro 5’, which is to be superseded by ‘Euro 6’ in September 2014. These latest 
standards were set out in Table 2.1. The 1998 Directive was revised in 2009 and 
also set out, complementary to the Renewable Energy Directive, a requirement to 
reduce GHG intensity of road transport energy, and sustainability criteria for 
biofuels. 
 
Car Labelling Directive (EC, 1999b) 
Through this cars must be labelled with information regarding their fuel efficiency 
and carbon emissions at the point of sale. Furthermore, this information should be 
available to users online and in promotional literature, and an annual guide should 
be produced. 
 
Renewable Energy Directive (EC, 2009c) 
This regulation requires that by 2020 there should be a 10% reduction in GHG 
intensity of vehicle fuel. This includes increasing the proportion of biofuel from a 
sustainable source clearly demonstrating a net life-cycle GHG reduction. New 
technologies and Clean Development Mechanism credits can also be taken into 
account. 
 
Clean Vehicle Directive (EC, 2009d) 
The Clean Vehicle Directive sets out a requirement that energy and environmental 
impacts are taken into account for vehicles purchased by public bodies to aid 
promotion of cleaner vehicles. This is to be achieved by setting technical 
specifications and/or the internalisation of external costs. 
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Passenger Car Emissions Regulation (EC, 2009a; EC, 2013f) 
This legislation sets mandatory emission reduction targets for new cars, with a fleet 
average of 130gCO2/km by 2015, 95 gCO2/km by 2020 and a 2025 target to be 
agreed by 2015. These are set using a limit value curve according to vehicle mass, 
and are to be phased in between 2012 and 2015. This will increase the proportion 
of manufacturer’s cars to be included in the average from 65% to 100%. Emissions 
are currently tested using standard drive cycles and test beds but the EC are 
seeking more realistic testing procedures.  
 
An ‘emissions premium’ must be paid if the average fleet target is exceeded. 
Manufacturers are fined in the order of €5 for the first g/km of exceedance, €15 for 
the second g/km, €25 for the third g/km, and €95 for each subsequent g/km. From 
2019, the first g/km of exceedance will cost €95. Eco-innovations cannot be 
demonstrated under type approval tests, so manufacturers can be granted up to 
7g/km of emission credits if independently verified. Extra incentive will be given for 
cars <50g/km - each will count for 3.5 vehicles in 2012/13, 2 by 2020, and 1 by 
2023. These “supercredits” were originally set to be phased out by 2016, which was 
viewed to be unrealistic by manufacturers. To prevent compromising overall targets, 
there is a 2.5g/km cap on that contribution. E85 (85% bioethanol blended petrol) 
vehicles will be considered as 5% lower, provided 30% of filling stations offer E85, 
though this is somewhat out of automobile manufacturers control. Each 
manufacturer gets an individual target based on average vehicle mass of newly 
registered cars, though manufacturers can pool together. Smaller manufacturers 
who produce between 10,000 and 30,000 vehicles a year can apply for a target of 
25% of 2007 emissions. Also those who produce between 1,000 and 10,000 can 
propose their own targets (subject to approval) and the smallest manufacturers 
(<1,000 vehicle a year) are exempt.  
 
2B.3.2 UK 
 
The major piece of legislation that informs climate change policies across all 
sectors in the UK is the Climate Change Act 2008, which created DECC and is 
responsible for setting our regulations and strategies to achieve our carbon 
reduction targets and ensure a smooth transition to a low carbon economy. 
Regulation is in place in the UK related to LCV uptake, some of which incorporates 
interpretation of EU legislation at a UK level, includes: 
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 Vehicle Excise and Regulations Act 1994 
 Energy Act 2004 
 Renewable Transport Fuels Obligations 2007 
 Renewable Obligations Order 2009 
 Biodiesel Duty Regulations 2010 
 Carbon Budget Order 2011 
 Finance Act 2011 
 
DECC introduced the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC, 2009) and Low 
Carbon Transport: A Greener Future (DfT, 2009b) in 2009, setting out a number of 
policies across all sectors in the UK, which includes transport and pledges to 
support the shift to new fuels and technologies, promoting lower carbon choices 
and using market mechanisms. This was replaced in 2011 with The Carbon Plan: 
Delivering our Low Carbon Future. Within these documents, the UK government 
envisages that almost every car will be an “Ultra Low Emission Vehicle” (ULEV), 
which is near zero emission by 2050. This involves a mixture of electrification of our 
personal vehicles and the use of sustainable biofuels. Both BEV and HFCV will be 
supported, assuming a complementary decarbonisation of power stations. As it is 
not seen to be certain which fuels and technologies will be most sustainable, policy 
is technology-neutral. It is also hoped that through this the UK automotive industry 
could be well-placed to be a global leader in ULEV. The government has committed 
£400m to support the uptake of ULEV up to April 2015.  
 
Current policies were preceded by various reports, most notably the King Review of 
Low-Carbon Cars (King, 2007; King, 2008), which was carried out in response to 
the Stern Report (2006) on the Economics of Climate Change. This set out not only 
the potential for CO2 reduction but also recommendations for action. Other reports 
influencing these policies include the Gallagher Review on Biofuels (RFA, 2008), 
the previous government strategy, Powering Future Vehicles (DfT, 2002), and 
reviews by non-governmental organisations (Foley, 2003; EST, 2002). Many of the 
policies suggested in these reports and set out in A Greener Future have been 
echoed or expanded upon in other reports in more recent years (Hanley and 
Buchanan, 2011; Lane, 2011; Rowney and Straw, 2013; Kay et al., 2013; CCC, 
2010). Some key policies and strategies that have been adopted recently include: 
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Public Procurement and Demonstration 
The Low Carbon Vehicle Public Procurement Programme was launched in 2007 to 
fund the trial of over 200 ULEV in public fleets to raise profile and gather ‘real world’ 
information. In the second phase of the programme, 500 further vans were made 
available for purchase with a discount grant from OLEV (CENEX, 2013b). The 
ULEV Demonstration Project (run through the Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation 
Platform), trials 340 cars in 8 locations across the UK. Initial findings from this found 
that the experience, performance and range of BEVs were greater than anticipated 
by participants, but range anxiety still exists (TSB, 2011). 
 
Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation Platform 
The need to support innovative R&D and UK industry is echoed in many policy 
documents. The Low Carbon Vehicle Innovation Platform was launched in 2007 
and run by the Technology Strategy Board to carry out feasibility studies and run 
bids for collaborative research and development projects set and match-funded by 
industry and government (OLEV, 2013b).  
 
Plug-in Vehicle Grants 
Purchase subsidies on a ULEV recognise the barrier of high purchase cost and 
make whole life costs more comparable to conventional vehicles. OLEV reported 
nearly 5,000 claims were made up to June 2013 (OLEV, 2013c). The grant is 25% 
of purchase cost up to £5000 for cars (available since January 2011) and 20% of 
purchase cost up to £8000 for vans (available since February 2012). Full electric, 
plug-in hybrids and hydrogen-fuelled cars are eligible if they meet certain criteria on 
type approval, emissions, speed, warranty. safety and performances. 
 
Infrastructure Development 
The Plugged-in Places scheme matched funding with 8 consortia in different UK 
locations to install and monitor charging infrastructure between March 2011 and 
March 2013. By the end of this period, 4000 charging points had been installed, 
with the greatest uptake in London and the North East (OLEV, 2013d). Recognising 
the need to develop a suitable recharging infrastructure, the government published 
the Plug in Vehicle Infrastructure Strategy in June 2011 (OLEV, 2011). This 
includes removing barriers for investment, identifying appropriate locations, 
encouraging both home and work-place charging, and developing a consistent, safe 
and easy recharging network. In February 2013, £37m was announced for installing 
both private and public charging points (OLEV, 2013e). 
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UK H2 Mobility  
Launched in January 2012, this project brings together automobile manufacturers, 
energy providers, infrastructure business and the retail sector to evaluate 
opportunities and barriers for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCV), in order to 
develop an action plan for commercial roll-out. The first phase report on the 
potential of HFCVs in the UK was released in April 2013 (OLEV, 2013f). 
 
Local Authority Schemes 
Local authorities are well placed to encourage LCV take up, not only by easing 
planning for infrastructure, but also through exemptions from schemes such as 
congestion or low emission areas, high occupancy or bus-only lanes and free or 
reduced parking. Currently ULEV are eligible for a 100% discount from the London 
congestion charging scheme. As further schemes are set up, exemption could help 
promote the use of ULEV and the creation of zero emission cities. 
 
Taxation 
Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) is an annual tax paid by vehicle owners for operating the 
vehicle. Since April 2011 it has been based on a CO2 emission band, before which 
it was based on engine size. Separated into 13 bands, vehicles emitting less than 
100gCO2/km pay nothing and highest emitting vehicles (>255g/km) pay £460, with 
higher costs in the first year of registration. Additionally, there are duties on the cost 
of fuels which are set in the Annual Budget, partly determined by the external costs 
of their climate impact. As the fleet is decarbonised there are concerns of a loss of 
revenue to the government if vehicle taxes are kept so oriented towards emissions. 
Therefore there is considerable interest being paid into the possibility of road or 
carbon pricing, or methods of taxing new fuels.  
 
Scrappage schemes 
Between April 2009 and February 2010 the UK government introduced a car 
scrappage scheme which gave motorists a £2000 discount for a new vehicle in 
return for scrapping their old one if it was over 10 years old (Harari, 2009). This was 
partly to remove less efficient vehicles from the UK fleet and also to support the UK 
car industry during an economic depression. 
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Information campaigns 
Relevant and authoritative information provision that complements other policies is 
seen as a necessity. Therefore, underlying other policies are a number of initiatives 
designed to inform the public of carbon emissions related to vehicles and the utility 
which different technologies could offer, such as through the Energy Saving Trust 
(EST, 2013). 
 
Support to the Automotive Industry 
All government supply-side policies in the UK are managed by the Technology 
Strategy Board. The automobile industry in the UK adds about £9.5b to the UK 
GDP (DfT, 2009a), so it is crucial that the move to LCVs does not adversely impact 
such a major contribution to the economy. Moreover, with the right investment, the 
UK could be well placed in becoming global market leaders in LCV technologies. 
The New Automotive Innovation and Growth Team (NAIGT) has developed a 
roadmap to achieve this (see Part A), which will inform the Government on policies, 
who have already committed over £2b to support the automotive sector.  
 
Although manufacturing in the UK is small compared to some other nations such as 
Germany or Japan, it is a world leader in specialist car manufacturing, which can 
stimulate innovation in the automotive sector and could play “a decisive global role 
in developing and manufacturing exciting, low carbon vehicle transportation 
solutions” (BERR, 2009, p.9). The UK has a strong tradition of innovation and 
competiveness, but coordination between industry and academia needs to be less 
fragmented (BIS, 2013). In order to achieve this, NAIGT recognise that supportive 
government policy is a key success factor, and in July 2013 the DfT announced a 
further £500m investment to make Britain a world leader in EV technology and 
investment in an Advanced Propulsion Centre for development, commercialisation 
and manufacturing (OLEV, 2013g).  
 
2B.3.3 Other Countries 
 
Outside of Europe, other countries also take their lead on LCV policy from 
international agencies.  Developed and rapidly developing countries are not the 
concern of this thesis. However, a brief overview of policies in the USA was felt to 
be appropriate, as it faces similar barriers to Europe.  
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Climate change policy in the USA trails somewhat to Europe as the USA did not 
officially sign up to the Kyoto Protocol. It is led by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). Greenhouse gases were officially covered by the Clean Air Act in 
2007 and the contribution from motor vehicles was recognised in 2009 (CEC, 
2012). Although Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Regulations had been 
in place since the 1970s, motivated by the 1973 oil embargo, they are being 
superseded by new standards that include emissions. The EPA and the National 
Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), set these standards that are 
aimed at automobile manufacturers and lead to a projected fleet average of 54.5 
mpg by 2025 (from 30.2 mpg in 2011). In addition, the EPA are introducing a 
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, which in 2013 expects about 10% of fuel to 
come from renewable sources (EPA, 2013). Individual states translate these into 
their own regulations, with some states going beyond national standards. The most 
advanced state is California, which has been promoting ‘clean cars’ for over 40 
years through the Californian Air Resources Board (CARB). CARB have introduced 
policies similar to those in Europe, and are particularly focused on zero emission 
vehicles (ZEV), which include HEV, PiHEV, BEV and HFCV. The Advanced Clean 
Cars Programme brings together the regulations and standards for introducing low 
and zero emission vehicles already in place in California (CARB, 2013).   
 
The Californian Low and Zero Emission Vehicle Regulations place the onus on the 
manufacturer to reduce the average fleet tailpipe emissions of GHG through 
producing more Low Emission Vehicles (LEVs), and by selling increasing shares of 
Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs), by imposing civil penalties on the manufacturers 
for non-compliance. These penalties are calculated on GHG and ZEV “credits” 
earned over a time period. Under the LEV component, GHG credits are calculated 
annually from the difference between the standard government target and actual 
sales weighted fleet emission average. The ZEV credit target for a company is a 
ZEV quota that the manufacturer must produce, which is based on a set percentage 
of non-ZEV sales from the previous six years. Credits are awarded to the company 
for ZEVs produced and sold. CARB also funds the California Clean Vehicle Rebate 
Project, which is administrated by the California Centre for Sustainable Energy. 
This provides $42m for the period 2009-2013, and is expected to be extended until 
2015, to give rebates of up to $2500 to customers who purchase or lease eligible 
zero emission or plug-in hybrid vehicles (CCSE, 2013). These policies are the focus 
of the second modelling case study and therefore further detail is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
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2B.4  Evidence-based Studies 
This section considers the findings of evidence-based studies of LCV uptake 
policies that were identified in this research. These include reviews of policy 
approaches, critical discussion of proposed policies and recommendations for 
policy improvements. It does not include studies based on models, as these will be 
discussed in Part C of the literature review. The findings are presented under the 
categories of supply or demand side policies. Some interventions may cover both 
sides or interact between them.  
 
2B.4.1 Supply Side Policies 
 
A technology push is required to stimulate innovation and encourage consumer 
uptake. This requires investment in LCVs and legislation of the automobile industry. 
Supply side policies are therefore aimed at manufacturers (and suppliers) in order 
to promote the development of innovative technologies and fuels to market 
readiness, alongside the creation of a sustainable supply chain. This is important 
because for mass adoption consumers need to be confident that any new 
technologies will not only be safe, reliable, economically suitable and fit for purpose, 
but also that they will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.   
 
From a 2010 round table discussion on stimulating LCV technologies, it was found 
that although the majority of stakeholders agree that vehicle fuel economy 
standards (i.e. miles per gallon) are necessary, some argue that manufactures 
should be made responsible for energy use in transport and are therefore obliged to 
increase engine efficiency. The report was not clear if this argument was extended 
to technology quotas. However, they did also note that “consistency between 
demand and supply-side incentives is required to keep emission concerns squarely 
among manufacturers strategic priorities” (JTRC, 2010, p.15). Further to this 
automobile manufacturers need certainty in their regulatory environment. This is a 
factor reflected in other studies. Although focused on renewable energy, in their 
analysis of innovation systems, Foxon et al (2005) highlight the importance of long-
term political support to new technologies, particularly in demonstration and pre-
commercial stages. In agreement with this, an ITF discussion paper on the impact 
of demand-side fiscal measures on the automobile industry agreed that strong and 
clear long term visibility of political intention in supporting LCVs is important in the 
medium and long term (Bastard, 2010). 
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In 2008, the IEA produced a report that reviewed international policies for vehicle 
fuel efficiency (Onoda, 2008). It identified that although regulatory standards aimed 
at manufacturers were met in all cases, voluntary programs alone were not capable 
of meeting emission reduction targets, perhaps because with increased fuel 
efficiency customers tended to purchase larger vehicles. It was further suggested 
that “a poorly designed standard may be worse than no standard at all because it 
could encourage the adoption of inappropriate technologies” (Onoda, 2008, p.29), 
and that as a broad scope, realistic, harmonised test procedures, technology 
neutrality and regulatory flexibility are required.  
 
Both the IPPR and RAC have carried out extensive literature reviews and 
stakeholder consultations to understand the role of the UK in the developing ULEV 
market. The RAC report, although it was focused on the demand-side, suggested 
that existing industry innovation programmes are hinting at initial success, and 
strategic niche management shows promise (Lane, 2011). The IPPR agreed 
somewhat more cautiously and recommended that three areas in critical need of 
stronger government policy for industry are access to finance, support for 
innovation and investment in workforce skills (Rowney and Straw, 2013).  
 
In summary, there was a general agreement that car manufacturers are strongly 
motivated by government policy but need further long term clarity and support. The 
importance of such strong supply-side policies was emphasised in a paper 
comparing Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) policies in eight different countries, where it 
was found that vehicle availability and reliability could be more important than 
consumer acceptance in LCV uptake (Yeh, 2007).  
 
2B.4.2 Demand Side Policies 
 
Demand side policy measures create a market pull for innovations and can be 
defined as “a set of public measures to increase the demand for innovations, to 
improve the conditions for the uptake of innovations and/or to improve the 
articulation of demand in order to spur innovation and the diffusion of innovation” 
(Edler, 2009, p.3). Demand-side measures may be hard measures, such as fiscal 
incentives or construction projects, or softer measurers aimed to encourage certain 
desirable behaviours, similar to Richard Thaler’s 2008 ‘Nudge’ theory. In the 
context of encouraging the uptake of LCVs, demand side policies are necessary to 
overcome the barriers of economics, behaviours and perceptions that currently 
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prevent the development of a successful LCV market. From the consumer 
perspective, the attributes of LCVs are inferior to those of cICEV, principally as 
purchase costs are significantly higher, and for BEV a much shorter range coupled 
with lack of infrastructure and long recharge times gives rise to ‘range anxiety’. 
Further to this the cultural status of a vehicle, or joy of driving may be important for 
some people.  
 
The IEA, in their review of fuel efficiency policies, concluded manufacturer 
standards would be more effective if accompanied by policies to stimulate demand. 
They concluded that fiscal incentives could not only be a powerful tool, but could be 
cost effective and incentivise manufacturers also (Onoda, 2008). Such measures 
were reviewed by the ICCT and compared between eight countries (He and 
Bandivadekar, 2011). They were found to need to be directly linked to CO2 
emissions to be most effective. The design of these is important in success, as 
identified in a global analysis of fuel-related fiscal measures, and concluded in 
another ICCT report compiled through a network of leading policy and industry 
experts (Kodjak et al., 2011). One report (discussed earlier) highlighted that there 
needs to be coordination of fiscal incentive schemes between countries as the 
variety that currently exists in Europe alone make manufacturer business strategy 
planning very difficult (Bastard, 2010). Also, governments need to be mindful of 
long term taxing of LCVs due to losses from cICEV fuel duty (Kodjak et al., 2011). 
 
The previously mentioned IPPR report suggested that tax increases should be 
based on median emitting vehicles as high emitters are declining anyway, and 
target new cars most strongly. In the UK, however, it was reported that tax bands 
have been too small to distinguish differences in lower carbon ICEV (Lane, 2011). 
Other recommended tax-related policies, such as road transport carbon emissions 
trading or road pricing scheme based on mileage, have not yet been implemented 
so there is no literature available to discuss their actual effectiveness.  
 
The ITF have carried out policy briefs on transport related issues. One reviewed 
scrappage schemes in France, Germany and the USA, which have been introduced 
for both economic and environmental stimulus. It concluded that although such 
schemes can decrease CO2 emissions, the gains are small as new cars tend to be 
driven more than the replaced older ones, meaning that it is not very cost effective 
(ITF, 2011b). Another considered EV purchase subsidies and warned that although 
subsidies may cover extra costs associated to average lifetime ownership of an EV 
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(compared to an ICEV), in high use cases the user can actually save money at the 
expense of society (ITF, 2012). Further to this, the conclusion of the JTRC round 
table discussion mentioned earlier warned that subsidies could be used to increase 
profits rather than affect supply, and there is a strong argument for avoiding 
subsidies due to the risk of them being withdrawn before vehicles are fully 
developed (JTRC, 2010). However, it was also noted that a survey of financial 
incentive schemes for EVs across Europe found that there is little correlation 
between the strength of the incentive and EV uptake (JATO, 2011). For instance, 
Germany had the lowest subsidy but the highest uptake. However, this study did 
not report what other factors were available that may have affected uptake or 
interacted with subsidy schemes, such as charge point availability. Despite this, 
another survey found that 84% of European respondents thought the Electric 
Vehicle purchase incentives were necessary (Thiel et al., 2012). 
 
Diamond (2009) applied regression analysis to HEV adoption data over time to 
understand the relationship with policy incentives and socioeconomics across 
different states in USA, finding sensitivity to state specific characteristics and a 
strong relationship with gasoline prices. However, on aggregate there wasn’t a 
significant impact from the introduction of monetary incentives, though in individual 
states, up-front subsidies appeared to have a stronger effect than rebates. Chandra 
et al (2010) carried out a similar study and method, but based in Canada and in 
contrast to Diamond found sales tax rebates had a significant and positive effect, 
but conclude that this subsidises people who would have bought HEVs anyway. 
 
Many studies suggested that usage incentives, such as providing infrastructure or 
allowing LCV exemptions from zone charging and restricted lanes can be important 
purchase incentives (Borjesson et al., 2012; Rowney and Straw, 2013; Hanley and 
Buchanan, 2011; Lane, 2011; Yeh, 2007). There were exceptions to this that found 
that such incentives may be area-dependent (Diamond, 2009), and that 
infrastructure for CNG had a minimal impact in Argentina (Collantes and Melaina, 
2011). Car clubs are well suited for LCVs, but it is uncertain if they are commercially 
viable in the long term (Lane, 2011). In a review of LPGV uptake and the refuelling 
network, Hu and Green (2011) also used regression analysis of data from a number 
of countries and identified that fuelling station availability appeared to lead LPGV 
uptake, but was not strong enough to be self sustaining. Yeh (2007) looked at NGV 
uptake across various countries, and found fuel availability to critical to success, but 
also NG price had to be significantly lower than conventional fuels. 
60 
  
A survey consultation regarding local authority incentives was carried out by the 
RAC and concluded that central government should work with local authorities in 
arranging schemes to ensure uniformity. As such, these are heavily reliant on 
government funding (Hanley and Buchanan, 2011). Charging infrastructure 
provision should be diverse (Rowney and Straw, 2013) and it is necessary to 
improve the coordination between planning documents regarding LCVs. Public 
procurement programmes should mirror the EU fleet average targets for maximum 
effect (Rowney and Straw, 2013), though one study looking at both USA and China 
found that niche demonstration projects do not necessarily lead to widespread 
adoption (Zhao and Melaina, 2006).  
 
Lane and Potter (2007) carried out a review of consumer attitudes towards LCV 
purchase, finding that consumer understanding of fuel economy and emissions is 
poor and there are psychological factors that influence car purchase, including 
attitudes, lifestyles, personality and self image. Furthermore, although 
environmental concern is high, awareness of LCVs is only moderate. This would 
suggest that policy is needed to improve consumer knowledge and influence 
decisions. For this, information provision is necessary but is not always sufficient 
and needs to be accompanied by the other measures on both the supply and 
demand sides (Lane, 2011). However designing information campaigns is complex. 
Within policies designed to raise awareness, behavioural studies suggest that there 
may be a call to design targeted policies to certain segments of society (Anable, 
2005; Schuitema et al., 2013). Furthermore, the importance of inter-personal 
interaction in consumer perceptions, including technology understanding and pro-
societal values, was observed through social network surveys (Axsen and Kurani, 
2011). Fuel cost labelling may be more effective that fuel economy labelling as, 
even though fuel economy is reported as being important, it is not reflected in car 
choices (though this may change as fuel prices rise) (Anable et al., 2008), and the 
actual impact of a CO2 label on vehicle choice may be small (Lane, 2011) or 
ineffectual in the absence of other policies (Onoda, 2008). 
 
In summary, there have been numerous studies of demand side measures, mainly 
focused on fiscal measures and behaviours. There is some disagreement in the 
effectiveness of measures and the interaction between measures, demonstrating 
the complex political and social environment related to car ownership and use. As 
many countries are concentrating on fiscal measures it would seem sensible to 
focus research on such policies. 
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2B.5  Conclusion and Research Focus 
 
Although this policy review has specifically focused on polices in a UK context, 
similar policies are being adopted across the Western world. Generally, they have 
been introduced relatively recently and in many cases their impact is yet to be 
proven. The ultimate aim of this thesis is to develop a modelling process to assess 
the success of these policies, in terms of emission reductions and ethical impact, in 
order to make policy recommendations. To aid in the management of this, it is 
necessary to categorise the policies into generic types. 
 
2B.5.1 Supply Side Policy Types 
 
Many of the policies have a great deal of emphasis on development of the supply-
side, and from this is can be suggested that these policies can be divided into two 
generic areas, Competition & Collaboration and Regulation, shown in Figure 2.12. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Supply-side policy measures for LCV uptake 
 
Competition and Collaboration 
In order to ensure that manufacturers are incentivised and committed to build an 
LCV market with a common agenda, the government must introduce policies which 
support both Competition and Collaboration in R&D. Competition between 
companies accelerates R&D, whereas Collaboration assists in overcoming barriers 
of higher R&D costs and skill shortages. Programmes are introduced which link 
industry and academia overcoming skill shortages, tackling commercial barriers and 
harmonising investments. As part of this the training of workforce, through 
apprenticeships and universities is key. This is made possible through initiatives like 
the SMMT and TSB, as well as on an international level through symposiums and 
initiatives. Integrated delivery programmes and competitions encourage consortia to 
form thus heightening collaboration.  
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Once vehicles reach a viable stage of development, demonstration of prototype 
vehicles, to enable mass manufacture and commercialisation may realise further 
technological challenges which are not yet anticipated, but by which time 
relationships should be in place which assist in the challenge. Government 
commitment to future transport technologies is indicated by the encouragement of 
collaboration between industry and academia, tackling commercial barriers to 
knowledge sharing and harmonising investment in research programmes.  
 
 Regulation 
To encourage manufacturers and fuel providers to improve technology, many 
governments have introduced Regulation that requires certain fleet targets to be 
met regarding tailpipe emissions and technology quotas. These targets are ensured  
by the application of fiscal penalties to the manufacturer should they not be met and 
credits should they be achieved. Usually, the targets will be technology neutral, 
allowing the manufacturer to make their own business decisions on how they 
should be met. Emission reductions can be met through improvements and 
efficiencies in ICEV, the application of new technologies and the introduction of 
lower carbon fuels. This option is currently being given significant attention in both 
the EU and California who are global leaders in vehicular CO2 emission legislation. 
By their nature, such regulations leave strategic business plan decisions to the 
individual manufacturers, and as compliance is dependent on average emissions, it 
could still allow high emitting vehicles, which may compromise or contradict 
messages of the importance of reducing emissions.  
 
2B.5.2 Demand Side Policies 
 
The remaining policies are all aimed at the customer and/or car owner, aiming to 
influence the purchase decision and force LCVs to take a place as a realistic option 
within their decision set when choosing a new car. Figure 2.13 shows the measures 
currently in place or proposed in the UK, indentified as being within one of three 
categories; Fiscal Measures, Raising Awareness and Facilitating Adoption. 
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Figure 2.13: Demand-side policy measures for LCV uptake 
 
 Fiscal Measures 
Fiscal Measures are hard policy instruments designed to overcome the current high 
cost differential between ownership of cICEV and LCV, by decreasing the purchase 
cost of the LCV or increasing running costs of cICEV. They will often take the form 
of taxes and subsidies, and are levied on the consumer at the point of sale or day-
to-day operating costs. These are currently heavily used in many countries.  Further 
fiscal incentives may be realised through vehicle to house/electric grid 
remuneration, and capital allowances of fleet vehicles. In the UK the most obvious 
examples of these are the annual VED for car owners, fuel duty paid at the pumps 
and the Plug-in Car Grant. Previously, scrappage schemes have been used to 
encourage the replacement of older vehicles with newer more efficient models. 
Other examples of Fiscal Measures that are being considered are road pricing 
charges or carbon permitting schemes. Any policy related to monetary penalty or 
incentive is likely to be controversial. Care must be taken to avoid mis-placed 
benefits and burdens. Transparency in decision-making can assist in this. 
 
 Facilitating Adoption 
To encourage LCV uptake, early adopters can be compensated for the lower utility 
it may provide them relative to a cICEV. Facilitating Adoption policies implement 
programmes of favoured traffic management or accelerated building of 
complementary infrastructure (e.g. charging points). Lack of refuelling infrastructure 
required to run an LCV to a comparable level of convenience will prove to be a 
hurdle to overcome particularly due to the fundamental issue of reliance on private 
vehicles as a way of life. Thus investment in refuelling stations and public charging 
points to ensure a timely roll-out and spatially sufficient provision is a possible way 
forward. To further encourage uptake, LCV may take advantage of priority lanes, 
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low emission/noise zones and free parking. Learning from demonstration schemes 
and market research can allow both government and developers to understand 
which measures may be most attractive to potential consumers. This is of particular 
importance regarding unfamiliar new or different methods of refuelling/recharging. 
Part of this may also involve the easing of planning and building regulations, and 
standardisation of both charging method and payment schemes to ensure 
interoperability. Investment may be needed for the installation of both private and 
public charging points. Further to this, the ease of use of electric vehicles is 
hindered by the range restriction, and this may be overcome by rapid charging, 
battery swap facilities and availability of car clubs.  
 
 Raising Awareness 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in the public adopting the LCV lies in the attitude 
towards the LCVs attributes that differ from the cICEV that they are more 
acquainted with. In addition there is the role of preferences – the user may feel 
aesthetically the ICEV is more attractive than an EV, that they have an affinity with 
the ICEV, or that there is a matter of status associated with the ICEV or its 
particular makes and models. Such attachment to the ICEV may be more difficult to 
overcome when there is any degree of climate scepticism of the emission reduction 
potential (and other sustainability aspects) of the LCVs.   
 
Raising Awareness introduces appeals to conscience and marketing to ensure 
consumers have correct and current information regarding vehicle technologies, to 
assess if their needs will be met, and address misconceptions of LCVs. Although it 
is reasonable to assume that, at least at present, not all consumers will have their 
needs met by an LCV, it is also not deniable that many will, though they may have 
the perception that they will not. Thus, information provision, through various media 
and increasingly importantly the internet, is required to encourage those consumers 
to review their stance and reassess their needs in light of the situation. This is not 
meant to be strictly coercive, but to make a conscience-neutral appeal to rationally 
address the utility an LCV may offer.  
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2B.5.3  Research Focus 
 
It has been clear in this review that there is a diverse range of policies required to 
ensure the uptake of LCVs necessary in decarbonisation of the transport system. 
Some have already been proven to be more effective than others. For example, 
regulatory measures on manufacturers were more successful than voluntary ones. 
On the other hand, there is split opinion on whether softer demand side measures 
are effective unless they are part of a larger policy portfolio. The review revealed 
that there has so far been less attention paid to policies directed at manufacturers 
than at the public in the literature, perhaps because it is too early to gather 
evidence. It is not possible to explore all of these policies in depth due to time and 
resource constraints of this research. Therefore there needs to be a focus on those 
policies which may have the biggest impact, one supply side and one demand side 
policy.  
 
The two policies of most interest are Regulation and Fiscal Measures,22 as through 
this literature review they appeared to be the most high profile, and similar 
approaches are in place in many countries. However, this research is also 
concerned with the ethics of these policies. To focus the research, an ethical 
framework will be developed and evaluated in Chapter Three. These will be taken 
into account when developing the modelling case studies in Chapters Four and Five 
that will explore the impacts of policies.  
 
 
                                               
22 Throughout the rest of this thesis, the generic policies will be italicised in the text to be 
clear when they are being referred to. 
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PART C: LCV UPTAKE MODELLING 
2C.1  Overview 
The previous sections of this literature review presented the range of LCV fuels and 
technologies that are being developed, the barriers that exist to their widespread 
adoption, and the policies that are being employed in order to overcome these 
barriers. It is the objective of this thesis to understand the impact that these policies 
and technologies may have in the real world, in order to identify potentially 
sustainable pathways. To achieve this, a policy model will be employed. 
 
Many real world systems can be modelled using mathematical formulae developed 
to represent relationships within that system. Such models can then be used to 
understand the impacts of changes within the system, or identify conditions 
required to meet desired targets through the manipulation of relevant elements. 
These have been widely employed in business, industry and government for many 
years to aid decision making, study new product diffusion and to inform transport 
planning. More recently models have been applied to the specific consideration of 
LCV uptake.  
 
The type of modelling employed in this research is system dynamic modelling (see 
2C.5), which incorporates numerous aspects of demand and supply within the 
automobile market including both diffusion models (2C.3) and discrete choice 
models (2C.4). System dynamic modelling was chosen not only due to the inclusion 
of these elements but as it also allows for the exogenous manipulation of attributes, 
the inclusion of wider system interactions and endogenous responses over a time 
period, and does not suppose an equilibrium. Following an overview of the 
background to transport modelling, the methodological theory behind the principal 
types of models relevant to this research is then presented. Findings from a review 
of existing LCV uptake model studies are then set out, and lead to the identification 
of research gaps. 
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2C.2  Background 
The growing application of models to the realm of transport planning, which was 
first applied in the 1950s (Hensher and Button, 2008), is due to the necessity to 
predict the impact that changes in transport networks would have on network users 
(or vice versa), thus allowing planning of optimal policies and efficient networks 
(Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2011). As decisions made by policy makers using 
transport models will be realised into a real world situation, the accuracy of the 
predictions is of major concern, by both model-sceptics and model-supporters alike 
(Timms, 2008). Despite this, modelling remains to be seen to play an important role 
in ex-ante evaluations of transport policy (van Wee, 2011a). 
 
Numerous different types of models can be employed or combined, depending on 
the objective of the project (including the level of precision required) and the 
resources available to the modeller. Most models tend to be based in econometrics 
and can be deterministic or stochastic, depending on the degree of randomness 
which is employed. The model could be static or dynamic, the latter representing 
changes over time. Many are based on an idea of seeking an equilibrium within the 
system and that actors within any system are rational and utility maximising.  
 
Although most transport models are concerned with modal choice, trip assignments 
and network effects, car ownership models can be seen as precursors to LCV 
uptake models. In the UK, the first forecasts were made in the 1920’s (Allanson, 
1982), with models being developed since the 1940s (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 
2011). The ability to predict changes in, impacts on or preferences for car 
ownership and use is important for local planning, government policy and the 
automobile industry.  
 
These studies have ranged from simple analysis of existing ownership (Tanner, 
1958; Wong, 2013) and forecasting uptake (Huang, 2005; Tanner, 1978), as well as 
more detailed studies such as extensive vehicle characterisation (Lave and Train, 
1979), behavioural understanding (Bhat and Pulugurta, 1998), 
location/spatial/population impacts (Clark, 2007; Fang, 2008; Ritter and Vance, 
2013), income/cost effects (Dargay and Gately, 1999; de Jong et al., 2009), or 
usage and retention (de Lapparent and Cernicchiar, 2012). Although it is not the 
purpose of this work to go into the findings of these studies in detail, some findings 
relevant to LCV uptake from an overview study suggest that both purchase price 
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and operating costs have significant negative impacts on vehicle choice, whereas 
spacious and powerful vehicles are preferred, while brand-loyalty is also important 
(Cao and Mokhtarian, 2004). 
 
Several approaches were used in these studies, including extrapolation from 
historic trends, establishing econometric relationships to socio-demographics and 
applying product diffusion, random utility or discrete choice models related to 
vehicle attributes. Recent studies were summarised by de Jong et al., (2004) into 
nine types, covering demand and supply markets, vehicle stock and usage, 
aggregation and disaggregation, and static and dynamic. Similar methods are used 
to estimate LCV uptake, though all have their limitations. For example, econometric 
models require historical databases of variables rendering them inappropriate for 
the forecast of LCVs, whereas choice models require stated preference surveys to 
provide underlying data, which is not wholly representative of real-world actions. 
More recently, studies have incorporated static data into dynamic models to better 
realise feedbacks which exist over time (Richardson et al., 1999). A significant 
advance between standard car ownership models and those for LCV uptake is the 
inclusion of multiple car types, as de Jong et al. (2004) suggest only choice models, 
which can consider numerous attributes are capable of doing so to a significant 
extent.  
 
To forecast the uptake of LCVs, there needs to be an understanding of car 
ownership and use (to allow for realistic substitution patterns), through in reality 
many LCV uptake models assume constant fleets and mileage. As LCVs are a new 
technology not yet widely available in the market, knowledge of the diffusion of 
innovative products and of the specific preferences which exist within and between 
consumers is required. The following section presents the theoretical background to 
the main types of models employed in studying LCV uptake. Other forms of 
modelling, based on equilibrium, econometrics or individual agents (see for 
example (Brand et al., 2012; Karplus, 2010; Zhang et al., 2011) have also been 
applied but are not the focus of this review. 
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2C.3  Diffusion Models 
Diffusion of innovation theory describes the process that occurs when new ideas 
are invented, diffused and adopted or rejected. It has widespread application to 
both sociology and business. Though first discussed by social scientists at the turn 
of the 20th Century, it was developed in the early 1960s by Everett Rogers, who 
described it thus; 
The process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels 
over time among the members of a social system. (Rogers, 2003, p.5)  
 
The adoption process was already established as a standard S-shaped curve, and 
Rogers standardised adopters as five categories of innovativeness, as shown in 
Figure 2.14. Although not explicitly used in this research, it is the first three 
categories that are likely to be the focus of the model, though the remaining cohorts 
remain a concern in the ethical discussion.  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Diffusion of innovation standard S-Curve and adopters (adapted from 
Rogers, 2003). 
 
This theory was first described as a product diffusion model by Bass in 1969 via 
Equation 2.1 and this is a highly cited work in marketing literature. This simple 
differential equation relates the number of sales to the number of previous buyers 
over a specific period of time, and can be used to calculate the rate of adoption at 
any given time. Integration of Equation 2.1 yields the S-shaped cumulative adopter 
curve of Figure 2.14.  
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Equation 2.1 (Bass, 1969) 
S(T) = Sales at time T 
p = coefficient of innovation (constant) 
q = coefficient of imitation (constant) 
m = number of initial purchases over period of interest (constant) 
Y(T) = number of previous buyers at time T 
t = time 
 
The evolution of sales over time is then described by Equation 2.2. The non-
cumulative adoption curve related to this is shown in Figure 2.15. In this figure, the 
sales above the dashed line are due to Imitators - those who are influenced 
internally by previous buyers (represented by the coefficient of imitation). Below this 
line are adoptions due to external influence. These Innovators correspond to 
innovators and early adopters in the Rogers classification, and are dependent on 
the coefficient of innovation. The maximum point of the curve in Figure 2.15 
corresponds with the inflection point of the s-shaped curve in Figure 2.14. For any 
product and set of adopters, determining p, q and m will reveal the speed and 
shape of the adoption curve. The parameters p, q and m require estimation through 
regression analysis or, in the case of no/limited data, by market analysis.23 
 
 ( )    
(   ) 
 
 
  (   ) 
(   
 
   
 (   ) ) 
 
Equation 2.2 (Bass, 1969) 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Non-cumulative adoption in the Bass Model (adapted from Mahajan et al., 
1990). 
                                               
23  The most common three approaches are ordinary least squares (OLS), maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), and non-linear least square (NLS). As parameter 
estimation is not carried out in this research, detail on these techniques is not provided. 
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The basic premise is that explicit behavioural assumptions (building from theories 
on adoption and diffusion within a social system) can be used for long range 
forecasting in the growth of sales for infrequently purchased consumer durables. 
There are a number of assumptions and simplifications included in this, such as 
selecting a time period which excludes replacement sales, but the model does give 
good agreement with existing data (Bass, 1969). There have since been many 
reiterations and refinements, for example by Bass on pricing strategies (Bass and 
Bultez, 1982) and decision variables (Bass et al., 1994) and others, on the influence 
of advertising and word of mouth  (Dodson and Muller, 1978), non-uniform effects 
(such as word-of-mouth and penetration rate timing) (Easingwold et al., 1983), 
introducing the concept of heterogeneity (Bemmaor and Lee, 2002; van den Bulte 
and Stremersch, 2004), changing attributes and cost (Schmidt and Druehl, 2005), 
and acceptance and rejection dynamics (Ulli-Beer et al., 2010). 
 
Product diffusion models are relevant to LCV uptake as these technologies are 
examples of new, innovative products. However, most established product diffusion 
models are not directly transferable to the case of LCVs. Often the literature will be 
regarding consumer lifestyle products such as white goods, computing and mobile 
phones. Such goods, although increasingly becoming integrated into many people’s 
lives, differ fundamentally from vehicles in a number of important ways. 
Automobiles are of a significantly higher purchase cost, leading to a longer 
retention of ownership – they are likely to be the most expensive item bought by an 
individual after a house. Also, most households in developed countries will be 
replacing an existing cICEV that is already an integral part of their daily life, and as 
such, any deviation from the utility it provides or how it operates greatly impacts on 
their decision.  
 
Thus, although product diffusion needs to be a constituent part of an LCV uptake 
model, it would also need to take account of heterogeneity and individual decision 
making. Some studies that are discussed later have specifically adopted a diffusion 
of innovation approach to studying LCV uptake potential (Cao and Mokhtarian, 
2004; Collantes, 2007; Morton, 2013), or integrated product diffusion into system 
dynamic models (Kohler et al., 2010; Struben and Sterman, 2008).  
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2C.4  Choice Models 
Choice modelling is a branch of economics that was developed to account for 
disaggregation of individual choices within a decision set by assigning preferences. 
It has been in use in a number of areas, such as marketing, environmental studies 
and transportation, for decades (Train, 2009). Discrete Choice Modelling (DCM) 
has been extensively used in transport planning to understand modal choices, time 
savings and willingness to pay. According to Ortuzar and Willumsen (2011, p.228); 
In general, [DCMs] postulate that the probability of individuals choosing a 
given option is a function of their socioeconomic characteristics and the 
relative attractiveness of the option.  
 
A DCM is based on random utility theory, assuming that individuals possess perfect 
information and act rationally choosing an option within a choice set which 
maximises their net personal utility. Within the choice set, there is a finite number of 
options available, each with an associated utility for the individual. This utility 
comprises of a measureable component based on known attributes of the choice 
and a random component which reflects individual tastes and unknown errors 
(Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2011). The decision-maker can be an individual or a 
distinct cohort (e.g. a household), the choice set has to be finite and exhaustive, 
with mutually exclusive alternatives and the decision rule is the method of 
calculation of the probability of choosing a variable (Train, 1993). This probability is 
an attempt to understand the behavioural response of an individual and in this way 
discrete choice modelling is highly related to individual values. 
 
The most widely applied and basic method of calculating the choice probability is 
the multinomial logit model (MNL) (Bhat et al., 2008), and is given by Equation 2.3.  
There are three basic underlying assumptions to the MNL (Bhat et al., 2008): 
1. The random components of the utilities of different alternatives are 
independent and identically distributed with a type I extreme-value (Gumbel) 
distribution; 
2. It maintains homogeneity in response to attributes of alternatives across 
individuals (i.e. does not allow sensitivity of taste variations to an attribute due 
to unobserved individual characteristics); 
3. The error variance-covariance structure of the alternatives is identical across 
individuals. 
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Equation 2.3 
Pi = probability of choosing option i, 
Vi = modelled utility of alternative i out of J alternatives – a function of the attributes of 
alternative I and estimated parameters including constants, scaling parameters and 
marginal utility coefficients 
Vj = utility of alternative j out of J alternatives 
 
Other types of choice model, for example mixed or nested logit and probit, may be 
used to overcome some limitations of logit. Examples of such limitations are 
accounting for random taste variation, the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
and individual unobserved factors (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2011; Train, 2009). 
These other models involve increasingly complex mathematics and for the purpose 
of this thesis only MNL will be considered, as this is the most commonly applied 
form of DCM in this field. 
 
The observed data for developing DCMs is generally obtained from surveys. This 
would ideally be a revealed preference (RP) survey of actual decisions that have 
been made, but in reality for new products and most DCMs, stated preference (SP) 
surveys are required, that ask the decision maker to state what they think they 
would choose. The success of a survey is led by its design and tailoring to the 
question being addressed, and requires a fairly robust knowledge of likely advances 
and timescales in technology and infrastructure, which is usually obtained by 
expert/industry guidance. The outputs of this are then used to estimate the 
parameters of the model (coefficients for preferences or willingness to pay for 
example), from which likely uptake can be plotted. The model is then subjected to 
sensitivity testing, and where possible compared to historic data to analyse fit.  
There is a note of caution attached to choice modelling. Survey data is both 
geographically and temporally specific, and dependent upon the original survey 
design. SP surveys can be particularly concerning as respondents may not answer 
truthfully (either due to a desire to conform or in reality they do not act as intended). 
Additionally, in order to obtain a comprehensive and significant amount of data, the 
survey and its analysis can be both time consuming and costly. There is a 
substantial and increasing body of work concerned with the methodological, 
sociological and psychological aspects of choice modelling (Hess and Daly, 2010). 
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Furthermore, it forms the basis of the majority of studies on the uptake of LCVs, the 
findings of which will be discussed in 2C6.2. As a new technology, there is little 
available data around past decision making regarding LCVs, and as such the 
choice models tend to be based on SP survey data, but may take a variety of 
approaches to analysing the data, going beyond MNL to more advanced logit 
models, such as nested, crossed and mixed. However, understanding the utilities 
that individuals may assign vehicle attributes (that characterise different vehicle 
types), does not on its own assist in the identification of suitable policies to 
stimulate LCV uptake. In order to understand what exogenous parameters may 
influence decisions in a choice model, and thus determine what conditions may be 
required for success, it can be integrated into a larger model that accounts for a 
wider system, considering the product diffusion and interaction with different actors 
within that system. 
2C.5  System Dynamic Models 
Systems thinking allows integration of many interactive elements that are active in 
any complex dynamic systems. This approach combines non-linear dynamics, 
choice, diffusion, time-delays and feedback controls within many disciplines, from 
social science and psychology to technology and engineering. System dynamics 
modelling has been applied extensively within business management, led by Jay 
Forrester in the 1950s (Forrester, 1958), but has over the past few decades begun 
to be applied to other areas, including government policy, healthcare and the 
automobile industry (Sterman, 2000). System dynamic models with broad model 
boundaries that include side effects, delayed reactions, changing goals and 
interventions can help inform policy by establishing conditions for success, tipping 
points and identify otherwise unanticipated results. 
 
Fundamentally, system dynamic models are a complex interrelated collection of 
simultaneous differential equations. The feedback processes within a system are 
modelled with stocks (accumulations of product) and flows (movement rates of 
product) interacting through causal loops over time to simulate real world 
processes. This allows for the understanding and analysis of impacts of 
endogenous and exogenous decisions and actions within a system.  Causal loop 
diagrams represent either positive (self-reinforcing) or negative (self-correcting or 
balancing) feedback dependency. Reinforcing loops amplify what is happening in 
the system, i.e. where an increase in one parameter leads to an increase in 
another, and without any other interacting parameters, this increase will continue 
75 
  
exponentially. Balancing loops are relationships that oppose change, so in such a 
loop an increase in one parameter leads to a decrease in another, until a dynamic 
equilibrium is reached. The interaction of multiple causal loops make up the wider 
dynamic system.  
 
A basic example of a simple reinforcing and balancing loop in a system is shown in 
Figure 2.16, the causal loops which represent the interaction between eggs, 
chickens and road crossings. The ‘eggs and chickens’ loop is reinforcing (denoted 
R) (hence the “+” in Figure 2.16) as more eggs lead to more chickens, which in turn 
lead to more eggs. If this loop was operating on its own, both chickens and eggs 
would increase exponentially. On the other hand, the ‘chickens and road crossings’ 
loop is balancing (denoted B) – although more chickens lead to more road 
crossings, the increase in road crossings leads to less chickens (denoted by  “-“). If 
this loop were operating alone, the chickens (and road crossings) would gradually 
decline to zero. In reality, as the loops interact, the path of eggs, chickens and road-
crossings over time are dependent on the relative rates but will eventually reach a 
dynamic equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Simple causal loop diagrams (adapted from Sterman, 2000). 
 
Stocks and flows are required in system dynamic models as in certain processes 
the parameters may accumulate as a stock from an inflow that declines once an 
outflow is permitted, similar to a bath before the plug is removed. The in and out 
flows may be non-linear and operate at different rates that are independently 
dependent on other parameters. For instance, the Bass diffusion model, as 
discussed in section 2C.3, was developed by Sterman (2000) to be represented as 
a dynamic system with feedbacks shown in Figure 2.17. Recall in Equation 2.1 and 
Equation 2.2 that Adoption (or Sales) is dependent on adoptions from imitation and 
innovation. In this diagram, innovation is represented by “Adoption from 
Advertising” and imitation is represented by “Adoption from Word of Mouth”, both of 
which are reinforcing causal loops. Adoption Rate is therefore represented in 
Equation 2.4.  
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Figure 2.17: Bass diffusion model dynamics (adapted from Sterman, 2000). 
 
 
       
    
 
 
Equation 2.4 (Sterman, 2000) 
AR is the adoption rate 
a is advertising effectiveness 
P is number of potential adopters 
c is the contact rate 
i is the adoption fractions 
A is the number of adopters 
N is the total population. 
 
A substantial amount of work has been carried out using system dynamic modelling 
to understand the automobile industry and some more recent studies, which are 
discussed in the next section, have considered the demand and uptake for LCVs, 
incorporating diffusion models and/or choice models. The automobile industry is a 
complex system, combining business management, technology research and 
development, customer decision making and government regulation. The addition 
of LCVs into the system only compounds the complexity and uncertainties. 
2C.6  Previous LCV Uptake Studies 
There have been many academic studies on choice, diffusion and system dynamic 
models of LCV. A selection of these are set out in Table 2.5. It should be noted that 
this may not be an exhaustive review of studies, but those that were felt to be most 
of note within the limits of this research. The first date back to the early 1980s but 
have been carried out more extensively since the 1990s (Brownstone et al., 1996).  
Potential Adopters
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Table 2.5: Selected LCV uptake model studies by primary model type 
(BF = Biofuel, DF = Dual Fuel) 
 Study Location 
Alternative 
Fuels and 
Technologies 
Study Objective(s) 
D
if
fu
s
io
n
 Cao and 
Mokhtarian (2004) 
USA NG, BF, HEV 
Estimate future demand and 
evaluate influence of factors and 
policies. 
Collantes (2007) USA HEV, HFCV 
Understand market diffusion 
develop estimates of market share 
evolution. 
C
h
o
ic
e
 
Ahn (2008) S. Korea 
LPG, NG, 
HEV 
Understand impact on vehicle 
ownership and use. 
Batley et al. 
(2004) 
UK generic 
Forecast demand and cost 
elasticities. 
Beggs et al. 
(1981) 
USA EV 
Potential consumer demand and 
preference parameters for AFVs 
Brownstone et al. 
(1996) 
USA BF, EV, CNG 
Forecast AFV demand and 
transactions. 
Dagsvik et al. 
(2002) 
Norway LPG, EV, DF 
Potential demand, elasticities and 
willingness to pay for AFVs. 
Eggers and 
Eggers (2011) 
Germany BEV, HEV 
Forecasting model to predict if 
current trends are sustainable. 
Ewing and 
Sarigollu (2000) 
Canada 
LEV, AFV, 
BEV 
Assess consumer preferences for 
CFVs and identify market segments 
to target. 
Link et al. (2012) Austria EV 
Gain knowledge of the needs of 
potential purchasers of electric 
cars. 
Mabit and 
Fosgerau (2011) 
Denmark 
HCFV, HEV, 
BF, BEV 
Potential future demand of AFV 
under certain tax conditions. 
Potoglou and 
Kanaroglou 
(2007) 
Canada HEV, AFV 
Examination of the factors and 
incentives that influence choice and 
willingness to pay. 
Train (1980) USA 
BEV, HEV, H2, 
AFV 
Estimate market share of non-
gasoline vehicles given certain 
characteristics. 
S
y
s
te
m
 D
y
n
a
m
ic
 
Boksberger et al. 
(2012) 
EU 
NGV, EREV, 
BEV,HFCV 
The interaction between supply and 
demand and impact of policies on 
diffusion of AFVs. 
Janssen et al. 
(2006) 
Switzerland NG 
Identify difficulties and chances in 
market penetration process. 
Kohler et al. 
(2010) 
Germany HFCV 
Examine Issues of infrastructure 
provision as part of the transition. 
Leiby and Rubin 
(1997) 
USA 
NG, LPG, BF 
EV 
Identify necessary conditions and 
associated costs for successful 
market transition. 
Stasinopoulos et 
al. (2012) 
Australia BEV 
Consider impacts of market 
competition, new materials and 
policy interventions on adoption. 
Struben and 
Sterman (2008) 
USA AFV 
Feedbacks that affect consumer 
awareness and key processes 
which condition adoption. 
Walther et al. 
(2010) 
USA 
HEV, PiHEV, 
BEV 
Examines manufacturer strategies 
for compliance to emission 
regulations. 
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2C6.1  Diffusion Models 
 
Only two studies were identified that took a purely diffusion model approach to 
understanding LCV uptake, though it has been more widely applied to general 
automobile demand (e.g. Tanner (1978)). It would seem that a distinct problem with 
diffusion modelling is that each type of LCV requires a separate model, so any 
interactions between powertrains are not captured. Also, as new technologies, 
there is no historic data on which to base trends on, meaning that trends of other 
artefacts are be employed that may not be wholly appropriate. Thus diffusion 
models may poorly represent particularities of the technology and consumer 
preferences are not accounted for. Nonetheless, such models may play a useful 
role in understanding basic dynamics and the role of potential adopters. 
 
Cao and Mokhtarian (2004) based their study on the Bass model and calibrated 
with existing historical data from the US Department of Energy. This approach is 
limited as it is based on vehicles which are already available and in use, and many 
LCVs of interest are not yet available, so could not be modelled. They based their 
study on a number of variables including sales, availability, range, refuelling 
availability and fuel price. Each type of LCV was modelled separately so interaction 
between types would not be captured, and as consumer choice was not modelled, 
this could lead to significant inaccuracies. The authors do recognise these 
limitations, alongside the failure to account for exogenous impacts and the fact that 
supply may not always meet demand. It was possible to carry out scenario 
analyses by varying the assumptions on forecasts for fuel price and model 
availability. Despite the model limitations, some interesting insights were 
determined. Firstly, their findings suggest that the only alternative fuel for ICEV 
which has potential to grow is biofuel (E85), though this is dependent on fuel 
availability. HEV however, have a great potential as they are closely related to 
ICEV, but is sensitive to fuel prices and customer awareness. The results of 
scenario tests were, however, in line with the findings on preferences in choice 
model studies (see later), that high purchase price, poor performance and lack of 
refuelling infrastructure are major obstacles, making government policy critical in 
successful LCV uptake. 
 
HFCV and HEV were the focus of another diffusion model study, which considers 
the adoption risk of consumers, and used a stakeholder survey to predict future 
market penetration (Collantes, 2007). This assumes that HEV only replace ICEV 
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and HFCV only replace HEV. The diffusion coefficients for HEV were estimated 
from existing sales, and the entry year for HFCV was based on survey data, which 
was determined to be 2014, with 5% of sales by 2033. A further assumption was 
made that the new technologies could capture 100% of the market, resulting in a 
HEV 100% market share by 2025 and HFCV by the late 2040s. Although this model 
can suggest a basic diffusion of these new technologies, it does not give space to 
examine system interaction or consumer preferences. 
 
2C6.2  Choice Models24 
 
Choice models are useful for identifying consumer preferences towards attributes 
related to LCVs, but do not take account for wider system interactions or the 
change in those preferences or attributes over time. The earliest study (Train, 1980) 
provided estimates for future market shares, but notably based on assumptions that 
vehicles would be available if demanded and that there would be no change in 
consumer preferences, policy regimes or fuel prices, and arbitrary forecasting of 
household demographic data. This static nature common to all choice models is 
one major disadvantage, as all of these elements (and more) may change over 
time, and through interaction with other system elements, to restrict the choice set. 
To analyse this, choice models need to be integrated into a dynamic system. 
 
With the exception of one study (Ahn, 2008) all studies in Table 2.5 included 
purchase price as an attribute of vehicles in the SP survey, and the majority 
included vehicle range, operational costs (including fuel), fuel type and an indicator 
of emissions. Although not all studies are clear in how they assigned the attribute 
level, if they were not carried out in conjunction with automotive engineers, this 
could mean that the results are not realistic. For instance, Beggs et al. (1981) made 
no presumption if their levels of attributes were achievable. As there was a variety 
in fuel types and attribute levels, only general findings and notable exceptions are 
presented here. No studies explicitly considered the second-hand car market and 
preferences were related to the purchase of new vehicles.  
 
Cost sensitivities (particularly regarding purchase price) and technical 
characteristics proved to be strong determinants in LCV uptake in most studies.  If 
technical performance is of most importance, then regulations targeting 
                                               
24 The focus of this research is not developing new choice models so detail and criticism on 
model formulation and methodology are not provided. 
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manufacturers is critical, as concluded by Ewing and Sarigollu (2000). Batley et al 
(2004) was the first study to consider elasticises of demand related to change in 
LCV attributes, finding a high sensitivity to purchase price and that even with 
significant improvements in fuel availability and range, there is little prospect of 
significant LCV take-up due to high purchase prices.  Conversely, a Danish study, 
where EVs could have a lower purchase price than cICEV due to exemption from 
high vehicle registration taxes, suggested great potential for EVs to capture half the 
market in the near term and be a market leader in the future (Mabit and Fosgerau, 
2011). Findings related to the impact on fuel costs do vary somewhat. In the USA, 
fuel cost is such a low portion of overall costs in the absence of tax, that it was 
found insignificant (Ewing and Sarigollu, 2000), though a study in the UK found 
substantial variance in taste parameters (Batley et al., 2004). Range was found to 
be the most important technical characteristic in many studies (Brownstone et al., 
1996; Beggs et al., 1981; Batley et al., 2004; Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 2007; 
Eggers and Eggers, 2011; Dagsvik et al., 2002; Ewing and Sarigollu, 2000), but 
refuel time was also found to be important, with one explicit exception (Brownstone 
et al., 1996), due to the assumption that EV recharging would take place at night so 
refuel time was not significant. 
 
The earlier studies (Beggs et al., 1981; Train, 1980) do not consider the 
environmental attributes of the vehicle in the survey, which may indicate the lower 
importance or awareness of this consideration at the time the studies were carried 
out. Including this in the SP experiment may influence opinion, but, as noted by a 
number of studies, this must be approached with caution as people’s actions do not 
always follow their preferences. However, once included strong preferences 
towards lower polluting vehicles were identified (Brownstone et al., 1996), 
particularly when fuel type is explicit, and households contain children. There is a 
general positive attitude towards LCVs, as some studies noted that if all else were 
equal they would be preferred  (Ewing and Sarigollu, 2000; Mabit and Fosgerau, 
2011), though Ahn (2008) found when looking solely at fuel type base utility, that 
gasoline was preferred to the LCV options. Although environmental impact was 
valued, it did not outweigh performance or price concerns (Ewing and Sarigollu, 
2000).   
 
Disaggregated studies showed large heterogeneity in LCV preferences 
(Brownstone et al., 1996; Mabit and Fosgerau, 2011; Dagsvik et al., 2002; Ewing 
and Sarigollu, 2000; Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 2007). For instance, Dagsvik et al., 
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(2002) who took an approach where preferences were considered in relation to age 
and gender found that females are more interested in EVs than males, which was 
also noted by Mabit and Fosgerau (2011). Interestingly, this gender bias dates back 
to introduction of motorised vehicles at the turn of the 20th Century, when the EV 
gained a reputation of being a ‘woman’s’ car and the ICEV being more ‘manly’ 
(Mom, 2004). Potoglou and Kanaroglou’s 2007 Canadian study considered both 
socio-demographics and category of vehicle, and was unique in considering policy 
incentives within the choice set. However, the only choice set attributes of their 
generic LCV that differed from hybrid was fuel availability. Their findings included 
that the probability of choosing a LCV increased if their pollution level was more 
than 25% less than a conventional vehicle and long-distance commuters had a low 
probability of choosing an LCV. Perhaps as would be expected it was found that 
higher income households were willing to pay more than other households, though 
more surprisingly, medium-income households had the highest probability of 
choosing a hybrid. The most positive and only significant incentive was a tax-free 
purchase, as free parking and use of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes were not 
significant though this may be specific to the area they tested (where parking is 
already cheap and HOV lanes unusual). 
 
No studies give explicit consideration to second-hand car markets, affordability of 
vehicle ownership, vehicle marketing or emotional attachment a customer may 
place on car ownership. Brownstone et al., (1996), whose research focused on 
vehicle transactions, noted that households with high income or currently 
possessing luxury vehicles are willing to pay a higher price. Ewing and Sarigollu 
(2000) did measure the respondent’s attitude towards the environment and 
technology in order to segmentise the responses. This would seem to be a useful 
approach, particularly in terms of informing targeted policy approaches. They found 
that the most actively concerned about the environment are most likely to have 
higher preferences for LCVs and these tend to be younger and wealthier people, 
whereas the least concerned contain a high percentage of low income households. 
Eggers and Eggers (2011) allowed respondents to choose a specific brand and 
vehicle class to help visualise a choice, though this may bias results as it is not 
certain all brands will offer all models, and any influence of this was not captured.  
This may be an interesting aspect to explore further, as the only other study to 
consider vehicle size directly found a high preference for BEV in the Medium sized 
vehicle segment but did not follow through to other socio-demographic 
characteristics (Link et al., 2012). This same study took an interesting approach 
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including modal choice to understand flexible mobility, and found those more 
amenable to public transport also had strong preferences for EV. Very few studies 
considered what the car was used for, or accounted for multiple decisions within a 
household, which was addressed by Ahn et al. (2007), but unfortunately, due to the 
static limitations of choice models, they only considered present car-owners and 
their patterns of car-use.  
 
Choice models are customer-oriented so may be well placed to inform demand side 
policies. As the findings of the studies suggest that such measures may have less 
impact than those directly promoting technological improvement on the supply-side, 
these models present a strong argument that successful LCV uptake studies need 
to consider the wider system. However the findings presented here also 
demonstrate the importance of including a robust consumer choice model rather 
than basing uptake on historic trends, which may be unrealistic, as is the case for 
diffusion models. 
 
2C6.3  System Dynamic Models 
 
Finally, attention is turned to reviewing system dynamic (SD) models of LCV 
uptake. This method has increasingly been applied in recent years, with a specific 
focus on manufacturers, and appears to be favoured for the reasons identified 
already – that SD modelling can account for wider systems and dynamic 
behaviours. As an SD approach is to be taken in this research, it is important to 
realise any research gaps in previous work. This allows for the testing of specific 
scenarios and policy environments. An immediate note from Table 2.5 is that there 
are no existing studies which are UK based. What follows is a critical review of 
specific studies before some general policy-related findings. 
 
The earliest SD study of LCV uptake identified dates back fifteen years and was 
built for the US Department of Energy to simulate the use and cost of LCVs over 
subsequent years to 2010, thought to be a transitional period for LCVs, accounting 
for behaviours of manufacturers, fuel retailers and consumers, and the dynamics 
between them (Leiby and Rubin, 1997).25 The purpose was to understand what 
conditions (or policies) may be required to ensure a successful transition. It differed 
from previous models as SD allows for changes to be calculated endogenously. 
                                               
25 This model may not be strictly SD as it was not programmed into SD software and 
visualised in causal loops, but the dynamic equations and feedbacks would suggest 
that it can be classed as SD. 
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Assumptions however, still needed to be made, and so a consumer choice model 
for vehicle and fuel types was incorporated, from a previous model developed at the 
same institution (Greene, 1994). An interesting element was the inclusion of an 
effective cost for limiting diversity of model choice. They reported that in a base 
case the only fuel to achieve a significant market share by 2010 would be LPG, 
which would still be less than 5% of production. In a ‘no barriers’ scenario, all but 
electric would capture a fuel share of more than 2.5%, with LPG being almost 15%.  
 
In reality, the 2011 data reveals that E85 vehicles are the LCV market leader and 
even that is less than 1% of total vehicles (Davis et al., 2013). This may be due to 
changes in political and economic environment over the time period, and serves to 
emphasis the limitations of accounting for all influences, as price curves were taken 
from US Government projections. The lack of success of EVs may additionally 
reflect the date of this study, as interest in and attributes of EV have improved since 
then, whereas LPG has gone somewhat out of favour. Leiby and Rubin ran two 
policy scenarios, regarding compulsory fleet purchase and alternative fuel tax 
credits, finding both options successful, but the market tends towards dominance of 
only one or two alternative technologies. 
 
Janssen et al., (2006) developed an SD model to study the market penetration of 
NG vehicles in Switzerland.  Model structure and input parameters were determined 
through stakeholder analysis. Within the model, consumers, fuelling stations, and 
import, retail and service of vehicles were all accounted for, whereas government 
and fuel industry were exogenous. The study then explored policy variables of 
subsidies (on vehicles and fuelling stations), tax reductions and advertising 
effectiveness, in various scenarios based on innovativeness of consumers and 
industry, but did not directly consider any policies aimed at manufacturers. They 
found that current goals (30,000 vehicles in 2010 and 300,000 in 2020) were 
ambitious and can only be attained in very favourable scenarios, though a 
sustainable market is possible. Timing of policy measures were found to have a 
critical, non-linear influence on market penetration. Ending fuelling station subsidies 
too early can stagnate vehicle sales due to lack of fuel availability and demand 
measures (a package including tax advantages, purchase subsidies and marketing 
effort) should be used in carefully timed conjunction with the fuelling station subsidy 
for strong and sustainable growth. Through this finding they identify a high tipping 
points sensitivity between success and failure that SD can be used to explore. They 
do not however go on to perform further sensitivity testing within the paper. 
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Struben and Sterman (2008) presented an SD model of LCV uptake focusing on 
the behavioural dynamics between consumers, which included an existing choice 
model and product diffusion processes based on the Bass model. Although the LCV 
presented were “generic AFV”, the inclusion of key consumer feedbacks, and 
sensitivity testing of these, is a significant advance in capturing and understanding 
key processes. These feedbacks include “willingness to consider” and the 
interaction between different consumer types. The key behavioural parameters 
behind this were based on marketing literature for consumer goods such as 
microwaves, which may be inappropriate, as remarked by themselves, 
“automobiles are more expensive and durable, and the purchase decision more 
complex and emotionally laden” (Struben and Sterman, 2008, p.1086). They did, 
however, carry out sensitivity testing to these, finding that, with the exception of 
marketing, “values more optimistic than the base case have relatively modest 
impact and exhibit strongly diminishing returns, while values less than the base 
case dramatically slow AFV diffusion” (Struben and Sterman, 2008, p.1086).  
 
Regarding utility, they found even increased AFV utility may require a long period 
for success, presumably due to the time needed for the willingness to consider to 
grow strong enough and the long lifetime (and therefore low turnover) of vehicles. 
As people do not necessarily keep their vehicle for its whole lifetime however, this 
may be misleading. They also explored the impact of increasing the installed base 
(rather than constant as in most models), finding that greater growth increased AFV 
diffusion (as would be expected perhaps), though with strongly diminishing returns.  
 
Struben and Sterman then considered impacts outside of their initial model 
boundary, including vehicle performance improvement and fuelling infrastructure 
development. For the former, which could be taken as representative of policies 
aimed at manufacturers, they aggregated vehicle performance for each powertrain 
and allowed it to follow a standard learning curve and modelled technology learning 
spill-overs between platforms. They determined that whereas spill-overs from the 
mature ICEV industry could greatly improve AFV uptake, allowing two-way spill-
over would do little to improve a stagnant baseline. In reality it is hard to see how 
any spill-over from AFV to ICEV could be prevented whilst the AFV market allowed 
to benefit from ICEV spill-over. Finally, they explored spatial co-evolution with 
fuelling infrastructure. Setting optimistic conditions of equal performance, universal 
consideration and high fuel station subsidies, AFV adoption remains limited outside 
urban areas, perhaps due to continued range anxiety.  
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The impact of infrastructure on HFCV uptake in Germany was explored by Kohler et 
al (2010). In addition to HFCV market penetration, the focus was also on 
relationships between stakeholders, and costs to the state. The model had four 
modules (Demand and Supply, Attractiveness, Filling Stations and Balance of 
Payments) but did not include manufacturer dynamics, assuming that 160,000 
HFCV could be produced every year at the starting time (2013), which is highly 
unrealistic at present as Europe has no commercially available HFCVs. They then 
compared a successful penetration scenario with three policy scenarios to test 
sensitivity. The successful scenario achieved a 30% fleet penetration by 2040 and 
required very optimistic policies. These were subsidies to make the HFCV not more 
than €2000 than a cICEV, 500 subsidised fuelling stations, and tax-free fuel and 
purchase. The assumed high production rate also accelerates learning effect for 
cost reductions so subsidies are not necessary after 5 years. The alternative 
scenarios reveal that the subsidies and infrastructure provision have a significant 
effect, as market penetration is not possible without them. They conclude that early 
and strong government support is necessary, but may be cost effective and fuelling 
infrastructure is required before cars are available. Within this, subsidies for 
infrastructure will be small compared to those for vehicles. Ultimately though, the 
HFCV transition will take a long time and require heavy support, and as concluded 
by the authors: 
Given the large uncertainties in the future costs of hydrogen vehicles and fuel, 
policymakers should not solely concentrate on hydrogen technology as the 
solution for reducing the carbon emissions of transport. It is still necessary to 
support a range of low-carbon transport technologies. (Kohler, 2020, p.1046).  
 
This acknowledgment is key, especially as the successful scenario was optimistic 
and assumed technology availability currently unrealistic. Additionally, they then 
compared the results with the EU “ASTRA” model (ASTRA, 2013), a widely used 
transport strategy assessment model. The HFCV market penetration rates were 
comparable with the optimistic scenario of Kohler et al, suggesting that ASTRA may 
be very optimistic. 
 
Walther et al., (2010) incorporated the diffusion elements of the Struben and 
Sterman model into a wider SD model aimed at studying manufacturer strategies 
for meeting the Californian LEV and ZEV Regulations (see Section 2B.3.3 for 
details). Over a time period of 2009 to 2021, they included cICEV and pro-electric 
powertrains (HEV, PiHEV, BEV), which were introduced at certain times or on 
reaching certain range or infrastructural requirements. There were 16 models in 
total as each powertrain was available in extra small, small, medium or large 
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segments (based on vehicle size and weight), though not all were available at all 
times. Dynamic vehicle parameters were developed alongside an automobile 
manufacturer, and a relevant choice model for California was included. It is not 
clear if it expected that segments/powertrains combinations in the model will be 
available in real world at the times which they are bought into the model, which 
could be a problem as some attributes are currently unrealistic (e.g. large BEV has 
a range of 240m). 
 
The model comprised of four main modules, being Regulations, Industry, 
Customers and Vehicle Stock/Infrastructure. The industry was represented by an 
aggregated manufacturer, which means that any interactions between 
manufacturers, or consumer consideration of specific brands, are neglected. 
Walther et al. were interested in the challenges for the manufacturers in meeting 
the two seemingly conflicting manufacturer regulations of improving efficiencies of 
conventional vehicles whilst introducing less competitive LCVs. They tested various 
strategies in meeting the regulations. It was found that the best GHG reduction 
strategy made meeting ZEV requirements more difficult due to the impact of the 
sale of extra small conventional vehicles on the sale of BEV and hybrid in that same 
segment. As both of these regulations are actually in place, this is the most realistic 
test carried out in the paper. It is not clear whether it is intuitively valid to combine 
the most successful separate strategies when it has already been acknowledged 
how interdependent the regulations are – perhaps less successful strategies 
combined would reveal some interesting results. Indeed, that is the case here as it 
was discovered that the best GHG strategy actual results in higher overall civil 
penalties when combined with the ZEV strategies. As explained in the paper, this is 
because the extra small segment is also available in cICEV, taking some sales 
away of extra small ZEV and thus incurring ZEV penalties. The paper does not tell 
us what the resultant GHG emissions are from the strategies, which is disappointing  
as this is what both regulations are striving to reduce. This is surely a relevant 
outcome that needs to be assessed. However, if manufacturers have avoided 
penalties, then this is an indication of success in reducing emissions – assuming 
that the penalties are set at the correct level.   
 
Two of the most recent studies also considered LCV uptake from a manufacturer 
point of view. Boksberger et al. (2012) analysed the interaction between supply and 
demand in the automobile market. The model was calibrated and validated against 
data from the European car industry and considered finance, R&D, production of 
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manufacturers, and addressed a gap in research that did not consider all of these 
aspects together. An improvement on Walther et al was that fuel types of NG and 
HFCV were included and five automobile manufacturers were represented, allowing 
a company to go bankrupt and drop out of the market. In contrast, however, the 
time horizon was 100 years, which could be argued to be too long as this could 
bring in far too many uncertainties. Their findings include improved infrastructure 
and stronger penalties encourages early LCV introduction, but do not lead to 
market dominance of one new technology. However, high standards and penalties 
can lead to manufacturer bankruptcy, though policies that reward proactive 
manufacturers yield the greatest emission reductions. Their recommendations are 
aligned with other studies, and include the fact that manufacturers should be 
proactive and collaborate, and offer a wide range of vehicle models, but should also 
be aware of preventing significant increases in vehicle costs. Regarding this last 
point, the authors mention this in order to keep the car market sustainable rather 
than being concerned about impacts on people’s mobility. 
 
Stasinopoulos et al (2012) considered the Australian car market in a wider context 
that also accounted for impacts of change on mode choice due to rising congestion 
and fuel consumption. They studied intervention by new vehicular materials and 
electric powertrains, allowing a previously unaccounted for interaction with down-
stream supply chain. Unusually, they allow for a growing car market, though at a 
constant rate, and considered modal switch to public transport. As the focus of the 
study was more on congestion than LCV introduction, it will not be discussed in 
detail, though some findings are of interest.  In line with other studies, they identify 
that petrol price may have the strongest influence on vehicle choice. They also find 
that electric vehicles can decrease car fleet energy consumption more than fuel 
efficient cICEV in the short term, but can increase transportation energy 
consumption in the long term as it may discourage people from shifting to public 
transport.   
 
Summary of Findings from SD Models 
One benefit of the dynamic feedback nature of SD models is the ability to include 
marketing and attitudinal changes over time. The models which included this found 
that influencing consumer behaviour and attitude change through marketing and 
education can have a strong influence on uptake (Janssen et al., 2006; Struben and 
Sterman, 2008; Walther et al., 2010). Of note were procurement programmes, 
though these could crowd out technology diversity (Leiby and Rubin, 1997). It was 
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also a notable find that, unless they are very optimistic (Kohler et al., 2010) 
purchase subsidies may only work in the short term or under conditional marketing 
conditions (Struben and Sterman, 2008). Whilst the studies provide an analysis of 
high level impacts, none of the studies accounted for who in the population may be 
impacted by any changes in the opportunity for car ownership incurred by the 
policies or scenarios. 
 
Infrastructural development has been moderately addressed, and it was found that 
this needs to occur rapidly. Kohler et al., (2010) suggest that for HFCV market 
penetration, hydrogen fuelling stations are needed before vehicle availability, and 
this could be achieved at relatively low cost. However, attention should be paid to 
the ratio of infrastructure to vehicles (Janssen et al., 2006; Boksberger et al., 2012), 
and home charging is required (Struben and Sterman, 2008).  
 
Market competition and collaboration is important for technology innovation 
(Stasinopoulos et al., 2012; Boksberger et al., 2012), and policies aimed at 
manufacturers are recognised to be required for success (Walther et al., 2010; 
Leiby and Rubin, 1997). As such, policies to increase R&D and expand vehicle 
production are important (Boksberger et al., 2012). Stretching fuel economy and 
emission standards and technology quotas can promote R&D and drive 
technological improvements (Leiby and Rubin, 1997; Walther et al., 2010). As part 
of this, a large and early range of LCV across segments and body types is required 
(Janssen et al., 2006; Leiby and Rubin, 1997; Walther et al., 2010), though the 
costs of doing so may outweigh the benefits, and without the correct policies may 
lead to dominance of one technology (Leiby and Rubin, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, feedback between different regulations needs to be considered by 
manufacturers (Walther et al., 2010). Similar to the choice models, none of the 
studies directly considered the second-hand car market, which likely accounts for a 
significant portion of the population. In addition, the focus of all studies seems to be 
on technology uptake, and while recognising the driver to be energy and emission 
reduction do little to actively report on this, or consider these impacts in terms of 
abatement costs. Although ideally placed to inform policy development, no studies 
contained explicit consideration or combination of policy approaches. 
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2C.7  Conclusion and Research Focus 
Overall, the focus of the studies varies between general forecasting to more explicit 
considerations such as on policy development and requirements, wider system 
impacts (such as environmental or energy demands), infrastructural needs and 
manufacturers. The assumptions made regarding technological innovation, model 
boundaries, specific interactions and inclusion of LCV types vary somewhat. Some 
studies consider generic LCVs through assigned attributes (such as drive range, 
performance, fuel availability) whereas others may concentrate on specific 
technologies. Impacts that are often considered in addition to vehicle attributes are 
the provision of infrastructure, pricing structures and projections, and government 
policies. A significant share of this work is based in California, which has several 
state laws driving the uptake of cleaner vehicles. Few studies are concerned with 
wider interactions such as traffic/spatial impacts, the automobile industry, fleet 
considerations, public transport or second-hand purchases. There is a lower 
coverage of biofuels, possibly as it is already being introduced into conventional 
fuels, so customers do not have much choice towards them. All the above studies 
suggest that cICEV will continue to dominate in the immediate future due to its 
current strong and widespread existence and infrastructure, as well as the higher 
costs and deficient attributes associated with LCVs. Despite this, most studies 
agree that under the right conditions, a slow but successful introduction of LCVs is 
possible that will eventually lead to a decrease in emissions. These conditions vary, 
but include technological improvements, behavioural change, infrastructural 
provision, realising economies of scale, industry commitment and, most importantly, 
strong and co-ordinated political support.  
 
2C.7.1 Model Limitations 
 
No model is a perfect replication of the system or process it is representing. A 
modeller will always be bound by project restraints, whether it is in terms of 
resources (e.g. time, man-power, computing ability), lack of available data, or lack 
of knowledge (of the modeller themselves, or generally within disciplines). All 
models are subject to assumptions that have to be made in response to these 
limitations. This should be remembered when studying any model with empirical 
outputs or elucidated policy recommendations. The time-scale of a model could 
have a significant impact on reliability of results – too short and there is not enough 
time for policies to take effect, but too long and results may be unrealistic. Most 
90 
  
models are based on data that is specific to the design, time and space where they 
were carried out. Specifically regarding LCVs there has been rapid development in 
both technological improvement and environmental conscience over the past 
decade. As people’s behaviour and attitudes evolve there is need for continual 
updates of choice models based on SP and RP data. Furthermore there is still a 
gap in methodological understanding of underlying mathematics and cognitive 
processes. These considerations may place a significant burden on the 
permissibility of using modelling in policy appraisal. 
 
2C.7.2 Difficulties in Study Comparisons 
 
Table 2.5 presented a selection of LCV uptake model studies, but demonstrates the 
clear diversity that exists between studies. In addition, the underlying assumptions 
or boundaries within the models, are not always explicit. The variety in other model 
aspects, such as terminology, the timeframe considered, the policies and 
infrastructure accounted for and even the units used (e.g. sales, registrations, 
vehicle parc) all combine to make any meta-comparison extremely difficult. An 
example of this problem is obvious when looking at the attributes used to describe 
the technologies and to explain purchase behaviour. These can be roughly divided 
into three categories: physical characteristics, monetary implications and technical 
specifications and are shown in Table 2.6.  
 
PHYSICAL MONETARY TECHNICAL 
Body type 
Size 
Class 
Seating capacity 
Storage capacity 
Age 
Range of models 
available 
Aesthetics 
Purchase cost 
Operating costs (annual or 
rolling, fixed or variable): 
Maintenance 
Fuel 
Taxes 
insurance 
Other incentives (e.g. 
warranties) 
Range 
Fuel efficiency 
Speed/Acceleration 
Fuel availability 
Emissions 
Refuel characteristics  
Engine size/power 
Safety and Reliability 
Driveability (smoothness) 
Table 2.6: Examples of attributes used in studies 
 
Included attributes depend on the objective of the study, the resources available 
and the level of detail required. Most studies cover body type/size, purchase and 
operating costs (the latter may be just overall rather than the component parts), 
speed, range, acceleration/power, fuel availability and emissions. These are 
perhaps the most disparate attributes from conventional vehicles, and thus will 
affect uptake most significantly. Each study then includes some of the other 
variablesand to further complicate comparisons, there are country variations..  
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2C.7.3 Research Focus 
 
It is the purpose of this thesis to develop a method that can identify the impacts of 
policies on different groups in society, and from this establish the acceptability of 
the policies. The chosen type of model in this research is System Dynamics (SD) 
that incorporates both a choice and diffusion model within it, allowing the study of 
feedbacks and changes over time. It is not the intention of the work to create a new 
model for this purpose, but to utilise existing, proven models. In summary of the 
findings from the SD studies previously presented, research gaps to be addressed 
are that there have been no UK based studies, the focus seems more heavily on 
technology take up than specifically emission reduction, impacts on individual 
groups or segments regarding opportunity for car ownership are not identified and 
none have explicitly compared or combined policies on supply and demand sides. 
Furthermore, the model must be one where policy scenarios reflecting the identified 
generic policy types (see 2B.5) may be replicated. Leading from this, this research 
will address three research gaps: 
 
 Develop a UK SD model of LCV uptake by using the existing UK choice 
model developed by Batley et al (2004). 
 Identify impacts on societal segments. 
 Be able to implement combined supply and demand policy approaches within 
the model. 
 
Choosing a base model for a case study is limited by availability and access to the 
existing models. As such, two models have been chosen for extension into case 
studies. A UK model was developed using Struben and Sterman (2008) as a base 
model. This was chosen as it is a simple model and so will allow focused 
exploration as skills are being developed, and due to its time-frame can be used to 
assess long term impacts. Walther et al (2010) forms the basis of case Study Two. 
It already has comprehensive coverage of the generic LCV uptake policy 
Regulation, but can be adapted to include market/society segments and calculate 
carbon abatement costs. As it is not possible to address all research gaps within 
this research, these are areas for future research. The most obvious of these would 
appear to be the inclusion of the second-hand car market, as this could have 
significant ethical implications, assuming that this overlooked portion of the 
automobile market constitutes not only the majority of society but also because the 
new car market likely consists of the most affluent.  
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PART D: ETHICS AND EQUITY 
2D.1  Overview 
Central to this thesis is a concern about fairness and responsibility. Scientific 
evidence would seem to support the view that climate change is likely to cause 
harm to both humans and the environment, and that the build up of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere originate from anthropogenic activities. This would 
suggest there lies a responsibility to decarbonise our society where possible, 
through technological and behaviour change brought about through political 
movement. The obligation to do so is perhaps greatest in the case of non-essential 
activities. This brings to mind many questions concerning what can and should be 
avoided, how different people will be affected by policies and technologies 
enforcing this and what other problems may arise from new policies or 
technologies.  
 
This section is a literature review of the ethics related to low carbon vehicles 
(LCVs). It starts with an introduction to ethics and overview of established theories 
of justice that form the basis of many political structures in the Western world.  
Following this, the area of environmental ethics is considered, before looking 
specifically at the increasingly debated topic of the ethics of climate change. Finally 
an overview of how ethics has been applied to the area of transport is then 
presented.  
2D.2  Introduction to Ethics  
In very basic terms, ethics is the study of how to live, by understanding what is right 
or wrong and what our goals should be. It is a branch of philosophy, the pursuit of 
understanding of the nature of things. Ethics is often referred to as moral 
philosophy, as morals and ethics are normally taken as interchangeable within 
philosophy.26   
                                               
26  
This note is made now as often (and specifically outside scholars of philosophy) a 
distinction does exist (implicitly or explicitly) that ethics is more of a general, accepted 
set of terms for a specific group of people, whereas morals are something more 
personal, perhaps related to one’s own religious or personal beliefs. On exploring both 
stances, the argument for a distinction diminishes as there is no logical reason why it 
should be that your personal view of good and bad should depend on your situation.  
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There is no single unified moral theory agreed by scholars, but there are distinct 
groups. Arguments between the groups as to why a certain action may be right (or 
wrong) add to the richness and diversity of western political philosophy forming the 
basis of our institutions. However, these theories are often in conflict, and although 
one may agree with a particular theory in one instance, it may be rejected in 
another. Alternatively, one may have different values that are in conflict within the 
same theory. Moral philosophers explore such conflicts, attempting to reconcile 
them and develop consistent theories. 
 
There are limits to ethical theories. A key assumption is made that the actor within a 
situation will act logically, and often an utopian idea of society or unrealistic 
scenario is in place. It can however be viewed as analogous to the scientific 
practise of laboratory experiments (Lawlor, 2013). Such tasks are carried out under 
unrealistic, non-real-world conditions, often seeking to understand the interaction or 
response of a particular element. In scientific theory and calculations, ideal 
conditions are also assumed.  
 
There are four established approaches to studying ethics (Thompson, 1999). 
Descriptive ethics is the study of what is believed in any particular society, 
describing the moral choices and values. Normative ethics addresses the norms of 
how people ought to act, and asks what our moral duties should be. Meta-ethics 
considers the language, nature and justification that is employed when discussing 
ethics (to provide clarity on what is meant in normative ethics). Finally, applied 
ethics takes the core of established ethical theory and applies it to practical real-
world situations and problems. The most developed areas of these are medical 
ethics, business ethics and environmental ethics. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the interest lies in applied and normative ethics, 
seeking to establish the acceptability of certain political approaches towards the 
introduction of LCVs. In order to develop any claims towards this, it is necessary to 
understand the normative approaches that are available, which are in three broad 
areas (Hursthouse, 2012): Virtue ethics, Deontology and Consequentialism. 
 
Virtue Ethics 
The basis of modern philosophy can be dated back to the classical Greek 
philosophers. These thinkers, specifically Aristotle, did not distinguish between arts 
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and sciences as we do now, but thought of life as a whole, and that it is our duty, or 
purpose, to flourish by pursuing “eudaimonia” (meaning the good life). This is 
achieved by behaving virtuously. However, to behave so requires us to possess 
practical wisdom and be both rational and reasonable in our decision making, as 
Aristotle defines virtue as, “A state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a 
mean… between two vices” (Aristotle, 1998, p.39). Following this, a decision is only 
virtuous if it is what we desire to do, not because we think it is the right thing to do 
or fear repercussions of doing the wrong thing. Objections to virtue ethics have 
arisen as it seems to be more ‘agent-based’ describing how a person should be, 
rather than ‘act-based’ and provide advice on what to do in a given situation, that it 
cannot provide guidance on conflicting dilemmas, and that it may be subject to the 
culture that the agent is in (Hursthouse, 2012). 
 
Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is a branch of ethics that suggests that the moral permissibility of 
an action is dependent upon the consequence or outcome of that act. 
Consequentialism has many forms, but the paradigm case is classical utilitarianism. 
This is also known as hedonistic act consequentialism, and dictates that the morally 
right action is the one which maximises the total good, and that good is measured 
in terms of pleasure or happiness (Kymlicka, 1990).  This approach appeals to 
many people as it has (on the face of it) a simple, empirical approach to ethical 
decision making. Utilitarianism developed in the late 18th and 19th Century’s through 
the work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Darwall, 1998). There are also 
numerous criticisms of consequentialism, and particularly utilitarianism. These 
include questions around what is good or what consequences count (e.g. actual or 
expected), and notions that it can overlook justice and rights or that it demands too 
much (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2012). Two particularly notable issues are; 
 
1. It fails to pay sufficient respect to individual persons. We may be required to 
perform an act conflicting with a deeply held interest, and within the 
calculation of ‘greatest good’ persons are reduced to isomorphic entities and 
risk losing identity and autonomy (Scheffler, 2003). For example, utilitarianism 
might suggest that it would be the morally correct action to kill one person to 
save others.27 
 
                                               
27 A classic example of this dilemma is should one healthy person be killed to provide life-
saving organs needed by five ill persons. 
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2. It is unrealistic to be able to perform a calculation taking into account so many 
different parameters, some of which are not obviously empirical, and that we 
cannot control (Williams, 1963). This becomes more of a concern depending 
on how we value utility, and how we measure it, as pleasure, preference 
satisfaction, or an accessible proxy for this. 
 
Deontology 
In direct contrast to consequentialism, deontological ethics are based on duties or 
principles that tell us what we should or should not do. It is a response to the claim 
that we cannot be responsible for the consequences of our acts as they are not 
within our control – only the decisions on which we act are within our own control. 
Alexander and Moore (2012) claim that there are three main branches to 
deontology, being ‘agent-centred’ (accepting responsibility for one’s individual 
agency), ‘patient-centred’ (rights-based) or ‘contractarian’ (a morally right act is one 
that would be accepted under a social contract). There are various weaknesses to 
deontology (and the specific branches). Although it is not necessary to go into these 
in detail here, they mainly arise from “the seeming irrationality of our having duties 
to make the world morally worse” (Alexander and Moore, 2012) i.e. the duty may 
lead to a horrendous outcome. The most prominent philosopher in the field of 
deontology is Immanuel Kant, who tried to ground his theories in both logic and 
reason, without considering desires, happiness or consequences. Kant argued in 
his “Critique of Practical Reason” (1788) that there are certain principles (“maxims”) 
on which one must act, the strongest of which being “categorical imperatives” – 
those maxims which should be universal for any person under any conditions (for 
example, ‘do not kill another person’).  
 
2D.2.2 Theories of Justice and Political Philosophy 
 
Although ethical theories consider many aspects of justice, such as rights and 
fairness, and inform discussion with compelling arguments for how one should act, 
they may be limited in their ability to suggest how society should be structured. 
Political philosophy is the study of what ought to be a person’s relationship to 
society, and what rules and institutions should guide that (Moseley, 2005). Theories 
of justice inform the debate on the fair distribution of goods, and respect of 
individuals rights, and justice itself is thought to be “the most political or institutional 
of the virtues” (Ryan, 1993, p.1).  
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Particularly of interest in this work is the idea of distributional social justice brought 
about by political institutions. Theories of justice have evolved as humanity 
progresses, and still differ between individuals and cultures. Although the discussed 
ethical theories inform political philosophy and theories of justice, there are 
numerous other established theories, including egalitarianism (or liberal equality), 
libertarianism, Marxism, communitarianism and feminism (Kymlicka, 1990). 
Utilitarianism has been very influential in western politics since the time of Mill, as it 
can be (to a degree) empirical. Utility (depending on how it is defined) can be 
approximately translated in monetary terms and calculated econometrically, 
allowing it to be considered in policy appraisal.28 Other ethical theories also feature 
strongly, such as the predominance of libertarian principles in American politics. 
Social justice concerns, looking towards the worst-off, or the difference between 
sections of society are seen as important by egalitarians. Increasingly, governments 
attempt to take a more balanced approach, incorporating various ethical theories 
and values. The most mainstream theories of contemporary political philosophy are 
egalitarianism (as developed by John Rawls)29 and libertarianism (as developed by 
Robert Nozick), so a brief overview of each is relevant. 
 
In 1971 John Rawls argued in his “Theory of Justice” that political theory at the time 
was inadequate, as it was caught between two extremes of utilitarianism and 
‘intuitivism’ (Kymlicka, 1990). As discussed previously, utilitarianism is subject to 
numerous criticisms particularly that it did not treat people as equals or respect their 
individual rights. Intuitivism is the idea that rights and wrongs are intuitive, but has 
no developed underlying theory or explicit method for reaching judgement. Thus, 
Rawls attempted to find a systematic alternative to utilitarianism that structures our 
intuitions. At the centre of Rawls’s response to this was the concept of “justice as 
fairness” – that basic social justice should be able to resolve conflicts between 
different individual’s values and goals. In order to do this, Rawls developed a 
“hypothetical contract”, in which he proposed what would be agreed should a group 
of persons be setting up a new society from an “original position”. To imagine this, 
Rawls asked us to put ourselves behind a “veil of ignorance” where “no one knows 
his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his 
fortune” (Rawls, 1999, p.11). From this position, he believed that the following 
principles would be agreed: 
                                               
28 For instance, through Cost Benefit Analysis. 
29 It should be noted that some scholars in recent years have argued that Rawls’ focus is 
not pure egalitarianism but prioritisation of the worst-off. 
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1. Liberty Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
of liberty for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a. Difference Principle: To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and; 
b. Fair Opportunity Principle: Attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999, p.53) 
 
Rawls was interested in the distribution of goods, which he distinguished between 
social primary goods and natural goods. Social primary goods can be distributed by 
the state and include rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, as well as the 
social basis of self respect (Mandle, 2009). Natural goods, such as health, 
intelligence and talents, are those which may be affected by the state but not 
directly distributed (Kymlicka, 1990). Behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls argued, 
everyone would seek the best access to social goods as they cannot determine 
natural goods. In doing so they would be giving equal consideration to each person. 
From this, Rawls argued that without knowing your position you would not argue for 
utilitarianism (in case you are sacrificed for the good of others). For example, as 
one would not know if they are a rich white male or a poor black female, they are 
(unlikely) to argue in favour of any bias toward affluence, gender or race. The 
rational choice, Rawls argues, is to adopt a “maximin” strategy – you would 
maximise what you would get if you were in the worst-off (minimum) position. This 
approach would allow inequalities in society only if they benefited the worst-off (or 
at least don’t make them worse off). In this way, Rawls was also influenced by the 
long established Pareto Criterion of economics, which dictates that the welfare of a 
group is at an optimum when it is not possible to make any one person better off, 
without making any other person worse off (Rawls, 1993).  
 
A Theory of Justice set a new standard in political theories of justice and a 
significant share of work on this subject since it was published has been written in 
response to his arguments (Kymlicka, 1990). Criticisms include (amongst many 
other things) issues regarding methodology, the excessive individualism and 
limitation to a basic structure (Mandle, 2009), but perhaps the most notable critic is 
Robert Nozick who offered a libertarian argument against Rawls’s work.   
 
While Rawls focuses on fairness, Robert Nozick presents an alternative theory of 
distributive justice, focusing on entitlements, liberty and self-ownership, in his 1974 
book, “Anarchy, State and Utopia”. Nozick proposes that if people are entitled to the 
good they possess then just distribution is whatever comes about through free 
exchanges. This theory leads to the idea that;  
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A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts and so on is justified; any more 
extensive state will violate person’s rights not to be forced to do certain things 
and is unjustified. (Nozick, 1974, p.ix) 
 
Nozick asserts that for a holding to be just, it has to adhere to three principles. The 
first is that the original acquisition (how it became to be held from being un-owned) 
has to be just and the second is that the transfer has to be just, which includes 
exchange or gift. If transfer occurs by theft, fraud, enslavement or prevents an 
individual choice it is unjust. Finally, Nozick’s third principle is that of rectification of 
injustice, which can be applied if the first two principles are transgressed. Only if all 
holdings in society were bound by these principles would distribution be just. This 
can lead to a society with significant inequalities, but Nozick argues that this is 
irrelevant regarding the justice of the distribution (Meadowcroft, 2011). Such an 
unequal society would be just, as long as the three principles described above have 
been adhered to. 
 
Nozick makes a distinction between an “end-state” theory of justice, where the 
fairness of a situation is judged on its structure at a particular moment in time, and a 
“historic” theory, which is judged on how that state came about. Either of these 
approaches may be patterned or un-patterned, depending on if the distribution was 
made according to a particular pattern or not. A pattern could be: “to each 
according to his moral merit, or needs, or marginal product, or how hard he tries, or 
the weighted sum of the foregoing, and so on”(Nozick, 1971,p157). Nozick’s theory 
is an un-patterned historical theory of justice, rather than a patterned end-state 
theory such as Rawls suggests. Nozick argues that patterned theories do not give 
liberty proper respect, through his well-known “Wilt Chamberlain”30 example: 
Suppose a distribution favoured by one of these non-entitlement conceptions 
is realised. Let us suppose it is your favourite one and let us call this 
distribution D1; perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in 
accordance with some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt 
Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams. Being a great gate 
attraction…. The season starts and people cheerfully attend his teams games; 
they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate 5 cents of their 
admission price into a special box with Chamberlains name  on it, They are 
excited to see him play; it is worth the total admission price to them…Is he 
entitled to the income? Is this new distribution D2, unjust? (Nozick, 1974, 
p.160-2)  
 
By Nozick’s reckoning, D2 is just, as Wilts acquisition was just. From this, we see 
that people’s free actions would allow them to make any just transfers they wish, 
                                               
30 
Wilt Chamberlain was a famous American basketball player in the 1970’s. 
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and in doing so any pattern will be disrupted. Nozick argues that the only way to 
prevent this disruption to patterns is to either ban certain transactions or constantly 
intervene in the market to redistribute property, either of which, he argues, violates 
an individual’s liberty. Thus he rejects the notion than any patterned or end-state 
theory is just (Wolff, 2006).  
 
Critics of Nozick argue that that as he rejects the rectification of inequality, it is 
intuitively unacceptable and may even be self-defeating as it can undermine his 
own values of liberty (Kymlicka, 1990). The idea of the minimal state in itself is 
abhorrent to some as it grants no provisions for the most vulnerable in society, 
whilst allowing others to legitimately squander their resources (Wolff, 2007). Nozick 
did not formally address his critics, and did not pursue political philosophy after 
Anarchy State and Utopia. He reportedly accepted that libertarianism is inadequate 
as it did not satisfactorily account for the importance of communitarianism or 
collective actions (Murray, 2013). 
2D.3  Environmental Ethics 
There are a number of unprecedented environmental challenges which we are now 
facing, including mass extinctions, depletion of natural resources, exponential 
population growth, air, water and soil pollution, loss of habitats and climate change. 
Much of these are the result of well meaning decisions by previous generations with 
unforeseen or unanticipated outcomes. As our recognition of our impact on, and 
interaction with, our natural environment grew, so did our questioning of our 
obligations towards the environment. This was particularly during the mid 20th 
Century through the burgeoning environmental movement, most notably following 
the publication of “Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson in 1962.  
 
Environmental ethics is a moral relationship between human and the natural 
environment. It considers the value that we put on the environment, but also the 
morality and social justice of allocation and distribution of environmental benefits 
and dangers between inter- and intra-generations, non-human life and ecosystems. 
There are a number of theories addressing this. Anthropogenic theories assume 
only humans have moral value, but there is indirect responsibility to the 
environment in order to preserve resources. Non-anthropogenic theories argue a 
direct responsibility to natural objects, which are individuals deserving respect as 
part of a holistic system.  
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Theories of environmental ethics are based on established ethics and theories of 
justice, which raised numerous problems as they tend to be (by their very nature) 
anthro-centric. Applying established ethics into new ways defines issues in 
standard theories. However, many environmental issues required extensions to 
these approaches and brought about questions, which hadn’t been considered 
before, such as responsibility to future generations and to non-anthropogenic life. It 
is widely accepted that the environmental impact is proportional to population size, 
consumption or affluence. Therefore as our population is increasing exponentially 
we find that we are making a bigger environmental impact. Des Jardins (2006) 
suggests five distinct environmental philosophies; 
 Biocentric ethics focuses on the inherent value of all forms of life as its own 
good (See Schweitzer, 1949 or Taylor, 1986). 
 Ecocentric ethics gives consideration to non-living natural objects, so as to 
account for ecological wholes and the interrelationships among natural objects 
(See Baird-Callicott, 1989 or Leopold, 1949). 
 Deep ecology allows environmental crises to be traced back to deep 
philosophical causes, thus a cure will only come with a change in philosophy – 
in individual and culture. Deep ecology is not a philosophy but a movement 
encompassing both philosophical and activist sides (See Devall and Sessions, 
1985 or Naess, 1989). 
 Social Ecology and Ecofeminism have arisen from links with theories of social 
justice - the distribution of benefits and burdens. Social ecology considers 
hierarchies, domination and balance (Bookchin, 1982) whereas ecofeminism is 
related to a range of female perspectives on ecological issues, linking 
oppression of women and oppression of the natural world (See Merchant, 
1990; Plumwood, 1992 or Warren, 1987).   
2D.4  Climate Change Ethics 
Although politically controversial in some regions, climate scientists agree that 
humans are responsible for contributing towards climate change, and that it will 
harm a significant number of people across the world, both those alive now and 
future generations. However, the extent that humans can be held accountable and 
how to respond is a much disputed ethical debate. Climate change poses a number 
of philosophical challenges as it addresses responsibility, justice, rights and harms. 
Climate Ethics is an emerging field, leading from established ethical theories, which 
has gathered momentum alongside public and political interest in climate science.  
101 
  
A number of ethicists believe that it is the interdisciplinary complexities of climate 
change that proves to be the greatest obstacle. For example, Stephen Gardiner 
terms climate change as a perfect moral storm due to “the convergence of a 
number of factors that threaten our ability to behave ethically” (Gardiner, 2006, 
p.398). These arise in global, intergenerational and theoretical dimensions, and 
comprise of the dispersion of cause and effects, fragmentation of agency, 
institutional inadequacy and moral corruption. Others suggest that we need to 
develop new values and conceptions of responsibility to motivate people to respond 
to climate change (Jamieson, 1992), or fundamentally change certain views on 
morality (Attfield, 2009; Baird-Callicott, 2011). Moreover, accountability for our 
choices and actions are all still in much debate in the wider applied ethics 
community. The case for individual responsibility is explored by many authors 
(Butler, 2010; Cripps, 2011; Garvey, 2011; Hartzell, 2011; Hillar, 2011; Hourdequin, 
2010; Nolt, 2011; Schinkel, 2011; Sinnot-Armstrong, 2005) and covers a number of 
arguments such as over-demandingness requiring unreasonable sacrifices, 
ineffectiveness of impact of individual actions, the importance of individual action 
and intention (virtues) and lock-in of carbon intense lifestyles and infrastructures.  
 
Further issues within climate change ethics include the economic case for and 
against acting (Lomborg, 2001; Stern, 2006), the considerations of uncertainties 
within climate modelling predictions (McKinnon, 2009) treatment of inter-spatial and 
inter-generational impacts (Caney, 2009; Helm, 2011; Moellendorf, 2009; Okereke, 
2011; Parks and Roberts, 2010), the difference between subsistence and luxury 
emissions (Odenbaugh, 2010; Shue, 1993) and our requirement to not “do nothing” 
(Garvey, 2008). Aside discussions of responsibility and obligation, there are those 
papers concerned more with the inadequacy of current political philosophy, 
particularly liberalism (Bell, 2011; Gardiner, 2011a; Hailwood, 2011). There is a 
specific interest around the appropriateness of carbon trading schemes, which may 
be risky in terms of distributional justice (Caney and Hepburn, 2011; Hyams, 2009; 
Page, 2011). There is also gathering work regarding the role of technology 
(Gardiner, 2011b; Hale and Grundy, 2009) and responsibility of engineers (Elliott, 
2010) as well as specific policy approaches This literature review is not designed to 
be an in depth discussion of climate ethics, but accepts that majority of the 
gathering catalogue of work on this subject generally agrees that Western 
governments are morally obliged to take action to prevent or restrict carbon 
emissions and work towards both climate change mitigation and adaptation. This 
point is emphasised by the inclusion of moral philosophy in the upcoming IPCC 5th 
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Assessment Report, and the consequential appointment of the moral philosopher 
John Broome as a lead author. Alongside this there is a less established claim that 
individuals are obliged to reduce personal emissions but obligations lie more 
strongly towards ensuring that governments are successful in fulfilling their 
obligations to implementing climate change mitigation policies and, once in law, to 
follow legal policies, as described by Cripps (2011).  
2D.5  Ethics and Equity in Transport 
There is very little literature explicitly discussing ‘transport ethics’ as a subject of 
applied ethics, though themes of ethics and equity often arise within the discipline 
of transport studies. On the other hand, there is also little literature in the realm of 
transport studies regarding ethics from a philosophical perspective (van Wee, 
2011a). Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that transport studies itself is a 
relatively new genre of academic study (Hibbs, 2000), bringing together aspects of 
multiple disciplines, from sociology to engineering, environmental, political and 
economic sciences to psychology and health. Despite transport being an integral 
part of life for centuries, it was not recognised as a distinct integrated political 
concept by UK Government until the Transport Act 1962 and the first academic 
journal devoted to transport, the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, was 
produced in 1967 (Hibbs, 2000).  
 
Transport is the practise of moving goods or people from one place to another. In 
this way, transport itself can be viewed as a good. Indeed some would argue that 
society has a crucial dependence on transport (Hibbs, 2000; van Wee, 2011a). It 
provides mobility and accessibility to individuals, which are often argued to be key 
elements to autonomy, itself a necessity of being human. A number of authors seek 
to define accessibility and mobility, identifying that although they are often used 
interchangeably within a transport policy context and that although there exists 
complex relationships between the two terms, they refer to distinctly different 
concepts (Gutierrez, 2002; Handy, 2002, Martens, 2012; Ross, 2000; Salomon and 
Mokhtarian, 1998). Mobility is the state of being capable of movement, whereas in a 
sociological context it is the specific movement of people (spatially or socially). 
Accessibility is the ability to be able to enter or reach a destination or activity. 
Therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to say that transport (and car ownership) is 
the means to these more essential goods of mobility and accessibility. As will be 
discussed later, Martens maintains that accessibility is more of a ’good’ than 
mobility as it is more related to basic needs, and many studies appear to agree with 
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this approach by focusing on accessibility in the context of social justice (Farrington, 
2007; Geurs and van Wee, 2004). On the other hand, mobility remains a critical 
concern, for instance as Stantchev and Meret (2010) suggest, ‘increased mobility 
leads to increased accessibility’. This work takes these views into account and 
adopts the approach that the importance of the car is primarily related to the 
accessibility which is provides, but mobility is not without its importance as it is part 
of being an autonomous being. 
 
There are many applications for ethics within transport, and many ethically relevant 
questions, such as where, why and how are we moving. What seems clear is that to 
answer any of these questions some system of value and judgment must be 
devised, and in doing this, concepts of what is good or bad are employed, implicitly 
or explicitly. Thus, transport is a valid field for applied ethics. Though transport, 
mobility and accessibility are not widely discussed in ethics or philosophy, there are 
relevant discussions being carried out in more established areas. For instance, 
general debate on justice and politics can inform decision making processes for 
larger transport projects. Discussion on medical ethics may be relevant to the 
health and safety impacts of transport in our lives. Engineering ethics inform the 
practises of civil, mechanical and electrical engineers who develop infrastructure 
and vehicles. Environmental ethics requires that not all transport projects remain 
human centred.  
 
There are both benefits and risks associated with transport: “Mobility and transport 
sustains life and provides a necessary condition for living well. Transport also 
presents threats to lives and the environment.” (Mullen, 2012). Further to this, 
decisions about transport policy that may lead to inequalities is relevant to many 
ethical debates. In transport literature the major areas of discussion in relation to 
ethical dimensions are “social exclusion, distribution effects as recognised in 
economics, and some reflection on the mobility system or the car-dependent 
society from a sociological perspective.” (van Wee, 2011a, p.2). More usual in 
transport literature, terms such as distribution, equity or fairness will be used, 
perhaps reflecting the sociological, rather than philosophical basis of the 
discussion. A significant portion of work in university transport study departments is 
related to policy and planning, informed by modelling of choices, networks and 
impacts, and by applying established analytical processes such as cost benefit 
analysis or multi-criteria analysis. All of these are to subject to ethical debate.  
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In this literature review, it is not the intention to provide an in-depth discussion of 
transport ethics, but to present a brief overview of works relevant to this thesis, 
some of which will be explored in more detail in the main body of work. There are 
two broad areas within this, automobility and transport policy appraisal. 
 
2D.5.1 Automobility 
 
It is not controversial to say the car dominants transport in the UK, where over 75% 
of households have a car (Lucas and Jones, 2009). This dominance has 
environmental, economic and social impacts, though in the literature these tend to 
be addressed from an anthropocentric viewpoint. Over the last century the car and 
society have co-evolved, embedding themselves into each other (Lucas and Jones, 
2009; O'Connell, 1998). This provides many benefits to both users and society, but 
also many disbenefits, highlighted in Figure 2.18. Other reasons for a move away 
from car-dominance include safety and freedom of other road-users, the closure of 
local services and businesses and the decline of social cohesion (Sloman, 2006). 
There are those that argue that this dominance is already receding, due to 
recognition of the disbenefits, coupled with peaking oil supply and increased use of 
ICT, there is evidence to suggest that we have reached a time of ‘peak-car’ in 
developed countries as growth in car ownership is slowing and the youth applying 
for driving licences are declining (though it is noted that there is debate on why this 
is the case, prohibitive costs are thought to be a factor) (Goodwin, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 2.18: Benefits and disbenefits of car use (Lucas and Jones, 2009, p.91) 
 
The place of the car in our society has been well discussed from a geographical 
and sociological viewpoint. The RAC Foundation in particular have released a 
number of reports relevant to discussions on automobility in the UK, including 
access and ownership (Cairns, 2011; Leibling, 2008), and its role in society (Lucas 
105 
  
and Jones, 2009). The impact of automobility (as part of broader transport 
discussion) on social exclusion is a focus of a number of studies and may be 
related to age, gender, disabilities, poverty or urbanisation, amongst other concerns 
(Bonsall and Kelly, 2005; Farber and Pajez, 2009; Lucas, 2012; Preston and Rajac. 
2007; Priya and Uteng, 2009; SDS, 2011). Social exclusion can be defined as: 
“…a multi-dimensional concept, the process of the interplay between a 
number of factors, unique to the individual or group, the consequence of which 
is a denial of access to the opportunity to participate in the economic, political 
and social life of the community. The process not only results in a diminished 
material and non-material quality of life, but also in tempered life chances, 
choices and a reduced level of citizenship.” (Kenyon, 2002, pp.99-100) 
It is not felt necessary to review this literature in detail for this research. It is 
sufficient to accept the generally accepted concern of these studies that social 
exclusion is a too-long overlooked aspect of transport policy, which has been 
strongly influenced by the increased lock-in to automobility. However, due to this 
lock-in, it is also recognised that social exclusion can be exasperated if transport 
policies result in increased disparity in the opportunity for car ownership between 
social groups. For example, Priya and Uteng (2009) found that the costs associated 
with obtaining a driving licence in Norway lead to employment and social exclusion 
for certain racial groups, and Bonsall and Kelly’s 2005 study identified groups that 
would be at-risk of social exclusion if road-user charging is introduced. Indeed, a 
key driver for this work, which will be addressed in the development of the ethical 
framework, is to minimise the impact of LCV policy on the opportunity to own and 
use vehicles in vulnerable groups. 
 
Within this, however, we must also acknowledge the widening interest in the car as 
an emotional and cultural artefact, and as such, its position in society may be much 
more than just a means to access and mobility, with important symbolic attributes. 
For example, Steg (2005, p.160) identified the significance of non-instrumental car-
use in Rotterdam through a survey, concluding “people do not only drive their car 
because it is necessary to do so, but also because they love driving” and car 
ownership in pre-war Britain had a crucial position in signalling “social position, 
taste, status and gender identity” (O'Connell, 1998, p.221). Featherstone, Thrift et 
al (2005) presented a number of compelling papers regarding automobility 
discussing topics such as how the car has become emotionally embedded in our 
national identities, lives and culture, and the role of the car in social change.  
 
There has only been a little consideration of automobility within the philosophical 
community, which will be discussed more fully within the development of the ethical 
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framework. The ethics of driving was discussed by Rajan (2007), Lomasky (1997) 
considered the link between automobility and autonomy, Wood (2009) explored the 
role of the car within the rights to travel, and Duvall et al., (2002) claimed that zero 
emission vehicle mandate policies caused infringements of liberties. 
 
The distributional impacts of car-related policies are being increasingly recognised 
in specific transport literature, though without explicit reference to ethics. Wadud et 
al., (2008) modelled a transport carbon permitting scheme that suggests credits 
spread equally between all individuals results in the greatest benefit to the poorest. 
The impact of the Stockholm congestion pricing was considered by Eliasson and 
Mattsson (2006), who reported that the richest third would lose around 2.5 times 
more than the poorest third. They add that if this revenue were to go on public 
transport, the scheme would then benefit the worst-off. A report for the DfT on the 
social and distributional impacts of climate change policies found that LCV uptake 
fiscal measures may cause an unequal distribution of impacts as they tend to 
favour higher income groups (Skinner et al., 2011). In contrast, Johnson et al., 
(2012) suggested that motoring taxes fall most heavily on medium income 
households. Recognising these problems, Skerlos and Winebrake (2010) suggest 
targeted subsidies aimed at lower income would increase PiHEV take up at lower 
cost and higher social benefits.  
 
2D.5.2 Transport Policy Appraisal 
 
Many aspects of transport studies are concerned with modelling, policy and 
planning. The ethics related with political decision making are widely explored 
outside of transport and, although they are transferable, will need expansion 
because of the more complex set of stakeholders, benefits and risks that transport 
programmes may have relative to other public projects. The philosophy and ethics 
of modelling (Martens and Hurvitz, 2009; Rabins and Harris, 1997; Timms, 2008) 
and practises such as cost benefit analysis (CBA) (Gardiner, 2011c; Kelman, 1981; 
Schmitdz, 2001) is an emerging field within this. One of the main criticisms appears 
to be the implicit utilitarian stance that such practises take and as such are subject 
to the concerns that are raised against utilitarianism as a political construct. Also, 
even though such practises may seem systematic, they are in fact “unexamined 
decision-making” (Kelman, 1981) due to implicit assumptions within them, such as 
the ability and acceptability of quantifying risks and benefits economically, and 
weighting or inclusion of certain morally relevant criteria. A number of authors are 
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now attempting to address such criticisms, not just in transport but in other areas of 
public policy, particularly within health care (Harris, 1997).  
 
One of the most prominent authors in recent years within transport ethics is Bert 
van Wee, who, in addition to numerous journal publications (van Wee, 2011b; van 
Wee and Geurs, 2011; van Wee et al., 2012; Van Wee and Molin, 2012; van Wee 
and Rietveld, 2013) has produced the only book known to this author that directly 
addresses this area (van Wee, 2011a). Van Wee is from a transport policy 
background, but is attempting to bring in explicit ethical theory into the deficiencies 
or arguments he has identified in practises such as cost benefit analysis, from an 
ex-ante perspective. By doing so, he believes that policy makers may overcome 
perceived limitations. Karel Martens approaches transport planning from the 
perspective of social justice, claiming that transport appraisal should be based on 
need rather than demand and that CBA is biased towards already highly mobile 
groups so should be based on accessibility rather than time-savings (Martens, 
2006). Furthermore, he applies Walzer's “Spheres of Justice” (Walzer, 1984) to 
transport planning (Martens, 2012). Walzer proposes that primary goods as 
suggested by Rawls can be separated into distinct categories of goods, and 
Martens argues that transport is one such category (see Section 3A.5.3).  
 
Attempts have been made by other authors to incorporate ethics or equity into 
transport appraisal by combining approaches such as multi-criteria analysis (MCA) 
and CBA alongside explicit consideration of equity perspective options (Litman, 
2013; Thomopoulos and Grant-Muller, 2013; Thomopoulos et al., 2009). These 
perspectives are expressed in terms of horizontal or vertical equity, where 
horizontal equity is the method of distribution between groups equally and vertical 
equity concerns distribution relative to circumstances, needs or abilities. Khisty 
suggested six different principles of distributive justice that could be adopted in 
transport projects (Khisty, 1996): 
 Equal shares – distribute benefits equally between relevant groups; 
 Utilitarian distribution – seek the greatest overall utility; 
 Egalitarianism – treat all humans equally and distribute according to need; 
 Distribution based on maximising the average net benefit with a minimum 
floor benefit of X units or benefit range constraint of X units; 
 Rawls Maximin strategy (see  2D.2.2). 
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2D.6  Conclusion and Research Focus 
The field of ethics, and its many relevant branches of philosophy (justice, 
distribution, rights and politics), is a complex and evolving field of study. This 
literature review has only touched the surface of the field to prepare the context of 
the wider thesis. Although the sub-genres of climate and transport ethics are less 
developed, this does not make them any easier to approach in this work. This 
thesis is interdisciplinary in nature, with ethical consideration forming one of three 
constituent parts to the methodology. Ethical theory will be applied to develop a 
framework by which policies identified within the model should be assessed. This 
framework is to take the form of seeking a balance between climate change 
obligations and accessibility or mobility rights when it comes to the introduction of 
low carbon vehicles. These ideas will be explored further in the next Chapter where 
the ethical framework is developed. 
 
There is already a well-developed body of work on ethics and theories of 
distributive justice that can be adopted in order to defend the framework, and 
development of any new or refined theory is beyond the scope of the thesis. The 
approach that will be taken is one that uses the status quo as a starting point and 
assumes that this situation is already unjust to some extent. From this starting 
point, the ethical framework will be developed in order to improve on this, with 
respect to the welfare of those who are already worst-off, by aiming to avoid (or 
minimise) the amplification of injustice. In this way, the work is influenced by the 
egalitarian theories led by Rawls.  
 
As there is also a significant amount of work already being carried out regarding the 
ethics of climate change, these arguments will be incorporated into the 
development of the ethical framework. Although there is a reasonable amount of 
literature in the social sciences regarding automobility, there is very little 
philosophical literature on this subject and none directly addressing the introduction 
of LCVs (at least from the point of view of climate change), so this area will be 
explored more fully from an ethical viewpoint. This part of the research will be a 
novel contribution to much-needed development of the field of applied ethics 
regarding both climate change and transport. Finally, the ethics and permissibility of 
appraisal and modelling in policy decision-making will be considered. There is a 
burgeoning field of discussion on this, currently focused around CBA, so any output 
from this work will make a worthwhile contribution to this debate. 
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PART E: CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This literature review was divided into four subject areas reflecting the 
interdisciplinarity of the thesis, and demonstrated the complex interrelation between 
these disciplines. The act of carrying out the review has made an important 
contribution to achieving the thesis objectives and has confirmed that the concerns 
raised are valid ones that have not been fully addressed in previous work. The 
remainder of this thesis explains and integrates the four strands of this literature 
review and in doing so this research could make a novel contribution to the 
advancement of understanding LCV adoption and policy appraisal. The following 
issues, which were established in this Chapter, form the focus of the research: 
 
 Vehicles with electric motors may offer the greatest potential for emission 
reductions. Barriers of high cost and different attributes than ICEV need to be 
overcome to gain successful market penetration over the next decade and 
into the future.   
 Five generic types of LCV uptake policies were determined. Fiscal Measures 
and Regulation are currently being given the most attention. 
 No current system dynamic models are UK based or explicitly consider 
distributional impacts of LCV uptake policies, and few compare supply and 
demand side policies within the same study.  
 There is a distinct research gap in the ethical consideration of LCV uptake 
policies in both philosophical and transport literature, and the debate on the 
use of modelling within transport policy appraisal is currently in its infancy. 
 
In addressing these issues, an ethical framework for LCV uptake policies is created 
that will encourage consideration of distributional impacts of EV uptake in the next 
decade as well as addressing the permissibility of models in policy prescriptions. 
Modelling case studies are then developed to cover the research gaps and test 
policies within the framework. Following this, an approach to developing an 
improved modelling and appraisal framework is proposed alongside 
recommendations for policy. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to consider the ethical implications of the 
introduction of Low Carbon Vehicles (LCVs) and the role of modelling in policy 
appraisal. From this an ethical framework for LCV policies is developed in order to 
be implemented alongside the modelling that is also carried out in this research. 
There are two Parts to the Chapter. The first Part takes a philosophical approach, 
establishing the permissibility of modelling in policy appraisal and two claims related 
to LCV polices. The first claim is in defence of coercive policies due to the potential 
harms of climate change, and the second claim calls for the rectification of 
injustices that may arise from such policies. In Part B, the elements of the 
framework established in Part A are subjected to a pre-modelling empirical 
evaluation, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. It describes a 
workshop and survey that was carried out to understand if there is support of the 
claims by experts in the field of LCVs, and also identify the potential impact of the 
generic polices established in Chapter 2 Part B on the average cost and utility of 
car ownership. 
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PART A: ESTABLISHING AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
3A.1  Introduction31 
It is the concern of this thesis that although Low Carbon Vehicles (LCVs) are 
necessary to reduce carbon emissions, that policies for the uptake of LCVs may 
cause issues of distributional justice in society. This Chapter sets out an ethical 
framework that recognises the need to minimise climate change on one hand and 
the impact that low carbon vehicle policies may have on the other. I take a 
pragmatic approach to exploring the relevant moral aspects of policy-making 
regarding low carbon vehicles, suggesting what issues of justice should be 
considered in these policies and how the policy appraisal processes can be 
improved. By considering both of these together, this Chapter highlights an 
important link between parts of policy-making.  
 
In this work, the focus is ‘real-world’ policy appraisal for the short-term, over the 
next decade. Using the ‘status-quo’ as a starting point (or baseline), and assuming 
that this situation is already unjust to some extent,32 I am concerned that carbon 
reduction policies may amplify existing injustice. The aim of this Chapter is to 
explore ways to avoid (or at least minimise) this occurring and develop an ethical 
framework on that basis. The ethical framework I seek to develop in this Chapter is 
one that not only defines what type of policies are acceptable in the promotion of 
LCVs but also what exceptions, or provisions these policies may require to prevent 
distributional injustices. Regulation and Fiscal Measures, the two policies identified 
in the literature review to focus on, are both coercive policies as they force people 
to act in an otherwise involuntary manner. Although Regulation is aimed at 
manufacturers, the coercive effect follows through to customers as their choice or 
opportunity for car ownership becomes biased towards LCVs. In this ethical 
                                               
31 Although writing in the first person may be unusual in the sciences, it is the common 
approach in philosophy, as one is putting forward one’s own views and arguing why 
they are legitimate. Therefore, Part A of this Chapter will retain a first person stance. 
32 By ‘unjust’ I mean that some people have more access to goods than others leading to 
an unequal society, arising from differences in wealth, opportunity and ability. I do not 
believe that this assumption is controversial. I am not concerned with how these 
differences have arisen, or the extent of the inequality simply accept that they do exisit 
and should be addressed. This is an ‘end-state’ view of justice as advocated by Rawls 
(see literature review). I do not in this research seek to reduce injustice or inequality to 
zero, but, as described in this chapter, to prevent the level of the worst off from being 
reduced from its current level.   
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framework, the focus is on the customer, though I accept that in future work, the 
arguments should be extended to consider manufacturers. Models used in policy 
evaluation tend to focus on measurement of an overarching objective without 
assessing the risks they may impose on an individual level and do not tend to 
contain explicit consideration of how the policies may impact on social justice. In 
this Chapter, I explore what these impacts may be and suggest how the appraisal 
process should be amended.  
 
Firstly, I investigate claims of justice related to LCVs. The first claim I address 
argues for coercive polices that promote the introduction of LCVs due to the harms 
of climate change, through an appeal to a generally accepted harm principle, before 
drawing parallels to Garrett Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968). In the 
second claim, I concede that such coercive policies should minimise unfair burdens 
on the most vulnerable, considering issues of distributional justice that may arise. 
Within this, I explore specific claims for car ownership, drawing the conclusion that 
there exists a valid claim that some groups (such as the less physically able or the 
poor) are more sensitive to change in the opportunity for car ownership. They 
therefore may need special consideration within the policies allowed by the claim 
for coercive policies. I explore what form this may take through consideration of the 
work of Jonathan Wolff (2011) and Michael Walzer (1984) on market regulation, 
and by drawing comparison to existing policies.  
 
My interest then turns to the crucial question of how policies in response to these 
claims can be assessed and chosen in practise in a policy appraisal process. I am 
concerned that such policies may be assessed in light of their contribution to carbon 
reductions but without sufficient focus on the issues of distributional justice I have 
identified. Key to this process is modelling, but as I seek to demonstrate, this is 
constrained by a number of parameters, including design, boundaries and 
cognition, but most notably recognition of the relevant moral considerations. 
Nonetheless, modelling is an important tool in policy appraisal, and has already 
been widely applied to the subject of low carbon vehicles. Despite this, the 
permissibility of modelling in policy making has had little discussion in ethical 
literature, unlike another tool, Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) (Gardiner, 2011c; Harris, 
1997; van Wee, 2011a). In this Chapter I suggest, through comparison to CBA, how 
models used to support LCV policy decisions can be developed to take account of 
ethical implications of policy. From this, I propose a methodology for modelling in 
my own work. 
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3A.2  Background 
At the centre of this research is a concern about the harms of climate change 
caused by carbon emissions associated with anthropogenic activities. I believe, as 
many others do, that these burdens can only be mitigated through interdisciplinary 
collaboration. This work focuses on the transition to LCVs. My concern is that we 
are currently locked-in33 to infrastructure, attitudes and lifestyles built up around car 
ownership, and those who are most legitimately dependent upon car ownership, are 
likely to already be amongst the worst-off. Thus if climate change policy reduces the 
opportunity for car ownership in these groups, it may not be morally permissible, 
requiring adjustment or compensatory measures.  
 
Before starting the discussion I will stipulate the assumptions that frame my 
arguments. These include empirical and non-empirical assumptions and 
judgements, which I think are reasonably uncontroversial on either a scientific or 
ethical basis, and most have been discussed in more detail in the literature review.  
 
 Climate change, that will result in significant harm and death to living things,34 
is occurring, is set to increase, and is due to anthropogenic carbon emissions, 
with a significant contribution from the road transport sector.  
 Developed carbon-intense countries, such as the UK, are responsible for the 
majority of both historic and present carbon emissions and as such 
governments have a moral obligation to reduce emissions due to the harms of 
climate change.35 
 Low carbon vehicles (including their production and dismantling phases and 
all fuels and power supplies) are a technically feasible option for 
decarbonising road transport.  
 Other impacts on sustainability arising from the introduction of LCVs (e.g. 
biofuel impacts on food crops) are externalities I am not directly concerned 
with in this thesis, but recognize that they have potential to cause harm. 
                                               
33  This is explored later in this chapter. I do not take ‘locked-in’ at its strongest 
interpretation, which would suggest that the users have no way out at all, but take a 
weaker interpretation in that it is extremely difficult, requiring many sacrifices, and 
removal of oneself from many aspects of society. This position is reflected in many 
works on individual responsibilities regarding climate change. 
34 There are many discussions about obligations to future persons, not just in regards to 
climate change, for a summary of these see Desjardins (2006). The moral status of 
animals, plants, land, resources and environment has been widely discussed (see for 
example, Singer (1979) or Naess (1973)).   
35 This reflects a position held by many scholars in the field of climate ethics, as discussed 
in the literature review, for example Gardiner et al. (2010) or Garvey (2008). 
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 This work is specifically limited to the case of private passenger cars36 and 
does not consider wider transport systems and behavioural or modal shift. I 
accept that these omissions are necessary for decarbonisation, and that 
many groups would benefit from greater access to alternative modes, but I 
believe that such a discussion would detract from the central arguments 
presented here. Importantly, neither do I wish these arguments to be taken as 
an acceptance of (or support for) our continuing car dependency. This is 
because in the short-term (which this work considers) there is not enough 
time for major infrastructural or attitudinal change, and levels of car ownership 
are unlikely to change significantly over this time. 
 When I refer to the ‘worst-off’ in this work, I have two groups in mind. First, 
there are those that are already most disadvantaged (compared to other 
people) in an unjust society (e.g. the disabled or the poor), and that the 
condition that disadvantages them makes them reliant on car ownership 
and/or very sensitive to changes in the opportunity for car ownership (in terms 
of cost and utility). Second, I am also concerned with those who are not in this 
worst-off category at present, but could become so as the result of an LCV 
policy. This ensures that anyone who is amongst the worst-off at any point in 
the timeframe of this research is considered.  
 Though the majority of people who want to own a car currently do so,37 there 
is a notable minority who do not. There are some groups for whom I assume 
car ownership is never an option (such as certain disabled or banned drivers) 
but I am prevented from including these groups as I do not address wider 
transport systems. For those who voluntarily choose not to own a car I 
assume that this is due to personal preference, or they have no need. As 
such they need no special consideration and they could choose to become a 
car-owner at any time. My main concern regarding non-car-owners is 
therefore those who do not own a car for economic reasons. These may well 
be even more worse off than the worst-off amongst the car-owners. Although 
I do not explicitly address this group in my work, I implicitly assume that any 
policy that would benefit the poorest car-owners would also help the poorest 
non-car-owners to become car-owners.38  
                                               
36 i.e. not fleet or company cars. 
37  Recall 75% of households have a car. In this research I implicitly assume that car 
ownership and use are, in our current culture, largely inter-dependent and 
synonymous, but I fully recognise that they are separate concepts, which require 
decoupling from each other in the longer term 
38 This does not reflect a desire to increase car ownership per se, but accepts that in the 
current lock-in there should be equal opportunity for ownership for all. 
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 LCVs currently have characteristics that differ from conventional cars, which 
despite other advantages, form barriers to adoption.39 These include high 
purchase cost, lack of fuelling infrastructure, and inferior technical attributes. 
Coercive policies to encourage LCVs, as described in the literature review, 
will overcome these barriers to an extent, but in the short term will result in a 
reduction in the overall opportunity for car ownership (of both conventional 
and low carbon vehicles) by increasing costs leading to car-poverty (being 
unable to afford a car) and decreasing car-utility (the accessibility and mobility 
a car offers). Within these policies. I do not directly consider the complete 
prohibition of conventional vehicles. 
 Accessibility and mobility are goods that should be preserved where possible, 
as they are means to many ends. Car ownership is not only a form of mobility 
that provides accessibility, but an important one given the current 
infrastructural lock-in.  
3A.3  Models in Policy Appraisal 
Recall from the literature review that models have been used to inform transport 
planning for over 50 years and more recently, there has been a widening range of 
studies modelling the likely uptake of LCVs. The focus of the studies varies 
between general forecasting or understanding of preferences to more explicit 
considerations such as policy development and wider system impacts. They often 
concentrate on overall emission reduction or technology uptake, but few take a 
disaggregated approach that can account for preferences of, or impacts on, socio-
demographic segments and none appear to voice explicit concerns about impacts 
on social justice. Because of this, many have recommended policies focused on 
achieving the objective for the study (i.e. emission reduction or market penetration), 
without assessing the costs they may impose on an individual level. I am concerned 
that the ethical issues I discuss in this Chapter regarding LCV policy are left out of 
these models. After I establish my claims regarding the policies, I will make a more 
detailed consideration of the permissibility of models in policy appraisal. 
                                               
39 Although I accept that there may also be advantages, such as lower running costs. 
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3A.4  Defence of Coercive LCV Policies 
CLAIM 1: In order to limit the harms of climate change, there is a strong case in 
favour of coercive policies that promote the introduction of LCVs – even if these 
policies may limit people’s opportunity for car ownership. 
 
In my stipulations I stated that governments are obliged to reduce carbon emissions 
for the sake of climate change. A review of previous literature regarding the ethics 
of climate change was presented in the literature review of this research and so I 
feel this stipulation is uncontroversial enough to need no further discussion. I 
believe that this is also a strong enough reason to justify limiting (but not 
preventing) people’s opportunity for car ownership compared to the present 
situation. In this section I defend the use of coercive policies that encourage the 
introduction of LCVs. These include the generic categories of polices identified in 
the literature review (Regulation, Competition and Collaboration, Fiscal Measures, 
Raising Awareness and Facilitating Adoption), as they may all directly or in-directly 
force a bias towards LCVs in the choices related to car ownership. A previous 
author (Duvall et al., 2002) has claimed that zero emission vehicle mandates (such 
as the Californian mandate discussed in the literature review) are unethical 
because they “override consumer preferences and limits the choices and thereby 
the liberty of members of society” (Duvall et al., 2012, p.562). I do not dispute the 
claim that such coercive policies infringe liberty, I very much agree that this will be 
the case, what I seek to argue here is that this infringement is permissible due to 
the harms of climate change.40 
 
The Claim is defended through explaining its consistency with the harm principle as 
a reason for legislation and Garrett Hardin’s’ proposed “mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon” to prevent a Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). I use the term 
’limit’ to mean that people will not have as much choice about what type of vehicle 
they own, or in the attributes of that vehicle, as per my earlier stipulation. I do 
however recognise that this claim can conflict with obligations to minimise further 
injustices, and this is addressed in my second claim. 
 
 
                                               
40 Duvall et al., did not consider carbon emissions in their paper, focusing instead on local 
pollution and disputed the environmental advantages of zero emission vehicles. 
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3A.4.1 The Harm Principle 
 
Any intervention that reduces our liberty may be undesirable and instinctively 
considered impermissible. However, there are many instances in which having 
freedom of choice would allow us to make unethical decisions where our actions 
can adversely impact others. Regulations are in place to prevent this (e.g. smoking 
in enclosed public areas). Prohibition of activities that prevent harm to others is a 
commonly accepted and uncontroversial government policy. 41  Joel Feinberg 
considers a range of liberty-limiting principles of penal legislation, the first being the 
harm principle, characterised as;  
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the 
actor… and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values. (Feinberg, 1988, p.xix)  
 
A detailed consideration of Feinberg’s work is outside the scope of this study. 
However, of the various principles, the harm principle is the least controversial, and 
is consistent with many liberal thinkers and what Gaus calls the Fundamental 
Liberal Principle:  
Freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who 
would limit freedom, especially through coercive means. It follows from this 
that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit the liberty of 
citizens. (Gaus and Courtland, 2011) 
 
As such, liberals would oppose a paternalistic law that (for example) prevented 
people from racing cars in controlled conditions where there is no risk to anyone but 
themselves. In contrast, laws preventing people from racing their cars on the 
streets, putting others in danger, is clearly not controversial. Feinberg’s definition of 
a harm is a “set-back to interest (non-normative) or violation of persons rights 
(normative)” and acknowledges that “requiring people to help prevent harms is 
sometimes as reasonable a legal policy as preventing people, by threat of 
punishment, from actively causing harms” (Feinberg, 1988, p.xix). In such 
situations, we may not carry the act out with the intention of causing harm to others, 
but we are (or any informed rational adult should be) aware of the risk that our 
actions may pose. A policy of phasing out of conventional vehicles by biasing the 
public towards lower carbon options can be supported by the harm principle as it 
reduces carbon emissions and thus their contribution to harmful climate change 
impacts on others.  
 
                                               
41 First proposed by J.S Mill in 1859. 
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3.A.4.2  An Appeal to “Tragedy of the Commons”42 
 
Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), discusses a notion of “no 
technical solution problems” (p.1243). These are major issues that can be only 
overcome by change in social behaviour, and are an important class of human 
problems that are often overlooked. Our current decisions relating to carbon 
emissions (and in the particular context of this work those associated with car 
ownership) fall within this category of problem.43 The concept of “Tragedy of the 
Commons” was first mooted in the mid-19th Century (Lloyd, 1832) and is explained 
by Hardin thus:  
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to 
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may 
work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and 
disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the 
day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this 
point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As 
a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of 
adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one 
positive component. 
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since 
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, 
the positive utility is nearly + 1. 
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created 
by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by 
all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making 
herdsman is only a fraction of - 1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each 
and every rational herdsman sharing the commons. Therein is the tragedy. 
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit - in a world that is limited….Freedom in the commons brings ruin 
to all. (p.1244) 
This generic concept can be readily witnessed (and addressed) in certain cases, 
such as grazing land, but as the size of the commons increases or its definition 
blurs, the impacts are not so easily identified and the exploitation can continue 
unabated. This is of particular concern when the impacts are temporally or spatially 
separated from the exploitation itself, most notably in the case of pollution. Climate 
change is an extreme example of such a case, and is occurring due to the growing 
number of people responsible for carbon emissions at increasingly greater 
individual contributions. 
                                               
42 All pages numbers given after quotes refer to Hardin, 1968. 
43  Although Hardin was particularly concerned with what he termed the “population 
problem”. 
120 
  
Other authors have already appealed to Hardin’s work in the study of climate 
change (for example, Gardiner (2001)) and I do not wish to repeat those thoughts 
here, but to apply it more specifically to the case of LCVs. The positive component 
is the utility that the vehicle ownership affords the individual, and in most cases it 
will be almost entirely theirs. The negative component of an extra car on the roads 
will be shared by all other road users due to congestion, local individuals due to 
safety risks and local pollution, and interspatial and intergenerational populations 
due to climate change. The majority of self-interested, rational individuals who could 
benefit from car ownership would do so,44 allowing the unabated negative impacts 
of car ownership to add up and lead to “ruin to all” (p.1244).  Hardin notes, 
however, that “morality is system sensitive” (p.1245). By this, he means that the 
actions of a small and steady number of people exploiting the commons, who may 
not recognise or cause serious or irreversible impacts, are not morally comparable 
to those who consciously join an already overexploited commons. This would seem 
to indicate that although the introduction of carbon intense technologies (such as 
conventional vehicles in the early 20th Century) is not wrong in itself, the choice to 
own and operate one today is less defensible.  
 
Hardin considers prohibition policies that governments could employ to facilitate 
required changes in social behaviour, which he recognises is “easy to 
legislate....though not necessarily to enforce” (p.1245), due to agreeing a just level, 
monitoring issues and the risk of corruption. He rules out appealing to personal 
conscience as the correct mechanism, as it is not guaranteed to be successful. 
Besides this, Hardin suggests that such actions may be morally questionable as 
control of others’ psyche often occurs through causing guilt and anxiety, which is 
“psychologically pathogenic” (p.1247) whether one conforms or not. With this in 
mind (and regardless of the morality), I believe that appeals to conscience could be 
even less successful today than when Hardin was writing, as there may now exist a 
weakened sense of community, reducing the motivation to be seen to do the right 
thing anyway.45 I would additionally argue that there are further moral concerns 
regarding appeals to conscience to those proposed by Hardin; they may allow 
exploitation of virtues,46 existence of free-riders47 and lack respect for autonomy. 48 
                                               
44 This assumes that anyone who wishes to own a car can do so (see stipulations). 
45  An anecdotal opinion that may be developed in future work, but it seems to be 
demonstrated by increased levels of anti-social behaviour and reduced participation in 
community activities. 
46 Exploitation of any kind implies using persons as means to an end – a practise thought 
wrong in most moral theories. When it is of one’s virtues, I believe that may be even 
worse. 
121 
  
 
Consequently, Hardin offers the possibility of “mutual coercion mutually agreed 
upon” (p.1247), carefully biased options (e.g. incremental price increases) that 
would lead even the conscienceless to make ‘responsible’ decisions in regards to 
the commons. To illustrate this concept, he starts with an easily understood 
example of the prohibition of bank-robbing, to which there is no exception. 
Everyone (except perhaps the bank-robber!) accepts this, as the robber is clearly 
taking unjustly from the commons and will be (presumably) unlikely to respond to 
an appeal to conscience. It seems right that we should have laws against robbery, 
as it would be unfortunately unrealistic to assume that no one would be tempted to 
rob, and without such laws we would be vulnerable to the would-be robbers. 
Moreover, Hardin points out that “when men mutually agreed to pass laws against 
robbing, mankind become more free, not less so” (p.1248), allowing people to make 
decisions on how to act based on legitimate available options.  
 
There are, however, situations where such outright prohibition of an activity may not 
be accepted, but needs to be controlled. Hardin uses the case of parking, where 
drivers are not always temperate in their use of spaces, and so parking charges are 
introduced, with meters for short stays and fines for longer ones. As he points out, 
“We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need 
merely make it increasingly expensive for him to do so” (p.1247). These are 
“carefully biased options” which Hardin considers as “coercion” rather than strictly 
prohibition.49 He recognises that coercion itself is not enjoyed and can be seen as 
unjust (though argues that so are existing legal constructs such as inheritance), but 
we do (in general) accept it, as “injustice is preferable to total ruin” (p.1247).   
 
When we face any paradigm shifts in social arrangements, even if the present 
situation is imperfect, Hardin suggests that we generally resist change to another 
imperfect situation and would rather wait until the perfect solution arises. However, 
he continues, in reality “we can never do nothing” (p.1247) because even if we 
                                                                                                                                    
47 Free-riders are those who benefit from not responding to appeals to conscience when 
others do. Although disputed in some instances, “free riding on the provision of a 
collective good is often characterised as morally wrong”  (Hardin, 2012). 
48  Over-riding one’s right to self-governance is a common objection to paternalistic 
interventions (Christman, 2011). 
49  Though I would argue that as these options may not be available to everyone, for 
example those who cannot afford a fine or do not wish to be burdened with the 
disgrace of being fined, it effectively means some people are still prohibited. With this 
in mind, it is possible that Hardin’s idea of coercion is closer to prohibition than he 
assumed, as prohibition may be a sub-set of coercion. 
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accept the status quo, we commit ourselves to one option and accept its 
imperfections without balancing its merits and consequences with the proposed 
reform and making a rational decision. In Hardin’s discussion of the population 
problem, he suggests that the error is in waiting for a “technical solution”. We must 
at some point accept that it may never arrive, or at least maybe not in time to solve 
the problem at hand as in the case of reducing carbon emissions, accepting any 
restrictions on freedom that may impose, such as the opportunity for car ownership.  
 
Hardin concludes his paper by summarising how “as the human population has 
increased, the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another” 
(p.1248). We have progressed down a path of recognising and mutually agreeing to 
prevent the impacts of overexploitation, from enclosing farmland to restricting waste 
disposal. Each new constraint on liberty was resisted until the realisation that once 
one knows what is prohibited and understands how that makes things collectively 
better, one is freer (recall the bank-robber example). Unless motivated by altruistic, 
moral or environmental concerns, a driver with the choice between a conventional 
car, which they are acquainted with and which meets their needs, would be 
irrational if they then chose a more expensive LCV that provides less utility. As out-
right prohibition of the conventional car is arguably unjust due to infrastructural lock-
in50 and appeals to conscience may prove ineffective and morally questionable, 
coercive LCV policies may be the solution. These may reduce the opportunity for 
car ownership, but following Hardin’s above argument, this is not necessarily a bad 
thing. 
 
An argument against Hardin’s claim that reduced choice makes us freer may be the 
generally held assumption that more choice is preferable to less. Gerald Dworkin, 
however, argues that this assumption is not necessarily always true due to the 
costs that come with some choices. These costs include the time and effort in 
making the choice (such as acquiring the information), the social and legal pressure 
in making a ‘responsible’ or ‘conforming’ choice, and that additional choices may 
change the nature of the original options. In relation to car ownership, Dworkin 
highlights how the introduction of the automobile increased travel options, but as 
this new option was taken up, funds were diverted from mass transit creating the 
lock-in to automobiles as, “What started out as an increase of the area of choice 
resulted in a situation in which one of the original choices was no longer available”. 
(Dworkin, 1982, p.54) 
                                               
50 This position is explored in the next section. 
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With carefully biased policy options towards LCVs, such as Fiscal Measures, there 
is still an option (albeit limited) of owning a car whilst carbon emissions are 
reduced. This position recognises and accepts the restrictions that climate change 
and low carbon technologies impose. It will also allow us to really examine what our 
requirements are, rather than making decisions that may be influenced by enticing, 
but ultimately irrelevant attributes, that may not be available in LCVs (such as top 
speeds above legal limits and mileage ranges above our needs).  
3A.5  Injustice from Coercive Policies 
CLAIM 2: In the short-term, many people are somewhat locked-in to car ownership 
for access and mobility. As such, policies should not allow additional unfair burdens 
on those who are already amongst the worst-off in society, or result in a different 
group of people being similarly disadvantaged.  
 
Having established that policies that may limit the opportunity for car ownership are 
permissible (due to the harms of climate change), attention now turns to how these 
limits may affect people. Although this may appear to be somewhat in conflict with 
Claim 1, in order to address climate change ethically, I do not believe costs should 
be just accepted. Rather, we should do all we can to avoid further injustices from 
those we currently have, so must ensure that it isn’t the worst-off who are hit 
hardest by the coercive policies from Claim 1. In this way, Claim 2 is in fact 
supplementary to Claim 1 rather than in conflict with it.  My concern is that some 
people in an unjust society,51 and particularly some of those already amongst the 
worst-off, may be more affected by change in the opportunity for car ownership than 
others. Previously, I stipulated that this opportunity is affected by two attributes: car-
poverty and car-utility, and that LCV policies will (in the short term) reduce the 
opportunity for car ownership by increasing car-poverty and decreasing car-utility.  
 
Car-poverty represents being unable to, or having limited ability to, own a car that 
meets one’s needs52 due to the costs associated with ownership (both purchase 
and operating). Those who are more sensitive to changes in the cost of ownership 
are vulnerable to car-poverty and I believe require protection if an LCV policy 
imposes car-poverty upon them by increasing costs of ownership. By the very 
nature of this group of people being sensitive to financial changes, it is very likely 
                                               
51 Recall this work begins from the status quo of an already unjust society. 
52 Although a potentially contentious concept, I define ‘one’s needs’ as gaining access to 
goods and services that are important to an individual. 
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that they are already amongst the worst-off in an economically driven society. I 
have assumed that car-poverty is increased by LCV policies as I assume that such 
policies make average ownership costs more expensive than today as conventional 
vehicles costs are increased but LCVs do not reduce significantly in price (and 
running costs do not counteract this).  
 
On the other hand, car-utility relates to the access and mobility that a vehicle 
provides to an individual. I have assumed that LCV policies reduce the average car-
utility through fewer conventional vehicles being made available and LCVs 
becoming more prevalent before meeting performance standards of conventional 
vehicles. This attribute of ownership will most greatly impact on those who have a 
higher reliance on car ownership than average. I am particularly concerned that this 
group of people contains those who already have a lower level of personal mobility 
(i.e. having less options for mobility, for example due to a disability or living in a 
rural area), and this condition itself may place them amongst the worst-off as they 
are already in a society that marginalises their needs. 
 
If the coercive policies permitted by Claim 1 impact groups in such a way that they 
are in danger of finding themselves amongst the worst-off, or if they are already 
amongst the worst-off then becoming more so, I believe these groups deserve 
special consideration, as finding oneself in one position of injustice should not lead 
to another.53 As my approach is addressing the real-world, I recognise that there is 
scarcity in resources,54 and so minimising these injustices for the vulnerable may 
require further sacrifice from those who are not amongst the worst-off. I will argue 
that there is a defensible claim that, in the short-term, many people are locked-in to 
a certain level of reliance on car ownership for mobility and accessibility.55 I then 
identify those groups that have the strongest claims for car ownership on the 
grounds of reliance. Once established, I consider methods to protect these groups 
by comparison to existing policies in the UK. More specifically I explore market 
regulation using the work of Jonathan Wolff (2011) and Michael Walzer (1984) then 
draw parallels to Disability Access Regulations, taxation and welfare benefits. 
                                               
53 See later on ‘pragmatic equality’. 
54 I use scarcity in a technical definition: “A condition where there is less of something 
available than at least some people would like to have if they could have them at no 
cost to themselves.” (Johnson, 2013). In any real world situation there will always be 
some form of scarcity. In this case, there are numerous relevant scarcities, notably 
money and the amount of carbon emissions the planet can absorb before we witness 
dangerous irreversible climate change (also known as ‘carbon sink’ – for more 
information see Garvey (2008)). 
55 Though I accept that car ownership is not inherently necessary to meet these needs. 
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3A.5.1 Claims for Car Ownership 
 
Philosophical Background 
Recall from the literature review that transport studies involves a complex 
interaction of many disciplines and transport ethics is not yet an established field.56 
There is a gathering body of work regarding automobility and transport policy 
appraisal, which discusses rights and fairness. This, however, has been generally 
carried out from a social science and humanities point of view. There has been little 
written in formal philosophical terms regarding car ownership directly. This is why 
consideration from the point of view of moral philosophy is important, and even 
more so in the context of climate change.  
 
Lomasky (1997) defends automobility to its critics by an appeal to its role in our 
development as autonomous beings, through self direction, privacy and choice. 
Although some of his claims may be somewhat stronger than many would accept, 
the combination of these goods does seem to have provided cars with a unique 
position in our society, embedding it in our lifestyles, and creating our reliance upon 
them. He states: 
Automobility is not just something for which people in their ingenuity or 
idiosyncrasy might happen to hanker…(it) is a good for people in virtue of its 
intrinsic features. (Lomasky, 1997, p.8)  
 
Similarly, Rajan’s work on the ethics of driving suggests that the normative view in 
liberal society is a positive one as it provides freedom and well-being and can be 
used as a “social equalizer” (Rajan, 2007, p.88). However, because of this a blind-
spot exists which leads to the automobile being so ordinary and accepted that its 
“conceptualization as a unique theoretical subject” is often overlooked, which 
“condition(s) us to accept its importance without question”, (Rajan, 2007, pp88-89).  
This view is perhaps supported by Wood (2009), who distinguishes the right to 
travel from the right to travel by a particular form of transport: 
The right to drive a motor vehicle on the public highway crept in almost under 
the radar. The use of cars by a privileged few was tolerated and became a de 
facto right in the early twentieth century, aided by it being a symbol of a status 
to which many people aspired. (Wood, 2009, p.10)   
 
I agree with Rajan that it is likely that car ownership (that I suppose is synonymous 
to driving in this work) currently holds a normative positive value to society and that 
the importance of this should be recognised. I am not attempting to defend that it is 
                                               
56 Although many recognised concepts such as risk, distributive justice and value of life can 
be transferred or enriched by application to transport. 
126 
  
right that the car holds this position, but accept it to be true, and therefore relevant 
to this discussion on the moral issues of the car dominant society. Further, it would 
seem to me that the car has indeed achieved this position “under the radar” as 
described by Wood, and this has lead to Lomasky’s assertion that automobility and 
autonomy have become entwined with one another. These are also morally 
relevant factors of car dominance that deserve recognition when designing policies 
that may affect car ownership. I would, however, challenge that this normative 
positive value of the car in society should remain to be the case (as I think Rajan 
was implying), and furthermore suggest that it is these very views that may cause 
the biggest barrier to a decarbonised transport system in the long term (as it will 
very likely require a significant shift away from private vehicle ownership). 
 
Historical Perspective 
Although removal of a technology may not intuitively be morally different from 
providing access to a technology in the first place, in this case the automobile has 
become a means to access and mobility. When the current conventional vehicle 
was introduced, it was only available to the rich and privileged, but now private cars 
are depended on, in growing numbers. The inequality of ownership at the 
introduction was not unfair as there was no obligation to provide this new 
technology to all people. However, as our current infrastructure has evolved around 
the automobile (which in some cases involved replacement or neglect of other 
transport options and their infrastructure), removal of the automobile could increase 
the gap in equality between sections of society. This is another example of Hardin’s 
proposal that morality is system sensitive, and is a reason why I only focus on a 
short time-scale in this research. I believe that as LCV attributes are normalised, or 
private car ownership is not viewed as the dominant / favoured mobility option, 
there will come a tipping-point, after which these arguments will no longer hold true.  
 
The ‘Locked-in’57 Barrier 
The accessibility a car provides not only adds value to our lives through enabling 
involvement in social and pleasure activities, but also may be a vital instrument in 
pursuing our deeply held projects, assuring our employment and security, and 
allows us a freedom of movement in many other areas important to us as 
individuals. The private automobile is seen as an essential part of everyday life for 
many citizens in the western world. To an extent, this is true regardless of socio-
demographics. The widespread availability of the automobile (as a form of cheap 
                                               
57 See footnote 33. 
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transport that allows freer movement) is seen by Karl Popper as a massive benefit 
to social reform and an example of “great revolutions… (which) cannot be foreseen 
by anybody” (Popper, 1997, p.42).58 In fact, it is most difficult for one to imagine 
what the world could be like if the car had not been invented. Since the first cars 
and roads were introduced around a hundred years ago, and the internal 
combustion engine dominated, our infrastructure and our culture have co-evolved. 
Numerous political decisions have indirectly cemented the car’s place in our society 
(e.g. cutting rail networks and building out-of-town shopping centres),59 to the point 
of creating a ‘lock-in’ to car ownership for many. A number of constraints may force 
one into requiring car ownership, and are the basis for the special claims for car 
ownership set out in the next section. These constraints make non-car ownership 
impossible or highly impractical and include limited personal mobility, distance 
between home and work, and lack of available or credible alternative modes to 
access services. The cultural and social status car ownership affords you may also 
be viewed a constraint for some people.60 I would not however argue that mere 
perception is such a constraint – for instance if one could simply not imagine using 
other modes because one is used to car ownership. Due to the reasons set out in 
this section, I believe that for many people, it is uncontroversial to say that owning a 
car is seen as greatly advantageous, if not a necessity, and this is an observation 
made by others, such as Lomasky and Rajan, but also as;  
“Motorized accessibility to key destinations such as employment centers, 
schools, or medical facilities, has become, in the words of Dworkin, a 
prerequisite for “a life of choice and value”. (Martens, 2006, p.7) 
 
Some people may rely so heavily on their car ownership, that their standard of living 
may be unfairly reduced if it is prevented or diminished in some way, creating a 
general claim for the preservation in the opportunity for car ownership. This said, it 
does not follow that owning a car is an absolute right that must not be violated. It is 
not the intention to suggest that car ownership is the only option for travel, or should 
be preserved indefinitely. Indeed, many people do not own a car, but do still travel.  
 
                                               
58 This comment was made in a critique of Marx, who Popper believed did not realise the 
value of revolution in ‘personal services’, and instead was concerned with the 
production of material things. 
59 Or conversely, this may have been the intention for some, as Margaret Thatcher is 
quoted as saying “Nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of our great car 
economy” (HoC, 2003). 
60 This is well illustrated by the anecdotal term ‘poverty wagon’ for public buses or Margaret 
Thatcher’s attributed comment in the previously mentioned debate that “A man who, 
beyond the age of 26, finds himself on a bus can count himself as a failure”. 
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For now, the question of whether cars should be allowed at all is one that will be put 
aside, though it is acknowledged that there are many reasons why we may wish to 
remove all (or many) cars from our roads, from environmental and safety concerns 
to social inequality in the future.61 
 
3A.5.2 Groups with Special Claims 
 
There are certain segments of society that may have stronger claims than others for 
the preservation of car ownership as they are sensitive to car-poverty and car-utility. 
These groups could face unfair burdens if coercive policies biased towards LCVs 
reduce their opportunity for car ownership, especially as these groups are often the 
most disadvantaged by a car-oriented society in the first place.  
 
Low-income 
Those in the lowest income quintile are already the worst-off in our money-
dominated society, and are at most risk of car-poverty. This group may not have a 
stronger claim than others for car ownership per se, but I argue can have a stronger 
claim for assistance in preserving it. As car ownership is already one of the highest 
household expenses, the poor who own a car are more likely to own a private 
vehicle because of necessity.62 Indeed, motoring costs account for 24% of the total 
household expenditure of car owners in the lowest income quintile (Lucas et al., 
2001).63  
 
As it is well documented that the poor are more sensitive to fiscal changes, and as I 
suspect that many of these people will be restricted (in terms of affordability) to 
owning older, second-hand cars that are less fuel-efficient, it is this group that 
would feel the impact of changes in motoring costs (of conventional cars), which 
would come about through coercive policies, the most. Further to this, they will not 
be able to afford expensive new LCVs and are unlikely to be able to access private 
infrastructure (e.g. charge points), as housing in this group is unlikely to be self-
owned or have the necessary private off-road parking and they may not be able to 
afford to purchase and install the infrastructure anyway. When this is set in a 
situation where this group generally travel less than other income quintiles (not due 
                                               
61 A discussion on this can be found in Sloman (2006). 
62 By this, I mean that they (more so than any other group) can only justify the cost of car 
ownership because they are required to make journeys that are not possible (or are 
highly impractical) without a car, due to the constraints listed earlier. Though this does 
not necessarily mean that they would prefer not to be car owners. 
63 This is between 10 and 15% in other quintiles. 
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to a lower need or desire but because they are prevented from doing so by 
associated costs) (SDC, 2011), and as a result of this they are amongst the least 
responsible for carbon emissions, it seems intuitively even more unfair that they 
may experience the brunt of the coercive policies. 
 
Disabled 
Before discussing car ownership claims for this group, it is crucial to note that I 
assume that this is a group of people who are already likely to be facing many non-
mobility related restrictions. Societal practises, culture and infrastructure are 
generally biased towards non-disabled people and marginalise disabled people. 
This situation, in addition to any specific hardships that the condition directly causes 
(e.g. pain, lack of autonomy or poor quality of life), makes them amongst the worst-
off and most vulnerable in society. I recognise, however,  that there are many forms 
of disability each having its own impact on mobility, so need to be dealt with 
separately when it comes to claims for car ownership: 
 There are (primarily physical) disabilities that makes car-utility a significant 
factor in car ownership, as they not only reduce personal mobility but also 
prevent or restrict access to other modes of transport. I would argue that 
those who fall in this category may have the strongest claims across all 
society for car ownership.  
 By contrast, many disabilities, such as certain physical or intellectual 
disabilities, visual impairments and mental health issues, may prevent people 
from driving entirely and are therefore not my direct concern in this work. 
Many of these may however, still be dependent on someone else’s car 
ownership. Should they also have poor personal mobility and/or be prevented 
or restricted in accessing other transport modes, people with disabilities of 
this type face the most barriers in a car-oriented society, so require special 
consideration in wider transport, accessibility or mobility policies. 
 Finally, other disabilities, such as hearing impairments, may not be relevant to 
car ownership positively or negatively, so may not have any strong claim for 
car ownership.  
 
Rural 
Those living in rural areas have a high sensitivity to car-utility as they are reliant on 
car ownership due to the distance from major amenities (e.g. retail, leisure, 
education and employment) and also suffer from the poorer provision of public 
transport and local services. People living in rural areas have the highest incidence 
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of car ownership of any group as they see car ownership as a necessity, imposing 
extra costs to rural living (SDC, 2011). Further to this, SDC report that low-income 
and young people in rural areas who do not have access to a car are particularly 
disadvantaged both in educational and employment opportunities. The claim for car 
ownership may not be as strong as some other categories due to the greater 
element of choice regarding where one lives (and works etc), but there is certainly a 
widening disparity in car ownership levels between rural and other areas (Lucas 
and Jones, 2009) that suggests a higher level of dependence that forms the basis 
of this claim. 
 
Elderly 
The elderly are generally less physically mobile and poorer than other segments of 
society, yet more dependent on social goods and services. This can make them 
susceptible to both car-poverty and car-utility. Although pensioners are entitled to a 
free bus-pass, many still own a private vehicle and see this as their main means of 
transport, providing greater independence and well-being (Lucas and Jones, 2009). 
Limited by even the shortest distances, car ownership may be a significant factor in 
maintaining independence, and lack of car ownership has a correlation with social 
exclusion (SDS, 2011). There will be many members of this group for whom car 
ownership is not a possibility to begin with, as some may have never driven 
(particularly women)64  or are no longer capable of doing so (due to declining 
physical abilities). As this may mean that this group may be a relatively small group, 
it is possible that they may be overlooked. Towards the end of the short time-frame 
of this work the group size is likely to grow as the UK has an ageing population.  
 
Other Special Commitments 
There are a number of other circumstances in which people are more sensitive to 
car-utility than average so may have a stronger claim for car ownership than 
average. These circumstances are more related to lifestyle choices,65 and as such, 
they may not give rise to making people amongst the worst-off, depending on how 
flexible that choice is. This group is quite varied, with the strength of the claim 
depending very much on individual circumstances. Examples of stronger claims in 
this category are those with particular family commitments (e.g. having large 
families or young children) or those who would otherwise have impractical journeys 
                                               
64 Around a third of women over 70 hold a driving licence whereas almost 80% of men do 
(Lucas and Jones, 2009). 
65 It is perhaps these types of lifestyle choices that become unrealistic in a low carbon 
future, or when the costs of carbon are internalised, not just in transport, but also 
housing, energy and commodities. 
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to their workplace, whereas weaker claims may be related to pursuing hobbies 
which are inconvenient without a car (e.g. scuba diving) or requires a car (e.g. 
racing driver). It may even include those who have particularly strong emotive 
attachment to the car (e.g. classic car enthusiasts). These claims may be false as 
they are weakened by the arguments in Claim 1, which accepts that effort or 
sacrifices may need to be made. This is especially so if the coercive policies for 
LCVs bring about mere inconvenience rather than making these people amongst 
the worst-off (as I believe could occur in the case of the other special claims). 
Although I recognise that in certain circumstances there may be strength in these 
types of claims, I do not believe I can argue in favour of them to the same extent as 
the other groups.  
 
3A.5.3 Comparison to Existing Public Policy 
 
I have now established that although coercive policies, which reduce opportunity for 
car ownership, are permissible, there exists a legitimate claim for the preservation 
of a basic level of opportunity for car ownership in the short-term, and have 
identified a number of groups who may need protection from changes in car-poverty 
and car-utility. In this section I argue that there is a government responsibility to 
provide this assistance under the same reasoning as existing public policies such 
as market regulation, disability access, tax exemptions and welfare benefits, in that 
a responsible government recognises and attempts to ameliorate inequalities within 
society. I believe this claim could be made even stronger when one recognises that 
it is government policy itself that has given rise to lock-in and inequalities. 
 
Market Regulation  
Success of any product in a true free market is due to buyer(s) and seller(s) 
seeking mutually beneficial agreement, without interferences from the state. This 
can lead to inequalities within society, due to pre-existing inequalities of needs and 
resources. In the UK we have a semi-regulated market, with many prices and 
transactions determined by market dynamics, but also with government pursuing a 
fair distribution. Jonathan Wolff believes that certain goods should be fenced off as 
a necessary condition of living well, because “if all goods are available only on a 
market basis, those who have not made an economic success of their lives will be 
excluded from almost everything else too” (Wolff, 2011, p.187). He further defends 
the need for regulation because “the free market cannot always be trusted to deliver 
outcomes that will seem to be socially acceptable” (Wolff, 2011, p.170) citing the 
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externalities of purchase decisions, the existence of monopolies, and the 
asymmetry of knowledge between buyer and seller. That said, in the long term, a 
freer market may be advantageous, as “free competition (can) .... drive out poor 
quality goods, keep prices low and match supply to demand”. (Wolff, 2011, p.174).  
 
Wolff is not alone in asserting that different goods should be treated separately, 
particularly in terms of distribution rules, as Michael Walzer’s “Spheres of Justice” 
(1984) would appear to come to a similar conclusion. Within his work, Walzer 
proposes that the distributive criteria of any specific good is relative to the social 
good it provides to a specific society: 
If we understand what it is, what it means to those for whom it is a good, we 
understand how, by whom, and for what reasons it ought to be distributed. All 
distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at 
stake (Walzer, 1984, pp.8-9) 
 
This recognizes that the value of a good is relative to the meaning it forms within a 
society, which in turn is influenced by the factors which have formed that society. 
Walzer goes on to establish that everyday commodities can be distributed in a free 
market, but for the most important goods in a society (those with a specific social 
meaning), the free market is not an appropriate mechanism for distribution. Such a 
good deserves their own “distributive sphere” that should be autonomous from 
other spheres, though he recognises that in reality “what happens in one distributive 
sphere affects what happens in the others” (Walzer, 1984, p.10).  Within such a 
sphere, the nature of the good itself determines the rule of its just distribution. The 
concept of transport as a separate sphere of justice is discussed in more depth by 
Karel Martens (2012), who defines the transport ‘good’ as accessibility rather than 
mobility, arguing the former is more linked to needs than the latter. 66 Although I 
agree with Martens that access is more linked to needs, making it a greater concern 
for transport policy, I do not wish to neglect mobility from my work due to its 
important role in autonomy. I capture this dual good of car ownership in the 
previously discussed term of car-utility – the access and mobility a car provides.  
 
Leading from this, I argue that because coercive policies essentially regulate the 
market, and in doing so reduce consumer choice in certain goods, further 
supportive measures are required to protect those vulnerable to that reduction in 
choice (i.e. likely to unduly suffer). I believe that (in the short-term) access and 
                                               
66 Martens further suggests that the distributive rule within this sphere should be one of 
‘maximax’, that “combines the goal of maximum average accessibility with a limit on the 
maximal gap allowed between the worst-off and the best-off in terms of accessibility 
level” (Martens, 2012, p.1048). 
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mobility through car ownership is such a good that Wolff’s argument is applicable 
and there is strong argument for it being fenced off, as exclusion in car ownership 
can lead to exclusion from so much more than many other goods. Likewise, car 
ownership could qualify for having its own distributive sphere, due to its distinct 
social meaning arising from ‘lock-in’ as discussed previously, and as it allows us to 
move freely, participate in society, and it increase’s our life choices.  
 
Disability Access Regulations 
Under the 2010 UK Equality Act, any public venue, (e.g. a theatre) is required to 
provide suitable access for disabled customers. Without this, the owner may decide 
that the extra income he would expect to receive from providing disabled access 
may not cover the costs required to put it in so decides against doing so. The owner 
has therefore acted discriminately, but in a strict free market approach that is his 
choice and the disabled person has no right to complain. In the UK, owning a car, 
like visiting a theatre, is an opportunity currently available to most of us, so an 
analogous law that ensures equal opportunity of car ownership between cohorts of 
society may be appropriate. Government assistance in mobility for disabled persons 
does exist, as the disability may incur higher transport costs than otherwise. For 
example, there is a mobility component to the Disability Living Allowance, and this 
may be used to lease a new car with adaptions where necessary through the 
“Motability” scheme. Yet a poor person who cannot afford transport does not 
necessarily get such explicit consideration (though transport costs are factored into 
job seekers allowance).  
 
A government which addresses an inequality resulting from one type of 
disadvantage in a different way to another may be deemed biased. Disabilities may 
be in many ways much less escapable than poverty but the effective life choices the 
condition imposes can be just as restrictive (if not more so). A societal inequity of 
any good (such as access or mobility) should be approached in a similar way in the 
first instance, though I recognise the underlying reason for the inequity may 
ultimately make a difference to the correct way in which to address it. In addressing 
inequalities brought about through disabilities, Wolff calls for “Pragmatic Equality”: 
“a world in which disability does not add to other sources of inequality” (Wolff, 2011, 
p.154). For example, disabled people should have the same opportunities as non-
disabled counterparts, everything else being equal. I believe this can be 
transferable to people in other positions vulnerable to injustice. Therefore, if one 
cohort of society is particularly dependent on car ownership for their accessibility 
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and mobility, and if the opportunity of car ownership is reduced, then the 
government should ensure that this is addressed by compensatory measures.  
 
Taxation and Welfare Benefits 
Another example of a coercive policy for LCVs may be a tax related to vehicular 
carbon emissions. Taxation as a form of coercive policy is generally accepted in the 
UK, even if somewhat begrudged. In a transport context there is an annual vehicle 
tax, based on tailpipe carbon emissions, and operational fuel tax, partly based on 
environmental impact. These taxes, especially on fuel, are one of the more 
controversial taxes in the UK due to their role in creating some of the highest fuel 
prices in the world, but also are integral to our economy, so are arguably 
necessary. If additional vehicle taxation is permissible (under Claim 1),  I believe it 
permissible to apply further taxes to some people to help provide government 
support for the worst-off, perhaps also allowing the groups with special claims to be 
eligible for tax reductions or exemptions. There is already in place in the UK a pilot 
rural fuel duty rebate scheme that offers five pence per litre discount on pump 
prices in the Scottish Islands and Isles of Scilly. Recently a consultation has been 
launched to assess if this should be extended to inland remote rural areas (HMT, 
2013). This is more related to the particularly high prices in these areas than car 
use, but may set a precedent for targeted fuel duty exemptions.  
 
Alternatively, an entirely different form of taxation, such as carbon or road pricing 
may be more appropriate. These of course, are not without their own problems 
when put into practise (such as unintended side-effects,67 enforcement, corruption 
and exploitation), but if they can be resolved, may offer a fairer distribution of 
burdens as they can raise the price of carbon intense goods (e.g. fossil fuels) or 
activities (e.g. driving) accordingly.68 However, if some people can no longer afford 
a car, and the impact on others is more of inconvenience, there is an inequality in 
the new situation disproportionate to the current situation, hence the need for 
government support. I accept that this may be at the further expense of others 
within society, but, bearing in mind that I am assuming conditions of scarcity (recall 
Footnote 54), as long as they are not amongst the worst-off I believe that this is 
acceptable. This is in line with my defence of coercive polices. Similarly, Duvall et 
                                               
67 E.g. as witnessed by the increase in Local NOx pollution due to an increased proportion 
of lower CO2 emissions diesel vehicles in UK fleet. 
68 Although fuel duty already reflects some environmental impact it is not explicitly linked to 
carbon emissions. 
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al., in their paper on the ethical issues of zero emission vehicles, argue in favour of 
emissions-based taxes, as customers have “options to reduce their tax liability” 
(Duvall et al., 2002, p.572) but they also recognise (through a Rawlsian “justice as 
fairness” argument) that a graduated tax system may be required: 
If different wages are paid to different people in proportion to the marginal 
value of goods and services produced (given a competitive market system), 
the different tax amounts ought also apply to different people in proportion to 
the marginal cost of decision relating to car purchasing, tampering etc. (Duvall 
et al., 2002, p.573) 
 
Inequality through taxation, which requires rectification, may be brought about in 
various ways. For example, regarding electric vehicles, as already established the 
poor are more likely to own high emitting cars, and less likely to own electric 
vehicles. As electric cars enter the market, if the electricity used to power them 
remains immune to fuel taxes, the poor may be doubly disadvantaged. Likewise, 
those in society with a high reliance on car ownership due to physical disabilities 
(whom are already amongst the worst-off regarding mobility) and those in specific 
constrained situations (e.g. the poor living in rural/inaccessible areas) are subjected 
to higher running costs, and the limited range of an electric vehicle may not meet 
their needs. 
 
Certain sections of society are recognised already as being less able to contribute 
tax, and are often those who are eligible for welfare benefits as well. Perhaps 
following this, a tax exemption on transport costs and/or assistance in purchase for 
certain cohorts of society may be appropriate. Such a scheme could be 
comparative to fuel poverty assistance schemes in the UK, such as the Energy 
Conservation Act 2000, which places a duty on government to have a strategy in 
place to “ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that no person lives in fuel 
poverty” (DECC, 2012).  
 
It is not clear, however, to what extent the government would have a duty to assist 
people in car ownership, rather than access and mobility, though I suspect that the 
arguments I have made relating to the locked-in barrier and special claims would be 
in support of the former. I believe that car ownership is as important to life as home 
ownership,69 perhaps more so due to the mobility it provides. Many people cannot 
afford to buy a house but the government assists in this through various schemes, 
such as shared ownerships and more recently the Help to Buy equity loan scheme, 
which provides interest free loans for deposits for those purchasing newly built 
                                               
69 Owning a house outright or through mortgage, not through rental. 
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houses. Other than the Motability scheme mentioned earlier, the government does 
not provide assistance to those who otherwise would not be able to purchase any 
type of car. The Plug-in Car Grant, to assist LCV purchase, and the previously in 
place scrappage scheme, to incentivise replacement of older cars, are the closest 
approximations to assistance in car ownership, but in both cases (and in the case of 
Help to Buy) it is not the poorest who benefit, as significant capital is required to be 
contributed by the purchaser also. Although my concern is for the worst-off, which is 
why I point this out, I am not arguing against these policies. It is not necessarily 
unfair if only richer people could afford a LCV in the short term, as innovators and 
early adopters are needed to germinate the market, bringing about technological 
progress and economies of scale that will be beneficial in the long term. I am simply 
emphasising that they do not assist those who are worst-off. 
3A.6 The Permissibility of Models in Policy Appraisal 
Now that the claims have been explored and defended, I have established an 
ethical framework that allows coercive policies for the introduction of LCVs, which 
may reduce opportunity for car ownership, but recognises that some groups need 
special consideration within these policies. The ethical framework will form the 
basis of what I seek to establish within a model in the remainder of this research. 
Therefore, I now turn my attention to the permissibility of models in policy appraisal. 
I consider this alongside another common, but controversial, tool, Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA),70 concluding that both have limitations in their use, with moral 
implications. Following this, I suggest how an empirical model could incorporate the 
non-empirical framework identified in this Chapter. 
 
3A.6.1 Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
In its simplest form, CBA determines whether a policy or plan would be desirable by 
identification of the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR), which should be greater than “1” (the 
sum of all gains/benefits should exceed the sum of all losses/costs). In addition, this 
can be used to compare policy options. Although it is generally agreed that CBA is 
a useful tool in making decisions (though is not a decision making tool by itself), 
and has been in use for over a century (Thomopoulos et al., 2009), its 
appropriateness for public policy by itself has been widely discussed in applied 
philosophy (particularly in healthcare). In these debates, it has been criticised for its 
                                               
70 Also known as Risk Benefit Analysis (RBA), but I consider these terms synonymous. 
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utilitarian approach, economic basis, anthrocentric focus, potentially superficial or 
limited application and tendency to bias.71 Whereas critics say that CBA fails to give 
equal value to individual lives in its calculations because it does not identify the 
distributional effect, tending to favour some72 and not preventing harm in others, 
advocates dispute this (Williams, 1988).  
 
3A.6.2 Modelling 
 
Modelling differs from CBA in that it does not directly contrast costs and benefits, 
but attempts to simulate changes over time, or identify conditions required to meet 
desired targets. Models can be used to make predictions on values of indicators 
subsequently used in CBA. There are many philosophical discussions already 
ongoing around model semantics, ontology, and epistemology (Frigg and 
Hartmann, 2012), but not on the ethics of modelling. It is not my intention to enter 
the philosophical debates here, but do wish to contribute to the under-developed 
conversation on the ethics of modelling in real-world policy-making. Models used in 
ex-ante evaluation of policies tend to focus on measurement of an overarching 
objective without assessing the risks they may impose on an individual level and do 
not tend to contain explicit consideration of how the policies may impact on social 
justice.  
 
3A.6.3 Limitations 
 
There are similar moral issues concerning the role of CBA and modelling in policy 
appraisal, as both focus on a chosen indicator(s), and may be blind to other morally 
relevant outcomes. Both methods are limited by practicalities (of time, data and 
resources) and implicitly laden with values and judgements made by the actor 
carrying it out as well as limited by their knowledge, competency, motivations and 
ethical mindset. Additionally, amongst policy makers there seems to be an implicit 
presumption of these being value-neutral, without any explicit defence of that being 
the case. In his consideration of ex-ante evaluation of transport policies van Wee 
defends CBA, “mainly for the practical reason that it may contribute to a ‘better’ 
quality of decision making”, as it is “a systematic evaluation of pros and cons” (van 
                                               
71 Discussions can be found in Gardiner (2011), van Wee (2011), Thomopoulos et al., 
(2009) and Harris (1997).   
72 For instance, in transport CBA willingness to pay indicators are often used which are 
biased towards richer people. 
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Wee, 2011a, p.18). Without such an ex-ante system in place, major inconsistencies 
may arise and highly debateable assumptions may not be challenged.73  
 
van Wee does recommend that CBA should be used with caution and should not be 
used as the only basis for decision making, as there are numerous ethically 
relevant criticisms. These criticisms relate to cases where alternatives are not 
comparable, winners and losers are not relatively equal to begin with, there is large 
uncertainty or there are political preferences. Further to this, CBA may generate 
more than one favourable outcome, thus is not able to conclusively assist in the 
decision making.  I believe that these criticisms must be addressed when choosing 
a CBA approach, to defend its permissibility. van Wee also considers models, 
suggesting that they are favoured as they “provide quantitative 
information…(and)…perceived neutrality” (van Wee, 2011a, p.195) (through 
calibration, validation, testing and frequent use), but warns that modelling has many 
ethically relevant dimensions. In addition to generic considerations of ex-ante policy 
evaluations, models may be limited to their specific situation/purpose, are 
vulnerable to mis-interpretation and sensitive to their complexity, boundaries and 
assumptions.  He concludes: 
The eclectic approach – combining multiple theories to come to a practically 
applicable approach – would certainly match the eclectic approaches that are 
often seen in studying transport and its impacts on society.’ (van Wee, 2011a, 
p.222)  
 
3A.6.4 Implications 
 
Martens has considered both CBA and modelling74 from a social justice perspective 
and concludes that “there has hardly been any explicit reflection on the 
distributional mechanisms that are currently built into both planning tools” (Martens, 
2006, p.3), and because of this, they “may actually reinforce the existing differences 
in mobility and accessibility between various population groups” (Martens, 2006, 
p.5). He suggests that, although attempts have been made to ensure environmental 
concerns are considered, such appraisal tools should be based on accessibility 
needs rather than demand, though he accepts there are many challenges in doing 
so: 
                                               
73 I would however argue that neither CBA nor modelling is immune to such issues, but 
should reduce the occurrence due to the systematic nature. 
74 Martens considers the classic ‘four-step’ models of transport networks, but I think his 
conclusions are transferable to car ownership models. 
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If … accessibility has indeed become a prerequisite for such a life, and if we 
posit that each citizen deserves such a life, the provision of transport facilities 
can hardly be based on the criterion of demand. Rather, need comes to the 
fore as the just principle upon which to distribute key transport facilities.… the 
goal of such a need-based model would be to assess to what extent the 
existing or future transport network is able to secure a minimal level of 
accessibility for all population groups. Unlike demand-based models that apply 
a seemingly neutral methodology, the development of a needs-based model 
will require an explicitly normative approach, as needs will have to be 
distinguished from wants and explicit accessibility standards will have to be 
set.  (Martens, 2006, pp.7-8) 
 
Although I understand why demand-based models were developed, I share the 
concerns of Martens. Systems based on and responding to aggregate demand 
cannot adequately take account of the needs of individuals, as opposed to 
preferences. Due to this, demand models fail to identify those who are in danger of 
a reduced opportunity for morally relevant goods. Further to this, Timms suggests 
the following: 
Moves should be made to adopt a communicative approach to transport 
modelling which views models as being tools in communicative planning 
processes. Models used in such processes would benefit by being subjectivist, 
whereby explicit recognition is made by the modeller about their (personal) 
level of uncertainty in the model. Furthermore, models making long term 
predictions should incorporate the responses of actors in the transport policy-
making process (planners, politicians and the voting public) to future states of 
the transport system. Such changes in modelling approach would be greatly 
aided if transport modellers were to become more aware of formal 
philosophical concepts and arguments….and were to incorporate the insights 
from such philosophy in their writing about models. (Timms, 2008, p.408)  
 
In agreement with Timms, I would stress that a modeller must be aware of the wider 
process and philosophy of their work and that a model should not be used as the 
sole decision-making tool. Models can only ever capture what has been decided to 
be modelled, which will be specific to the question raised by the policy-maker, and 
therefore needs to be framed within a communicative process as implied by Timms.  
 
As models are built to reflect real world systems, which contain many complexities, 
feedbacks, unknown and unpredictable events, an accurate model which replicates 
an entire system would be a significant, if not impossible task. Therefore the 
modeller is limited to restricting the parameters of the model and systems within it 
to a manageable size. Although this reduces the accuracy and realism of a model, 
so does any academic task, be it lab-based or philosophical.  However, I do accept 
that there may be a danger in this comparison. Policy makers may have high 
expectations for models’ outputs, and therefore must be fully briefed in the 
interpretation, accuracy and limitations of these outputs. As part of this, the 
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modeller should be aware of and able to manage their accountability, and the 
policy-maker should be wary of making judgements based on (unwarranted) 
appeals to authority.  
 
There will always be insurmountable obstacles which one encounters when 
attempting to seek methods that marry empirical data and non-empirical 
judgements. However, any policy-maker who uses models to inform their decision-
making must be fully aware of the ex-ante ethical evaluation, and of the purpose, 
design and limitation of the model. Such pressure of understanding may be too 
demanding, but it is not unreasonable to argue that any policy-maker has a duty to 
be informed. The model may be vulnerable to misuse or corruption, but no more so 
than other policy appraisal tools. Like any evaluative procedures, it can only test the 
predicted problems and ascertaining these is itself a morally relevant activity. 
 
3A.6.5 Application 
 
By combining the recognised limitations of modelling with the “eclectic” (van Wee), 
needs-based (Martens) and communicative (Timms) approaches, I think modelling 
methodology can be improved. The overarching objective, needs and burdens 
(including what is ‘acceptable’) should be clearly identified by both modeller and 
policy-maker, through an ethical-socio-technical consideration of the policies. 
Where needs and burdens have been identified, compensatory or supportive 
measures must be considered. This allows for the identification of potential 
vulnerable sections of society and these tasks together form what I term ‘the ethical 
framework’. The modellers’ decisions on the model boundaries, inputs and output 
parameters, should then be guided by this framework, and outputs that are 
indicators of unacceptable burdens should be included. This process should be 
transparent and clearly communicated to the policy-maker. Finally, a model should 
not merely be a predictive tool for identifying the best option, but should instead 
compare the impacts of certain options on particular outcomes, within a specific 
framework, and used in conjunction with other appraisal tools. 
3A.7  The Ethical Framework 
In this research I am developing a model to test policies within the ethical 
framework established here that satisfies the claims I have argued for in this 
Chapter. This framework allows coercive policies for the introduction of LCVs, 
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which may reduce opportunity for car ownership, but also recognises that some 
groups need special consideration within these policies. 
 
I have sought to develop a model to test policies within the ethical framework 
established here, through three parameters: reduction in carbon emissions (this is 
empirical and already built into the model I use); impact on car-poverty (by change 
in purchase prices) and change in car-utility (by change in vehicle attributes). The 
latter two should be linked to vulnerable segments of society as they are morally 
significant impacts on car ownership that the introduction of low carbon cars may 
incur. Also, the model is for one specific concern of social justice, and therefore can 
only be used in consideration of that. It cannot (for example) compare the impact of 
changes in the opportunity for car ownership on social inclusion or public transport 
(though these are morally relevant questions which should be addressed 
elsewhere). Also, the model is based on the ethical framework I have developed – 
another philosopher, policy-maker or scientist may view this differently. Although I 
recognise that there are limits to the applicability and permissibility of models in 
policy making (due to design and boundaries) it does not diminish the approach I 
take in this research. Modelling may only answer a specific question within an 
appeal to a specific political philosophy of a specific policy maker/modeller, but 
nonetheless plays an important role in policy decision-making when carefully 
applied. 
3A.8  Conclusion 
At the beginning of this work I established that my objective was to suggest how we 
should deal with the practical, real-world issue of policy-making regarding low 
carbon cars. I considered philosophical questions of justice regarding climate 
change, car ownership and coercive policies, and made suggestions on how we 
should protect the most vulnerable, based on existing public policy. I established 
that there is an obligation to reduce carbon emissions due to the harms of climate 
change, and it is permissible to use coercive policies to do so, even though they 
may impact on the opportunity for car ownership. However, as car ownership needs 
vary across society, I have argued that such coercive policies should not amplify 
existing, or create new, injustices. This may require market regulation and public 
policies that preserve the opportunity for car ownership for the most vulnerable and 
may be at the expense of others in society. Identification of these issues was a 
necessary step in a policy appraisal process culminating in modelling of policies, as 
I was concerned that modellers in the past may not have considered sufficiently the 
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issues of distributive justice. Following from this I argued that models are an 
important tool in policy appraisal, but are also limited in their application, which has 
morally relevant implications - though this provides no reason to discard them, 
merely to ensure that they are used appropriately. Finally, I have presented the 
ethical framework for LCV policies that has been established through the research 
in this Chapter that will be applied in the remainder of the research.  
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PART B: EVALUATING THE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
3B.1  Introduction 
The next step of the research was to carry out pre-modelling evaluations of the 
framework, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. This was achieved 
by soliciting expert opinion through an online survey and interdisciplinary workshop. 
The survey data was subjected to descriptive quantitative analysis in order to 
assess support of the claims made in the framework and the policies chosen for 
research. Qualitative analysis of the workshop discussion and comments from the 
survey revealed further support for the framework. The work in this Chapter also 
formed part of a separate project from this thesis that was awarded a Youth 
Prestige Grant from the World Conference on Transport Research in 2013. 
3B.2  Quantitative Evaluation 
An online survey was designed and carried out that invited experts working with 
Low Carbon Vehicle (LCV) issues in the fields of ethics, policy and technology, to 
comment on the impact that LCVs may have on society.  Screenshots of the survey 
are presented in Appendix A. The survey was divided into three parts and only 
descriptive results are used in this research. Firstly the respondents were asked to 
express their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements related to 
the impact of LCVs in society, using the terms of car-poverty and car-utility as 
defined in Part A of this Chapter. The second part of the survey asked respondents 
to assess what impact the generic policies set out in the literature review may have 
on the cost and utility of owning a car. The final part gathered background 
demographic information on respondents.  
 
Promotion of the survey was to targeted individuals and audiences through a 
number of electronic media including mailing lists, newsletters, websites and social 
networking sites for academic and professionals working in the areas of energy, 
transport and philosophy. Survey participants were self-selecting, given the option 
to take part if they considered themselves ‘an expert’ in LCVs with a sound 
knowledge of both technology and policy. It is recognised that the data therefore is 
reliant on a level of trust in the honesty of the respondents. Additionally, this method 
of anonymous self-selection and self-assessment, and the limitation to on-line 
advertising and participation, may introduce some bias in participants. However, 
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this work does not seek to carry out detailed statistical analysis of data, but to 
capture a descriptive indication of attitude and opinion. This should be borne in 
mind by the reader. The survey was open between July 2012 and January 2013, 
and had forty eight responses, eleven of which were not completed. Response 
rates for quantitative questions ranged between 65 and 100%. Of those who 
responded, the majority were from an engineering or policy background, though 
there were some from philosophy, and this was in line with expectations. Most 
respondents were male, which may be due to the heavy bias of males in both 
engineering and philosophy, and there was a spread of ages, with the majority of 
people who answered this question being between twenty and forty.  
 
3B.2.1 Support for Claims 
 
Part A of the survey asked respondents some general background questions on 
their attitude and opinion of the role of the car, the impact of LCVs and the 
importance of these in the context of climate change. These responses were 
framed by a five point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree. The survey was designed whilst the ethical framework was still being 
developed. Therefore, although the wording of  the questions presented in Part A of 
the survey do not entirely reflect that of the claims which form the framework, they 
nonetheless provide some interesting insights. The results from this part of the 
survey are presented in Table 3.1. As can be seen, ‘Agree’ is the strongest 
response in each question, and there is an over 50% agreement with all questions, 
apart from 1e (it is important to limit decreases in car-utility), though even this 
question had more positive support than negative. It is noted however, that it is 
relevant that there is notable neutrality and disagreement to the questions, 
particularly Questions 1d to 1f where over a quarter of respondents were neutral. 
This does, however, imply that the concerns of the ethical framework are not 
controversial. To assess this level of support in more detail, it would seem 
appropriate to consider Questions 1a, 1f, 1g, and 1h in terms of Claim 1, and 
Questions 1b to 1e in terms of Claim 2. 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
TOTAL 
1.a. The introduction of low 
carbon vehicles will change the 
way we view and use cars in 
the UK. 
9  
(19%) 
24 
(50%) 
5  
(10%) 
9  
(19%) 
1  
(2%) 
48 
1.b. There is a general and 
defensible claim that one 
should be able to own and run 
a car that meets one’s needs. 
8  
(17%) 
24 
(51%) 
5  
(11%) 
9  
(19%) 
1  
(2%) 
47 
1.c. Certain segments of 
society may have a stronger 
claim for owning a vehicle than 
others. 
14  
(29%) 
24 
(50%) 
4  
(8%) 
2  
(4%) 
4  
(8%) 
48 
1.d. It is important to limit 
increases in Car-Poverty. 
5  
(10%) 
22 
(46%) 
13 
(27%) 
7  
(15%) 
1  
(2%) 
48 
1.e. It is important to limit 
decreases in Car-Utility. 
3  
(6%) 
18 
(38%) 
14 
(29%) 
10  
(21%) 
3  
(6%) 
48 
1.f. Limiting increases in Car-
Poverty is more important than 
limiting decreases in Car-
Utility. 
7  
(15%) 
17 
(36%) 
13 
(28%) 
7  
(15%) 
3  
(6%) 
47 
1.g. Some increases in Car-
Poverty are permissible in the 
context of climate change. 
4  
(8%) 
29 
(60%) 
9  
(19%) 
4   
(8%) 
2  
(4%) 
48 
1.h. Some decreases in Car-
Utility are permissible in the 
context of climate change. 
8  
(17%) 
24 
(52%) 
8  
(17%) 
5  
(11%) 
1  
(2%) 
46 
Table 3.1: Responses to survey Part A 
 
Claim 175 
The responses to Question 1a are nearly 70% in agreement with the statement that 
LCVs will “change the way we view and use cars”. Although view and use may not 
be synonymous, this positive response suggests agreement that LCV introduction 
(which I assume is brought about or accelerated by coercive policies) will impact on 
the role of the car in society. What this doesn’t confirm is if this impact will be 
positive or negative. As previously established, opportunity for car ownership is 
assumed to be affected by car-poverty and car-utility. Looking at the responses to 
Questions 1g and 1h in Table 3.1, over two thirds of respondents agreed that some 
negative impact on car-poverty and car-utility is permissible in the context of climate 
change and this can be taken as indicative evidence of support for Claim 1. There 
was stronger support for 1h, which reflects the general agreement in Question 1f 
that limiting impact on car-poverty is more important than on car-utility.  
                                               
75 In order to limit the harms of climate change, there is a strong case in favour of coercive 
policies that promote the introduction of LCVs – even if these policies may limit 
people’s opportunity for car ownership. 
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Claim 276  
Over two thirds of respondents to Question 1b either agreed or strongly agreed that 
one should be able to own and run a car that meets ones needs, which may imply 
that there is a form of lock-in to car ownership. Question 1c confirms that almost 
80% of respondents had a positive support to the statement that certain segments 
of society may have a stronger claim than others for car ownership, and was the 
strongest agreement of all the questions in Part A of the survey. Although this 
response cannot be used to confirm direct support for special consideration within 
policies for these groups, it does imply that others agree that such groups exist. 
Further support could come from Questions 1d and 1e, which showed that over half 
of respondents believed that the negative impacts on car-poverty and car-utility 
should be limited. It should be noted however, that the relatively strong agreement 
with Question 1g may somewhat undermine support for this claim. 
 
3B.2.2 Impact of Policies 
 
Regulation and Fiscal Measures were identified in the literature review as being the 
most high profile policies. As a central concern of this research is the distributional 
impacts of such policies, then it seemed sensible to develop an understanding of 
the potential impacts of all the generic policy options on the opportunity for car 
ownership. By doing so, it was possible to determine which policies should be the 
focus of this research. 
 
In Part B of the survey respondents were asked to give their opinion on what impact 
each generic policy type could have on the average cost (Question 4) or utility 
(Question 5) of car ownership to the consumer by 2020. In doing so they were 
asked to take account of a number of parameters, including likely market 
penetration, both running and purchase costs, progress in technical attributes and 
ease of use. Respondents were provided with descriptions of policies and 
definitions of terms to assist understanding (see survey screenshots in appendix). 
The impact was assessed using a seven point scale ranging from Significant 
Increase to Significant Decrease given arbitrary scoring functions from -3 (most 
negative impact) to 3 (most positive impact), with intervals between impact levels 
being nominally 5%, and a no impact option. When the results were collected, an 
                                               
76 In the short-term, many people are somewhat locked-in to car ownership for access and 
mobility. As such, policies should not allow additional unfair burdens on those who are 
already amongst the worst-off in society, or result in a different group of people being 
similarly disadvantaged. 
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average score for each policy could be calculated. An in-depth multi-criteria 
analysis through a participatory approach may have been preferential, but as this is 
part of a small study, a simple online survey was thought to be more suitable. A 
number of approaches were considered, as the question is rather complicated. Too 
much information could deter a respondent from answering at all, whereas too little 
information may create confusion or not provide the respondent with enough 
guidance to appreciate the context of the question. Eventually, it was decided to 
limit the survey to two questions, one each for cost and utility, but with supporting 
information. The survey design was further informed by standard survey 
development methodologies (Denscombe, 2003), and a simple descriptive 
technique of displaying the data using a box and whisker plot was chosen (Dytham, 
2010). 
 
In assessing the impacts on cost and utility, the respondents were asked to 
consider how these could change for each of three powertrains (ICEV, PiHEV and 
BEV) and also how their market shares could change by 2020. In order to do this, 
policy descriptions, concept definitions and current cost and utility for each 
powertrain were provided, as in Table 3.2. For these, the attributes for Ford Focus 
(ICEV) and Nissan Leaf (BEV) and Vauxhall Ampere (PiHEV) were provided.  
 
Table 3.2: Vehicle attributes in survey Part B 
 
C/D-segment vehicles (small family car) was chosen as the highest selling new car 
segment in the UK (SMMT, 2013a) and because there are currently no BEV or 
PiHEV available in smaller classes. In these calculations, an equal petrol/diesel 
market share was assumed for ICEV. Purchase price, LCV fuel costs, range and 
 
ATTRIBUTE ICEV PiHEV BEV 
C
O
S
T
 Purchase Price (£’000) 20 37 31 
Operating Cost (ppm) 26.3 13.1 6.8 
U
T
IL
IT
Y
 
Maximum Speed (mph) 125 100 90 
Maximum Power (kW) 102 54 80 
Maximum Full Tank 
Range (miles) 
630 360 100 
Fuel Availability (%) 100 90 40 
Max. Refuel/Charge 
Time (hrs) 
0.25 6 12 
Refuel/Charge Location Service stations 
Service stations, 
home and public 
charge points. 
Home and public 
charge points. 
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speed/power were all taken from the manufacturer websites (Ford, 2012; Nissan, 
2012; Vauxhall, 2012), and fuel availability calculations were the same as used in 
Case Study 1 of the modelling exercise (see Chapter 4). LCV refuel times and costs 
were also taken from manufacturer websites and calculated using EU energy prices 
(EEP, 2013) with ICEV derived anecdotally from the authors experience and the 
Automobile Association (AA, 2012). Operation costs included tyres, service labour, 
replacement parts, parking/tolls and tax, with LCVs being half that of ICEVs (in line 
with most estimations), but omit deprecation, insurance and breakdown as these 
were assumed to be similar for all vehicles (AA, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.1 presents the descriptive survey results for the impact of policies on 
ownership cost (including purchase and running). As the scoring functions were 
approximately ordinal and this is a pilot study, the mean is taken to be an adequate 
average estimation alongside the median and interquartile ranges. Regulation and 
Fiscal Measures have negative mean and median scores, and the median is low in 
the range. In addition, almost 90% of respondents felt that Regulation would 
increase the cost of car ownership and nearly 60% thought that Fiscal Measures 
would also do this. This supports the view that these policies should be a focus of 
modelling work. Facilitating Adoption and Raising Awareness both have even 
spreads of responses around the median, the first having an approximately even 
split of respondents between a positive, negative or no impact, and the latter having 
almost two thirds of respondents assigning no impact and the remainder equally 
split between positive and negative impact. Competition and Collaboration is the 
only measure where the majority of respondents believe the impact on cost will be a 
positive one. In summary, respondents believed that only Regulation and Fiscal 
Measures may have a negative impact on average cost of ownership. 
 
Figure 3.1: Descriptive results of survey Q.4. 
Impact of policy on average cost of car ownership by 2020. 
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The descriptive results of the average impact of policies on utility of car ownership 
are shown in Figure 3.2. The findings indicate that no policies have negative mean 
and median scores, and only Regulation and Fiscal Measures (the policies with 
negative cost impacts) have an interquartile range that covers negative scores. This 
is a surprising result, as the hypothesis was that policies could reduce overall utility 
due to inferior LCV attributes. It is possible that the question or definition of car-
utility was mis-interpreted by the respondents, but could also suggest that 
respondents thought that LCVs with a lower utility would not account for a large 
enough proportion of overall fleet to make a difference in overall utility, or else that 
they focused only on improvement in LCV utility. It is however, hard to account for 
how respondents interpreted the question. Looking at simply positive or negative 
responses, for each policy over a third of respondents believed there would be 
positive impact, with over half of respondents believing Competition and 
Collaboration and Facilitating Adoption would have a positive impact on utility. If this 
does occur, then policy makers may be tempted to focus on implementing them 
over other options. This would be a worrying strategy as there are numerous 
arguments for a move away from being a car-dominated society in the long-term. In 
summary, respondents believed that there would be very little impact from policies 
on average utility, and if anything, it would be positive. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Descriptive results of survey Q.5. 
Impact of policy on average utility of car ownership by 2020. 
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3B.3  Qualitative Evaluation  
Alongside the survey, which provided opportunities to comment on each of the 
questions, a workshop was held. The workshop was convened to bring together 
professionals and academics in various fields to specifically discuss the impact of 
the new technologies on society. Traditionally, different disciplines rarely mix, but 
this subject is at the juncture of the three disciplines of engineering, transport policy 
and ethics. The workshop involved talks from experts in each of these fields 
followed by a facilitated discussion, based on the survey questions, regarding how 
introducing LCVs will change the way we view and use cars, claims for ownership 
and vulnerabilities to car-poverty and car-utility. Having both the survey and the 
workshop maximised the gathering of qualitative data in order to gain a greater 
understanding of the problems, and for the appetite for collaboration and cross 
discipline understanding in this area.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows a “word cloud” representative of the workshop transcript77 and 
comments captured in the online survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: 'Word Cloud' of qualitative data 
 
 
 
                                               
77 
This was not a verbatim transcript. 
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The size of each word as it appears in the image corresponds to the number of 
times that word appears in the text. Although no conclusions can be drawn directly 
from this, the illustration serves as a good visual representation of the key issues 
and interests arising in this work. The three most obvious words are “people”, 
“need” and “change”. It is recognised that these words may be biased by the 
wording of the questions asked, but the fact that that these three words should 
stand out reminds us of the concerns of the impacts of LCVs – that it affects us all 
(“people”), that there is some level of basic dependency which will be affected 
(“need”) and an acknowledgment that we cannot stand still (“change”). 
 
In order to elucidate if there is any further support for the framework, a simple 
confirmatory analysis of the transcript and comments (Guest et al., 2012) was 
carried out with the intention of only identifying any evidence which was in support 
or denial of the claims of the ethical framework. Although this does not in itself 
confirm or deny any support, it does in fact highlight the many complex interactions 
and considerations in this area.   
 
Claim 178 
For Claim 1, there was no explicit support regarding decarbonisation – but it was 
felt that this was not mentioned as it was perhaps taken as a given. This may reflect 
the interests of the people attracted to take part in the workshop and survey in the 
first place. Although it does not appear that any of these themes directly support 
Claim 1, it is not disputed either. As said by one workshop participant “people want 
to do the right thing” and “if you can get somebody to change for a good reason it 
will mean something deeper to them”, suggesting that people can only be confident 
in doing this if they feel they are making a fully informed choice. In the UK, many 
decisions are structured around ‘wants’, and the definition of how that differs from a 
need is not clear – such as where to draw the line between subsistence and luxury. 
Understanding of this can help people make better decisions. There is a declining 
trust in institutions from the public and people, in general, do not want to change. 
As another workshop attendee suggested, “this does not mean they should be 
pushed, but perceptions can be challenged”. 
 
On the other hand, there were some comments which would appear to be against 
the claim. It was recognized that “the free market is how we developed as a society” 
                                               
78 In order to limit the harms of climate change, there is a strong case in favour of coercive 
policies that promote the introduction of LCVs – even if these policies may limit 
people’s opportunity for car ownership. 
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in the West, and that this generally allows change to happen at the right time. 
Indeed, a survey respondent queried, “is it appropriate or necessary for 
policymakers to intervene directly in the automotive industry by introducing 
disruptive incentives for use of particular types of prime mover – or should this be 
left to market forces?”  
 
There would seem to be a general agreement that as an evolving society, “a 
decrease in utility is not an option”, though another participant believed that “we can 
deliver a low carbon fleet without having to ask people to change”. A survey 
respondent suggested that “decreases in car-utility could be viewed as positive in 
the context of smart urban/residential and infrastructural development that reduced 
the need for private cars”, though this is beyond the scope of this research to 
directly consider.  
 
Claim 279  
Regarding Claim 2, there appeared to be a strong recognition of the lock-in to car 
ownership, and that this in itself may create inequalities or emphasis existing ones. 
It was suggested that “mobility is a core component of how we operate as a 
society”, and that “mobility is a right – but not necessarily car ownership, even 
though they are very much linked”.  Further to this,  there were some comments 
that strongly believed that this lock-in exists for everyone, described by one survey 
respondent: “the majority of the population MUST have a car in order to get to work, 
shop etc and most of them will never be able to afford a new car, therefore the 
existing car stock is all that is available to them for many years to come” and 
another believed “that vehicle use will never decrease due to safety, movement of 
vehicles and the way that life is now”. One survey respondent recognised this lock-
in can cause distributional issues as “a car can be a necessity and some people 
who can’t afford a car are at a disadvantage”.  
 
A number of points were raised regarding whether ‘ownership’ itself requires 
preserving or if it is access to a vehicle which is more important. Ownership is 
restricted by purchase costs more than running costs and enforces existing 
inequalities. For example, one survey respondent voiced their concerns that “a low 
carbon car future simply bolsters the mobility divide between those with access to 
                                               
79 In the short-term, many people are somewhat locked-in to car ownership for access and 
mobility. As such, policies should not allow additional unfair burdens on those who are 
already amongst the worst-off in society, or result in a different group of people being 
similarly disadvantaged. 
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private vehicles and those who don’t (have access). In fact it could increase it as 
the market for low carbon vehicles is immature and doesn’t allow a mechanism for 
easy access to second-hand vehicles”. 
 
If cars had never been affordable they would not have integrated our society as 
they have. One respondent believed that “individuals are entitled to cars if they can 
afford them”, whereas as previously mentioned, others fear such market led 
approaches can amplify inequalities. Car markets are already segmented and 
exploited by car manufacturers, but we are currently locked in to markets which 
may no longer be appropriate. This includes the use of GDP as a measure of 
success or progress, and the inadequacy of internalization of carbon (or other 
environmental) costs, however, one respondent suggested that “no mechanism is 
too big that society could not together solve these problems”, though it was also 
recognized by another participant that “this is relatively easy to discuss at the 
concept level. The real issues maybe only come out when you look at individual 
cases”. 
3B.4  Conclusion 
Bringing together the findings of this Chapter, the following conclusions can be 
drawn which help set out an approach to modelling within the ethical framework. 
Firstly, from considering the responses to Part A of the survey, the arguments 
presented in the ethical framework seem to be supported, so there is confidence 
that there is validity in the claims, beyond the arguments presented in Part A of the 
Chapter. Secondly, the responses to Part B of the survey would suggest not only 
that there is general agreement that policies will impact on cost of car ownership, 
but also that the two policies that were suggested in the literature review to be the 
most high profile, are the two which come across as having potentially the greatest 
negative impact on costs of ownership. This further strengthens the case that these 
should be the focus of research. Finally, the qualitative analysis of the comments 
provided through the survey and workshop revealed that although some support for 
the claims appeared to exist, there are numerous conflicts and concerns which 
make LCV policies complex.  
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With this established, it would seem appropriate to then identify what would be 
required in a model in order to assess policies within this ethical framework. As the 
response to Part B suggests that experts do not believe that the policies will have a 
negative impact on utility, the focus should be on cost,80 where the chosen policies 
were found to have negative impacts. This is because the concern of this research 
is towards reducing burdens on the worst-off. 81  Therefore, in the model, the 
following outputs will be required: 
 
 Carbon emissions as the policies are only permissible in the context of 
climate change, and; 
 Changes in opportunity for car ownership, represented by purchase cost, 
for societal segments defined by their vulnerability to car-poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
80 The fact that the findings suggest that the policies will only have neutral/positive impacts 
on utility may, as mentioned, mean that the question was not understood. However, if it 
was taken in the way it was meant to be, and experts genuinely believe this to be the 
case, then it could be that these policies should be given more attention in future work. 
81  Recall the stipulations in Part A that define what is meant by the worst-off in this 
research. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: MODELLING CASE STUDY ONE 
The purpose of the first case study was two-fold. Firstly to develop skills and 
understanding of modelling processes, and secondly to explore basic factors 
affecting the uptake of Low Carbon Vehicles (LCVs) in the UK. The model was 
developed initially for contribution to the “Plug-in Vehicles Economics and Carbon 
Benefits Project”, funded by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI, 2010) and part 
of a larger government research programme for the roll out of LCVs. An aggregate 
version of this work was reported in Shepherd et al., (2012). This Chapter 
commences with a detailed description of the base model and extensions made to it 
for the purpose of this research, mainly in adapting it for the UK. The model 
calibration and development of “Business as Usual” (BAU) and “Conditional 
Marketing” (CM) baselines are then described. Following this, the results of model 
testing is presented in three sections. The first describes sensitivity testing of some 
key model variables, the second presents scenarios related to options for Electric 
Vehicle subsidies (an example of a Fiscal Measures policy) under both a BAU and 
CM scenario, and the third is an illustrative representation of a Regulation policy on 
manufacturers, based on a BAU scenario. The findings are then discussed in more 
detail. 
4.1 Description of Base Model 
The case study is based on a core model originally built by Sterman and Struben 
(2008) (see literature review) to study the market formation and diffusion dynamics 
for alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) with a focus on the feedbacks concerning 
customer awareness and consideration of AFVs. This model draws on established 
diffusion models and discrete consumer choice models, and is a reduced-form of a 
more detailed model for AFV adoption that was developed in a PhD thesis of one of 
the authors (Struben, 2006). This case study takes the Struben and Sterman model 
as a base and builds upon it, in the specific case of Electric Vehicles (EVs – this 
includes both Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PiHEV) and Battery Electric Vehicles 
(BEV)) in the UK. The most important elements are presented in Figure 4.1. Details 
of underlying equations and parameters are available in Appendix B. What follows 
is a description of the most important elements as developed by Struben and 
Sterman, as well as the assumptions and modifications for the UK model. 
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Figure 4.1: Main model of Case Study 1 (adapted from Struben and Sterman, 2008) 
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There are a number of interesting elements contained within this basic model. First, 
shown at the top of Figure 4.1, are the separate stocks of installed bases of Internal 
Combustion Engine Vehicles (ICEVs)82 and EVs.83 These are calculated in each 
time period from the number of sales and discards that have taken place in the 
previous period. Within this there is a constant installed base of 32 million vehicles 
so there are no new drivers entering the market, only replacement vehicle sales. As 
can be seen in Figure 4.1, the inflow of the installed base stock is sales and the 
outflow is discards. Discards are related to an average vehicle life of 14 years84 
(CfIT, 2001) and are equal to the total sales, which are then modelled in terms of 
the purchase share using a standard MNL choice model equation as described in 
the literature review, based on perceived utility to vehicle platforms. “Share of 
Purchases EV” in Figure 4.1 represents Equation 4.1, which calculates the share of 
sales of EVs (assuming a single platform) from those who have just discarded an 
ICEV. For these ICEV discarders, their perceived utility of an EV is assumed to be 
reduced by their lack of awareness of an EV, so the resultant “perceived affinity” is 
used in the logit model instead of the usual “perceived utility”. This differs from 
those who have just discarded an EV (which is not represented in the figure), as 
they are fully aware of the EV so can base their choice on the full perceived utility of 
an EV in the usual way.  
 
     
   
 
     
      
   
Equation 4.1 
    is sales of EV 
   
  is the perceived affinity that that a drivers may have with an EV, and is dependent upon 
awareness of the platform and perceived platform utility. 
     
  is the perceived utility of ICEV 
 
The key element of the base model, which was not altered in the case study, was 
the technology/diffusion process, which followed a standard diffusion S-curve (see 
Literature Review). As this is of particular importance it will now be discussed in 
more detail. The perceived affinity that has already been mentioned is a product of 
the vehicle utility and the drivers’ “Willingness to Consider” (WtC) the platform. 
Each powertrain has set values of attributes, being range, fuel availability, emission 
                                               
82 The ICEVs in the model are assumed to be produced to be conventionally fuelled but to 
avoid confusion they are referred to as simply ICEV. 
83 Struben and Sterman use generic Alternative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) rather than EV. 
84  Struben and Sterman used a conservative US estimate of 8 years based on their 
sensitivity analysis, but 14 years was found to be more appropriate for the UK. 
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rating, maximum speed, operating cost, and purchase price. The coefficients for 
each attribute were obtained from a choice model (Batley et al., 2004), and used to 
generate a generalised cost for each powertrain to calculate the perceived utility. 
 
Within the diffusion process, a specific social exposure loop calculated a customer’s 
WtC a specific vehicle platform. When a driver is unaware of a powertrain, WtC is 0, 
and the maximum WtC is 1, meaning that they are fully aware of the powertrain and 
would always consider it. For example, everyone considers a ICEV, so WtC ICEV 
was assumed to be constant at 1, whereas, only those drivers who have been 
exposed to EVs would have a WtC EV greater than 0.  However, WtC represents 
more than just platform awareness; 
“Willingness to consider a platform captures the cognitive, emotional, and 
social processes through which drivers gain enough information about, 
understanding of, and emotional attachment to a platform for it to enter their 
consideration set”. (Struben and Sterman, 2008, p.1077) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, WtC is a product of two competing causal loops, 
“Forgetting” and “Talk of the Town” (TotT). The TotT causal loop consists of the 
effect of the total exposure to EVs from marketing effectiveness of EVs and “Word 
of Mouth” (WoM) contacts from both EV and non-EV drivers (that are only ICEV 
drivers in this case as no other powertrains are included), and assumes these 
interactions are positive. Total social exposure, the proportion of drivers who are 
aware of EVs, arises from marketing and contact between drivers, and is captured 
in Equation 4.2. 
 
                          
   
 
   ∑               
     
 
 
Equation 4.2 
        is the impact of total social exposure on the increase in familiarity of EV for ICEV 
drivers 
    is the marketing effectiveness for EVs 
        is the frequency and effectiveness of contact about EVs between ICEV drivers and 
EV drivers  
      is the willingness of an EV driver to consider an EV 
    is the installed base of EVs 
  is the total installed base of vehicles 
         is the frequency and effectiveness of contact about EVs between ICEV drivers and 
non-EV drivers  
        is the willingness of a ICEV driver to consider an EV 
      is the installed base of ICEVs 
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The first expression in Equation 4.2 relates to marketing. In the base model, the 
marketing effect is constant through the time period and was based on estimates 
from marketing literature (this is varied in the conditional marketing baseline, 
therefore further detail on this is provided later). The second expression in Equation 
4.2 is the WoM from those with direct social exposure of seeing EVs “on the road” 
and talking to EV drivers, based on the frequency and effectiveness of contacts and 
the share of the installed base of EVs. Due to the low intial EV installed base WOM 
from EV drivers has little impact at the start of the time period. WoM between ICEV 
drivers is captured in the third expression in the same way, and dominates social 
exposure at the start of the time period (see Section 4.4.1 for sensitivity testing on 
WoM). Thus, as installed base of EV increases, this results in a positive feedback 
as WtC increases leading to an even higher share of EVs (the “social exposure” 
loop in Figure 4.1) and increased WoM in the TotT loop. 
 
The TotT reinforcing loop is balanced by the Forgetting loop, which captures a rate 
of decay as customers ‘forget’ their exposure to the EV, thus decreasing their WtC. 
Previous work by Struben (2006) found that this awareness parameter was highly 
non-linear, requiring exposure to be “sufficiently intense” before there is no decay. 
The “fractional rate of decay” is a function of the total social exposure (Equation 
4.2) and a maximum decay rate, so that when total exposure is equal to zero, then 
the decay rate is 1, and the rate tends to 0 as social exposure approaches   as 
captured in the logistic function shown in Equation 4.3. Other functional forms of 
this were explored by Struben and Sterman in previous work (Struben, 2004), but 
this expression was proven to provide robust results. Further to this, they tested the 
sensitivity of the decay in social exposure to installed base and marketing effects, 
and found that in the absence of these (i.e. if all EVs were removed and un-
marketed), it would take 5 years for WtC to fall from 50% to 5%. This can be slowed 
by including marketing, but under base case parameters EVs need only capture 5% 
of installed based again to increase WtC to 100%. 
 
 (       )   
   [   (          
 )]
     [   (           )]
 
Equation 4.3 
 (       ) is the fractional rate of decay 
   is the reference rate of social exposure at which WtC decays at half the normal rate  
  is the slope of the decay rate at the reference rate of social exposure ( 1/2η* ) 
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The base model assumes the marketing effect is constant, and is set to a time 
period of 40 years, nominally starting in 2010. The modifications made to the base 
model for this research are described in the next Section. The model was then 
calibrated to UK data, as detailed in Section 4.3. 
4.2 Extensions to the Base Model 
There are a number of notable amendments made to the Struben and Sterman 
base model in order to ensure that the case study was suitable for this research. 
These will now be described in more detail. 
 
4.2.1 UK Choice Model 
 
One of the most significant changes was the inclusion of a UK discrete choice 
model (Batley et al., 2004) to calculate the perceived utility, and as part of this, UK 
based vehicle attributes.  This is discussed in more depth in the next section, as it 
was used in calibration of the model.  
 
4.2.2 Vehicle Platforms 
 
The inclusion of more than one vehicle platform was also an important amendment. 
In the Struben and Sterman base model there is only one generic AFV, whereas it 
was the desire of this research to consider Electric Vehicles (EV). The two EV 
platforms included were a Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PiHEV) and a Battery 
Electric Vehicle (BEV).  
 
4.2.3 Price-volume Effect 
 
Purchase prices are connected to the perceived utility of customers towards EVs. 
There was a concern that the purchase price of EVs would not (in reality) be 
constant over the period of study, but would actually come down as EV take-up 
increased. This would occur through economies of scale in production costs and 
improved technology reducing battery costs. Therefore, a “price-volume effect” was 
built into the model that was a standard learning curve with the price differential 
being reduced to 95% of the previous value as the EV installed base 
doubles.  Tsuchiya and Kobayashi (2003) state that the typical learning curve is 
described by Equation 4.4, with the exponent r calculated by Equation 4.5. 
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Equation 4.4 
Yi is the product cost at i
th
 production 
Xi is the cumulative number of products at i
th
 production 
A is a constant 
 
   
   
  (    ⁄ )
 
     
Equation 4.5 
F is the progress ratio of production cost reduction 
Vt is the EV installed base at time t 
VO is the original EV installed base 
 
The value of 95% was taken from the report to Energy Savings Trust (2007) which 
states “The typical learning rate within the automotive sector for new technologies is 
95%. The learning effect is applied to the additional cost of each technology above 
the C/D baseline vehicle.”  Using Equation 4.5, as F is equal to 95% and Vt/Vo is 2, 
then r is 0.074. The price effect is demonstrated in Figure 4.2 as the relationship 
between purchase costs and installed base for BEVs. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Price effect of BEV 
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4.2.4 Loss in Fuel Duty Revenue 
 
One common concern about the introduction of EVs is that there will be a loss in 
the significant income to the UK government from duty paid on conventional fuels. 
A number of options to compensate for this are being considered, such as tax 
based on vehicle mileage. In the model a revenue preserving tax was added as a 
one-off annual fee within the car purchase model, so it would be felt similar to 
purchase price. Though inclusion within operating costs may have been equally as 
valid, it was felt that this approach was more representative, as it is similar to 
increasing VED by emissions as carried out in the UK.  
 
To add such a tax to the model, it was first necessary to include within the model 
how much fuel duty revenue would be lost every year. This was taken to be the 
difference between the initial fuel duty revenue from a ICEV only fleet and the fuel 
duty revenue in the transformed fleet for each year, shown in Equation 4.6 . As the 
model is constant fleet and mileage, fuel duty was also assumed constant to allow a 
simple comparison. Though this may underestimate losses, a cautious approach 
was felt to be more suitable. However, as ICEVs become more fuel efficient, it 
could imply a relative increase in duty, which aligns with government intentions. 
Therefore, the initial fuel duty revenue is a product of the fuel duty (7.86p/mile),85 
installed base and ICEV mileage (15,000km / 9.375 miles (BERR/DfT, 2008)), 
which is £23.58b. The fuel duty in the transformed fleet comes from ICEV and 
PiHEV, and is the product of fuel duty, annual mileage and installed base for each 
of the two powertrains, with PiHEV users paying only 80% of fuel duty in line with 
their reduced emissions (see Section 4.2.5).  
 
                                
 (           )
       ((               )  (                      ))  
Equation 4.6 
FD is the fuel duty (constant at 7.86p/mile) 
AMx is the average annual mileage each year for powertrain x 
IBx is the installed base each year for powertrain x 
 
 
                                               
85 Based on 58.96p/litre and 12km/litre (HMT, 2010). 
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To calculate average mileage, assumptions were made that PiHEV would have 
similar average mileage to ICEV, whereas BEV would be slightly lower, at 80% of 
ICEV mileage, but could rise as range increases, equalling that of ICEV at a range 
of 350 miles. As this may reduce total mileage (and the model is set at a constant 
mileage), any loss is made up by increasing the mileage of ICEV and PiHEV user. 
The lost revenue could then be redistributed among all drivers based on miles 
driven per year (which is constant in this model), as a revenue preserving tax, 
shown in Equation 4.7.  
 
                             
   
  
      
Equation 4.7 
FDL is the annual fuel duty revenue lost 
TM is the total annual fleet mileage 
AMx is the average annual mileage for powertrain x 
 
4.2.5 CO2 Emissions 
 
The driving focus of this work is not just the increase in market share of EVs but 
also what impact that has on CO2 emissions. For this a simple aggregate approach 
was used.  The emissions of each powertrain in each year were calculated using 
Equation 4.8, and then summed together for total emissions per annum. In the base 
case, fleet average Well- to-Wheel ICEV emissions were assumed to be 165g/km in 
2010, reducing to 115g/km by 2050, PiHEV were 80% of ICEV and BEV were 
106g/km down to 41 g/km. This was in line with the BERR/DfT (2008) report used 
to calibrate the model (see later), based on vehicles manufactured in 2030 and 
allowing for a lag for emissions from previous cohorts of vehicles. Ideally to fully 
understand impacts on CO2, emissions from different classes of vehicles would be 
accounted for, but regulations are based on average fleet emissions and this 
approach gives a feel of the relative impact over time. 
 
                      ∑             
Equation 4.8 
EFx is the emission factor for powertrain x (CO2/km x 1.6) 
AMx is the average mileage for powertrain x 
IBx is the installed base of powertrain x 
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4.3 Model Calibration and Baseline Development 
In order to calibrate the model to a UK trajectory, it was scaled using a UK choice 
model and a previous sales prediction (BERR/DfT, 2008). Interestingly this 
calibration leads to a WtC of 1 for EVs by 2050.  
 
4.3.1 Selection of the Coefficients 
 
The choice coefficients came from the most recent and relevant stated preference 
(SP) study that used multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (MXL) to model 
consumer demand for AFVs (Batley et al., 2004). Although technology and attitudes 
may have changed since 2004, it was the most recent and relevant study in the 
public domain at the time of the research, and it is assumed that this will not be 
significant. Six factors of customer choice, were considered: purchase price; 
operating costs; maximum speed; fuel availability; emissions; range and refuel 
location. It is recognised that less-emprical factors, such as affective, hedonic or 
symbolic attitudes towards the car do play a role in vehicle choice (Choo and 
Mokhtarian, 2004; Gatersleben, 2011; Peters et al., 2011; Schuitma et al. 2013; 
Sheller, 2004; Steg, 2005). However, such aspects are difficult to measure and a 
very recent study suggested that the strongest influence on choice in relation to this 
that can be captured is brand loyalty (Element Energy, 2013). This case study does 
not capture brand as an aggregrate manufacturer is represented, but would be an 
insightful addition to future research. Element Energy also identified that there are 
specific attitudinal barriers related to EVs, but these are related to technology 
maturity, which is captured in this model through the improving attributes, and 
consumer awareness, which is captured in this model through the WtC parameter 
as discussed.  
 
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept estimates were taken from Batley et 
al’s MNL model, as follows: 
 £665 for a 10mph increase in maximum speed; 
 £1089 for a ten percentage point increase in refuelling availability; 
 £986 for a 10% reduction in vehicle emissions; 
 £335 for a 1p/mile increase in operating costs; 
 £2225 for a reduction in vehicle range of 100 miles. 
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The selected base values for the attributes for each of the vehicle platforms are 
presented in Table 4.1. In the base case, these attributes were assumed to remain 
constant over time, apart from the EV purchase price, which is reduced over time 
as previously discussed. They are then manipulated in the sensitivity testing 
described in Section 4.4.1. 
 
ATTRIBUTES ICEV PiHEV BEV 
Purchase Price (£’000) 12 18.5 20 
Operating Costs (p/mile) 22 17 10 
Maximum Speed (mph) 125 125 90 
Fuel Availability (% of stations) 100 90 40 
Emissions (1-10) 10 8 1 
Range (miles) 350 350 + 25 electric 60 
Table 4.1: Vehicle attributes 
 
Purchase Price 
A base value purchase price for ICEVs was taken from the Energy Savings Trust 
(EST, 2007), with an assumption of premiums on that price for PiHEV and BEV. 
The premiums used were the mid-points of a range of price premiums from an 
unpublished report by Ricardo Plc, which were £6,500 and £8,000 respectively. 
 
Operating Costs 
ICEV operating costs were taken from the Automobile Association (AA, 2012) for 
mid range petrol cars, and exclude depreciation, insurance and annual tax, but do 
include ‘other running costs’ related to maintenance etc. BEV operating costs were 
based on an assumed electricity consumption of 20kWh/100km (based on the small 
iMiev) and a lowest cost of 5p/kWh (typical night tariff in 2010), plus the ‘other 
running costs’ were also from the AA. PiHEV were assumed to have costs between 
those of ICEV and BEV. Although it may not be realistic to assume constant 
operating costs in the base case (considering unpredictable prices of oil and 
electricity), this in effect implies an offset by any increase in vehicle fuel efficiency 
as aggregate emissions reduce over time. Although this also may be unrealistic, 
because technological improvements do incur cost, as they are brought in over 40 
years, an assumption is made that the impact will be minimal in order to retain the 
simplicity of the model. 
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Maximum Speed 
As maximum speed is difficult to average across models, it was taken directly from 
Batley et al. PiHEV was assumed to be the same as ICEV and BEV was slightly 
higher than the original study as there had been technological progress since then. 
 
Fuel Availability 
ICEVs could be filled at any filling station. EV fuel availability is interpreted as the 
convenience of charging EV versus convenience of charging ICEV. It was assumed 
that most of PiHEV range will come from the ICE fuel tanks, which again can be 
filled anywhere. However, there will be some reduction in availability to account for 
the electric recharging, so PiHEV fuel availability is set at 90%. Based on Batley et 
al.’s refuel location penalty and willingness to pay for increase in fuel availability, an 
estimate is that BEV fuel availability is about 50 percentage points below PiHEV. 
 
Emission Ratings 
To highlight the difference between powertrains, ICEV is given the highest rating 
and BEV the lowest. PiHEV is given as a slightly lower emission rating than ICEV 
assuming that most of its use will be under ICE control. 
 
Range 
Assumptions are made based on the lower end of typically accepted ranges for the 
three powertrains. 
 
4.3.2 Scaling the Predicted Share 
 
The selected coefficients and attributes yielded a sales share in 2050 of 30.4% for 
PiHEV and 6.4% for BEV. However, as it is well recognised that stated preference 
based models may overestimate market shares, so scaling to a more recognised 
estimate was deemed necessary. A number of options were considered, but the 
most suitable was felt to be that from a 2008 BERR/DfT report “Business as Usual” 
Scenario, which suggests sales of 17.9% and 3.5% for PiHEV and BEV 
respectively in 2030. To do this alternate specific constants (of £3500 for PiHEV 
and £4000 for BEV) were added to the model. These alternate specific constants 
can be seen to reflect unobserved preferences.  
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4.3.3 Calibrating the Trajectory 
 
The final step of calibration was to ensure that the standard S-shaped diffusion of 
the EV installed base is correct within the model. The BERR/DfT BAU projection 
was used again as a reference point that predicted 2.5m PiHEV and 0.5m BEV in 
2030. The reference rate of exposure was adjusted until a similar fit was achieved, 
which was 2.4m PiHEV and 0.538m BEV (shown in Figure 4.3) at a reference rate 
of 2.5%. The difference is due to the assumption in this model of a constant car 
fleet whereas the BERR projection assumed growth. The growth effect was omitted 
to retain the simplicity of the model but also as growth is itself uncertain - if modal 
shift policies are successful then there could actually be a reduction in the fleet size. 
Although this assumption may lead to under or over-estimation of emissions, it is 
any relative impact that is the interest of this work.  
 
4.3.4 BAU Baseline 
 
Results from the model Business as Usual (BAU) baseline, following the extensions 
and calibration described in the previous sections, are presented in Figure 4.3. 
Installed base of PiHEV and BEV can be seen to increase in line with the 
BERR/DfT forecasts, and between them displace almost 30% of ICEV sales by 
year 40, though this market share has remained fairly constant for the latter half of 
the time period. Annual fuel duty loss has increased to almost £2b per annum by 
year 40 and annual emissions have been reduced by around a third since the start 
of the time period. Although it may be argued that perhaps EV powertrains may 
never realistically greatly displace ICEV or equal their market share, due to the 
restraints that they may have on some people, the emission reduction is 
disappointingly short of government targets and at great budgetary loss. These 
BAU results would seem to prove that interventions are required if EVs are to be a 
successful, cost effective method of reducing transport carbon emissions. 
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Figure 4.3: Outputs from model BAU baseline. 
Installed base (top right); Sales market share (top left);  
Fuel duty revenue lost (bottom left); Annual CO2 emissions (bottom right). 
4.3.5 Conditional Marketing Baseline 
 
In the base model there is a constant marketing effect throughout the time period. 
This marketing effect could be assumed to come from the manufacturers 
themselves, through government awareness campaigns, or through a combination 
of the two. In the Struben and Sterman study, it was noted that the marketing 
duration has a significant impact on market success, as marketing was required to 
be in place for 20 years to sustain EV market penetration. In this model, it is 
assumed that the marketing comes directly from the manufacturers and that they 
reconsider their marketing and production after 10 years based on sales at that 
time. This is a reasonable assumption as continuing to fund potentially expensive 
marketing campaigns and vehicle development without success would be a risky 
business plan (though the choice of 10 years itself is fairly arbitrary).  
 
In the BAU scenario, after 10 years the EV share of sales is 6.7%, and removal of 
the marketing results in market collapse, demonstrated in Figure 4.4. If marketing is 
retained, as in the successful case, year 11 has a share of 8%. As the marketing 
feeds directly into the social exposure and therefore WtC, this would seem to signal 
that the social exposure without the marketing is not effective enough after 10 
years, so when marketing is removed there is a collapse. To recreate a failing case 
that could be tipped into success, a nominal threshold of 7.5% in year 10 (halfway 
between these shares) was chosen to create a hypothetical failure case. This 
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represents a situation where if a 7.5% share is not attained by year 10, the 
manufacturer believes that the market will collapse and therefore no longer wish to 
invest in marketing. This mechanism was included in the model, creating a 
“conditional marketing” baseline.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: EV sales market share in BAU and failing cases 
4.4 Model Testing 
The purpose of this model was to build understanding of modelling processes and 
explore factors affecting EV uptake, specifically regarding the two specific policies 
relevant to this research, Fiscal Measures (in the form of subsidy) and fleet 
Regulation. This section describes the tests carried out. 
 
4.4.1 Sensitivity Testing 
 
The model BAU baseline was subjected to sensitivity testing for three of the input 
parameters. Firstly, the effect of “word-of-mouth” (WoM) within the social exposure 
loop on the WtC, secondly the average life of vehicles, and finally the emissions of 
the electricity generation.  
 
“Word-of-Mouth” Effects 
The “Talk of the Town” loop was described in Section 4.1. Within this, WtC is 
influenced by three input parameters (marketing, WoM with EV drivers and WoM 
with ICEV drivers), and was shown in Equation 4.2. The impact of marketing has 
already been discussed in the development of the failing case, which is also 
explored in later scenario testing. Therefore, it was felt worthwhile to consider the 
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impact of WoM whilst keeping marketing constant, as the “contact effectiveness” 
values were taken from Struben and Sterman (2008), who themselves developed 
the value from another study (Easingwold et al., 1983), but they recognise them as 
being highly optimistic. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the impact of doubling and halving the WoM impacts from EV and 
ICEV drivers on WtC and ICEV installed base. These results clearly show that the 
WoM of ICEV drivers have a much greater effect than EV drivers, until the base of 
EV drivers builds to a significant level later in the time period. Perhaps what is of 
more interest is the impact on installed base of ICEV. Again the WoM of EV drivers 
would appear to make very little difference, but it is noticeable that halving the WoM 
of ICEV drivers seems to have a greater impact than doubling it does. This means 
that if the base case parameters of WoM were overestimated, then the predictions 
could be very optimistic. Clearly the results are highly sensitive to assumptions 
regarding WoM. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Impact of changes in WoM on WtC (top) and ICEV installed base (bottom) 
 
Average Vehicle Life 
Vehicle life is assumed constant in the BAU model. As a new technology, lifetimes 
for EVs are uncertain, particularly around battery life and associated expenses of 
replacing batteries, and so are generally expected to have a shorter life than ICEV. 
Also, so-called “scrappage” schemes could be reintroduced, that encourage the 
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removal of older cars from a fleet by providing the owner with a discount on a newer 
model. To test the sensitivities regarding this, tests were carried out that reduced 
either the EV or ICEV life from 14 to 10 years, and the results of these on total EV 
installed base and annual CO2 emissions is shown in Figure 4.6. This in effect 
increases the turnover of vehicles, and thus the total new vehicle requirement. 
When a vehicle is discarded the owner has the choice to either purchase the same 
type or change to another powertrain (as explained in Section 4.1). It is worth noting 
that vehicle life doesn’t itself influence vehicle choice, though as few people will 
purchase a vehicle with the intent of keeping them for the whole lifetime, this may 
not be relevant in reality. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Impact of changes in vehicle life on EV installed base (left) and CO2 (right) 
 
When the EV life is reduced, discards are increased. Due to the low perceived utility 
with EV, the driver has a high probability of purchasing a ICEV to replace their 
vehicle. Following this, EV installed base under a reduced EV life is lower than 
BAU, reducing the probability of an ICEV driver replacing their vehicle with an EV. 
This is because the lower installed base (than BAU) leads to reduced social 
exposure which then impacts on willingness to consider and perceived affinity with 
EV (recall the social exposure loop in Figure 4.1). This is despite the fact that total 
sales are increased compared to BAU in order to maintain a constant fleet when 
discards are increased. EV discards therefore increase at a greater rate than sales 
increase as some replacement EV sales go to ICEV.  
 
On the other hand, reducing ICEV life has a bigger impact on EV installed base 
than reducing EV life. This may seem counter-intuitive, but is due to the fact that the 
initial ICEV fleet is so much larger than the EV fleet. With the faster turnover of 
ICEVs (due to reduced vehicle life), there is more opportunity for an ICEV driver to 
become an EV driver (as they face the choice more often), increasing EV sales 
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(with no change in EV discards). In addition, as EV installed base increases 
compared to BAU, WtC increases as the social exposure loop is positively 
reinforcing leading to a greater affinity of the ICEV driver with EV and thus a higher 
probability they will choose an EV. In this scenario EV installed base has nearly 3 
million vehicles more than BAU, which corresponds to a 9% increase in EV market 
share. 
 
Of course, there are limits to these findings as there is no second-hand car market 
within the model (taking an assumption that the car is retained for its whole life), but 
it would suggest that mandatory scrappage schemes may favour EV uptake. If 
some other benefit is offered to the owner for scrappage this would alter the choice 
and may not achieve similar results. There is not as significant an impact on CO2 
emissions through such schemes, shown in Figure 4.6, and in fact when 
considering cumulative emissions the difference is almost zero. The increased 
turnover may mean that the embodied (production and dismantling) emissions are 
increased across the fleet, whilst fleet average emissions are reduced by the 
increase in EV. While not included here, such effects should be studied in more 
detail if scrappage schemes are considered to be a viable option. 
 
EV Emissions 
The introduction of EVs as a solution to carbon reduction challenges is wholly 
dependent on decarbonisation of the electricity generation mix itself. This may be 
uncertain but it was felt useful to consider a scenario where the reduction was 
greater than assumed in the BERR/DfT report (see Section 4.2.4). To test this, the 
BEV emission factor was reduced by 15% to 35g/km (from 41g/km) and the PiHEV 
by 7.5% to 85g/km (from 92g/km). The results shown in Figure 4.7 suggest that 
there would be very little difference to annual emissions by 2050. This may be 
partly due to the fact that the emission factors were not directly linked to vehicle 
choice in the model, so shares would be the same as in the BAU scenario, where 
the EV share is only a quarter of the installed base by 2050, and mainly PiHEV. 
Even if the BEV emissions were set to zero and PiHEV reduced to 75g/km (highly 
unlikely unless considering decentralised micro-generation), the reduction from 
BAU is still less than 5%. It is also likely that ICEV emissions may be less than the 
BAU scenario, and this will be tested in the Regulation scenario in Section 4.4.3. 
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Figure 4.7: Impact of EV CO2 reductions on total CO2 
 
4.4.2 Subsidy Scenario Testing 
 
Fiscal Measures was identified in the previous Chapter as having a potentially high 
impact on car ownership opportunity. The model was then tested to understand the 
impact that subsidies on EV purchase prices may have. Subsidies were chosen as 
they are the most widely recognised type of Fiscal Measure, though future work 
would benefit from exploring changes in ICEV purchase costs or manipulation of 
operating costs. Twenty different subsidy scenario tests were carried out, twelve of 
which were based on the BAU scenario, and eight on the failing base with 
conditional marketing. Eight indicators were chosen to assess impact: 
 
 Market share of installed base in year 10; 
 Market share of installed base in year 40; 
 Total sales over 40 years; 
 Additional sales compared to BAU base over 40 years; 
 Total subsidy over 40 years; 
 Fuel duty lost over 40 years; 
 Annual fleet CO2 in year 40; and 
 Total CO2 emissions over 40 years. 
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4.4.2.1 Business as Usual Base 
 
The conditions for the 12 BAU subsidy scenarios are set out in Table 4.2.  These 
scenarios reflect a range of options that could be taken regarding subsidy-based 
policies for EV uptake. The subsidies are £2500 or £5000 on BEV, PiHEV or both 
EVs, which are in place for a fixed duration of 3 or 6 years or, in the case of SUB11 
and 12, under specific budget caps of £250m and £500m.  
 
SCENARIO PiHEV SUBSIDY BEV SUBSIDY 
BUDGET 
DURATION/CAP 
SUB1 £2500 0 3 years 
SUB2 0 £2500 3 years 
SUB3 £2500 0 6 years 
SUB4 0 £2500` 6 years 
SUB5 £5000 0 3 years 
SUB6 0 £5000 3 years 
SUB7 £5000 0 6 years 
SUB8 0 £5000 6 years 
SUB9 £2500 £5000 6 years 
SUB10 £5000 £5000 6 years 
SUB11 £5000 £5000 £250m 
SUB12 £5000 £5000 £500m 
Table 4.2: BAU subsidy scenarios 
 
Table 4.3 presents the results of these scenarios. It can clearly be seen that none 
of the subsidy scenarios make a significant impact on installed base market shares 
or sales compared to the base case scenario, but the costs of the subsidy and lost 
fuel duty revenue is in the scale of £billions for most scenarios. SUB10, which 
provides £5000 for both EVs for 6 years has the most significant impact. Even this 
however, provides less than 2 million additional sales of EV over 40 years and 
around 0.13 Mtons of annual CO2 savings in year 40 compared to BAU.  
 
The limited reduction in CO2 may be surprising as from the vehicle attributes (Table 
4.1), a BEV could provide a 65% drop in emissions per km and a PiHEV a 20% 
drop. However, from BAU to SUB10 there is only a 1.2% shift from ICEV to EV and 
the majority of the EVs are PiHEV (81%), this leads to an emission reduction of only 
0.34% (1.2 x (0.19 x 65 + 0.81 x 0.2)). Considering these marginal changes in CO2 
emissions and EV additional sales, it may then be concluded that subsidies have 
very little impact if they are the only policy intervention. 
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Table 4.3: BAU subsidy scenario results 
Lost fuel duty and total CO2 emissions for SUB1-12 in relation to BAU Base, costs 
discounted to NPV at a rate of 3.5% years 1-30 and 3% years 31-40 (HMCO, 2013). 
 
INSTALLED 
BASE 
MARKET 
SHARE (%) 
TOTAL 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
ADDIT. 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
TOTAL 
SUBSIDY 
(£M) 
TOTAL 
LOST 
FUEL 
DUTY 
(£B) 
ANNUAL 
CO2 (Mt) 
TOTAL 
CO2  
(Mt) 
 
2020 2050 
BAU Base 
ICEV 98.26 74.62 73.71 
n/a n/a 12.75 51.58 2690.14 PIHEV 1.43 20.66 14.44 
BEV 0.32 4.72 3.28 
SUB1 
ICEV 98.11 74.50 73.50 -0.20 
 
+0.24 51.56 -1.10 PIHEV 1.56 20.76 14.62 0.17 260 
BEV 0.33 4.74 3.31 0.03 
 
SUB2 
ICEV 98.22 74.59 73.66 -0.05 
 
+0.10 51.57 -0.30 PIHEV 1.44 20.68 14.47 0.03 
 
BEV 0.34 4.73 3.30 0.02 57 
SUB3 
ICEV 97.77 74.30 73.14 -0.57 
 
+0.65 51.53 -3.06 PIHEV 1.89 20.93 14.94 0.50 873 
BEV 0.34 4.77 3.35 0.07 
 
SUB4 
ICEV 98.15 74.54 73.58 -0.13 
 
+0.29 51.57 -0.89 PIHEV 1.45 20.71 14.51 0.07 
 
BEV 0.40 4.74 3.34 0.06 188 
SUB5 
ICEV 97.85 74.31 73.17 -0.53 
 
+0.64 51.54 -2.94 PIHEV 1.80 20.92 14.90 0.46 925 
BEV 0.34 4.77 3.35 0.07 
 
SUB6 
ICEV 98.17 74.55 73.58 -0.12 
 
+0.26 51.57 -0.82 PIHEV 1.45 20.71 14.52 0.07 
 
BEV 0.38 4.74 3.33 0.05 204 
SUB7 
ICEV 96.91 73.83 72.25 -1.45 
 
+1.69 51.47 -7.91 PIHEV 2.71 21.33 15.72 1.28 3196 
BEV 0.38 4.84 3.45 0.17 
 
SUB8 
ICEV 97.96 73.35 73.35 -0.35 
 
+0.80 51.54 -2.42 PIHEV 1.49 20.80 14.64 0.19 
 
BEV 0.55 4.79 3.44 0.16 684 
SUB9 
ICEV 97.47 74.13 72.81 -0.89  
+1.43 51.50 -5.34 PIHEV 1.95 21.04 15.11 0.66 1759 
BEV 0.58 4.83 3.51 0.23 693 
SUB10 
ICEV 96.61 73.69 71.97 -1.74 
 
+2.43 51.45 -9.99 PIHEV 2.77 21.41 15.85 1.41 3210 
BEV 0.62 4.89 3.60 0.32 704 
SUB11 
ICEV 98.11 74.50 73.50 -0.21 
 
+0.29 51.56 -1.21 PIHEV 1.55 20.76 14.61 0.17 205 
BEV 0.34 4.74 3.32 0.04 45 
SUB12 
ICEV 97.95 74.38 73.29 -0.41 
 
+0.57 51.54 -2.36 PIHEV 1.67 20.86 14.78 0.33 410 
BEV 0.37 4.76 3.36 0.08 90 
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There are noticeable reinforcing effects that the uptake of the two EVs have on 
each other. For example, SUB8 (£5000 for BEV only) achieves around 160,000 
additional sales of BEV compared to BAU, yet SUB10, which offers the same plus 
£5000 for PiHEV achieves 320,000 additional BEV sales to BAU.  This effect 
appears to work both ways, as in SUB7, which offers £5000 only for PiHEV, there 
are 1.28m PiHEV sales additional to BAU, whereas SUB10, the same scenario with 
a £5000 BEV subsidy, achieves 1.41m additional PiHEV sales. Though, looking at 
these numbers it would appear that BEV gain more by PiHEV subsidies than the 
other way around, presumably due to the higher installed base of PiHEV. This 
phenomenon is due to the increased number of EV drivers and thus increased 
WoM effects, which depend on total EVs.  
 
As annual emissions were 79.2 Mtons CO2 at the start of the time period, the BAU 
base represents a 30% reduction in emissions, which is far off government targets 
of 80%. When looking at the cumulated CO2 emission savings, the results look 
more impressive, as the most successful scenario, SUB10, may save almost 10 
Mtons of CO2 over the 40 year period, but this is still less than 0.4% from the BAU 
Base total emissions. Furthermore, this is at a cost of nearly £4b in subsidies and 
£2.4b from fuel duty revenue loss (in addition to base), which works out at £2255 
per vehicle from subsidies alone or £3652 if including fuel duty loss.  
 
When considering carbon abatement costs (£/tCO2), a simple calculation can be 
carried out that describes the cost the government would pay for each ton of CO2 
removed relative to the baseline at the end of the 40 year time period. Although 
other approaches can be applied this is the preferred approach for estimating 
carbon abatement costs by at least two governments (DCCEE, 2011; Atkins, 2009). 
Carbon abatement costs can give an indication of cost effectiveness, but should be 
viewed with caution as costs may be uncertain and should account for all social 
cost and benefits (Anable, 2008). Using Equation 4.9, the abatement costs (just 
considering subsidy) are between 190 (SUB2) and 459  (SUB9) £/tCO2. The lower 
end of this is in line with carbon abatement costs in the EC GHG TransPoRD 
project (Schade et al., 2011), which reports a feebate abatement cost from an 
Authority Perspective of 199 €/tCO2  (approximately 170 £/tCO2), though it is noted 
that this project was a much more in-depth study and feebates differ slightly from 
subsidies. Note however, that the UK shadow price of non-traded carbon is 29 - 86 
£/tCO2 (DECC, 2011c). 
 
177 
  
                         
               
                 
  
Equation 4.9 
TCNPV, Scenario is the total incurred government cost (due to subsidies and/or loss of fuel duty 
revenue) by year 40 of the policy scenario compared to BAU at net present value86 (£) 
TEX is the total emissions of CO2 over the 40 year period in Scenario x (tons) 
 
Budget caps, as in SUB11 and 12, are more likely than the government dedicating 
up to £4b to subsidies. In these scenarios, the available money is used up in less 
than 3 years. The impact in the short term, during the subsidy and not long after is 
more promising, but the drop in sales when the subsidy ends is quite clearly seen in 
Figure 4.8, which shows EV sales, by the ‘kink’ in the uptake trajectory. At this 
point, the removal of the subsidy effectively creates a £5000 increase in EV 
purchase price, as the learning effect price reduction is not yet strong enough to 
bring down purchase price as much as the subsidy had done. This affects PiHEV 
more strongly, halving sales the year after the subsidy is removed.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: BAU vs SUB10 EV sales 
 
4.4.2.2 Conditional Marketing Base 
 
Although it would seem that under BAU conditions, subsidies may not have a great 
impact, model testing then moved on to assess if subsidies could make any 
difference to the failing market baseline outlined in Section 4.3.5. Recall that this 
involved a conditional marketing regime of the manufacturers, such that if a sales 
threshold of 7.5% by end of year 10 were not achieved, marketing was removed 
                                               
86  Discounted at 3.5% p.a. up to year 30 and 3.0% from year 31 to 40 as per UK 
government guidelines (HMCO, 2013). 
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(implying production would scale back also). Eight Scenarios, as presented in Table 
4.4, were designed that resulted in a successful market as they succeeded in 
exceeding the sales threshold of 7.5% in year 10. The only intervention for 
CMSUB1-4 were subsidies, similar to those in the BAU subsidy tests, and these 
were based around the duration of subsidies required to achieve success, and 
demonstrate the sensitivity to the market to this (also proven by Struben and 
Sterman (2008) in their study).  CMST1-4 were themed, combining subsidies with 
changes in vehicle attributes over the time-period. To design these, it was 
necessary to understand what sort of change would bring about success. 
Therefore, each vehicle attribute was tested individually (with all else constant), 
identifying the following requirements: 
 
 6.8% increase in ICEV operating costs; 
 10.6% decrease in PiHEV operating costs; 
 66% decrease in BEV operating costs; 
 160 mile range for BEV; 
 130mph max speed for BEV; 
 Fuel availability increase from 40 to 55% for BEV (with associated PiHEV 
increase). 
  
SCENARIO 
PiHEV 
SUBSIDY 
BEV 
SUBSIDY 
BUDGET 
DURATION 
/CAP 
OTHER 
CMSUB1 £5000 0 4 years n/a 
CMSUB2 0 £5000 10 years n/a 
CMSUB3 £5000 £5000 3 years n/a 
CMSUB4 £3000 £5000 4 years n/a 
CMST1 £5000 £5000 5 years ICEV op. cost -5% by year 10 
CMST2 £5000 £5000 3 years 
BEV range 200m by year 20 
BEV fuel availability 70% by year 40 
BEV max speed 100mph by year 20 
PiHEV op. cost -10% by year 40 
BEV op. cost -10% by year 40 
CMST3 0 £5000 £500m 
BEV range 300m by year 20 
BEV and PiHEV fuel availability 
100% by year 40 
BEV max speed 120mph by year 20 
PiHEV op. cost -10% by year 40 
BEV op. cost -20% by year 40 
ICEV op cost +10% by year 40 
CMST4 0 £5000 £500m 
As CMST3 
Revenue Preserving Tax in place 
Table 4.4: Conditional marketing with subsidy scenarios 
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It seemed clearly unrealistic that PiHEV or BEV could have such high decreases in 
operating costs over the next ten years, nor that there would be the technical 
advances in BEV for the increases to average range and speed. However it was 
interesting that only a relatively small increase in ICEV costs could tip the market. 
As it was felt plausible that oil prices may drop over the coming decade (as the oil 
market is extremely volatile), ICEV operating costs and fuel efficiency could actually 
decrease, so CMST1 is a scenario that considers what a 5% drop in ICEV 
operating costs would mean for subsidy duration.  It should be remembered that the 
sales threshold figure was somewhat arbitrary when viewing the results. Had it 
been set slightly lower, success would have been achieved at lower costs. CMST2-
4 were designed to have relatively realistic improvements to the EV technical 
attributes over the time period, though in CMST3 and 4, by year 20, BEVs have a 
higher perceived utility than ICEVs and PiHEVs so this is an optimistic case. This is 
likely due to the fuel availability, maximum speed, purchase price and range 
becoming more in line with those of ICEV and PiHEV whereas emission factor and 
operating cost remain significantly lower. In CMST4 the revenue preserving tax, as 
described in Section 4.2.4, is added to CMST3.  
 
The results of all the Conditional Marketing scenarios are presented in Table 4.5, 
which also include the BAU and CM baselines for further comparison. As can be 
seen, there is only a marginal installed base of EV in the failed market scenario, CM 
base, though even this has resulted in a £2b loss in fuel duty revenue. The result is 
3.5Mt more annual CO2 emissions than under the BAU base, and an extra 56Mt 
over the time period. The subsidy scenarios result in market shares as successful 
as BAU base but not as successful as the best case subsidy scenarios under BAU. 
The three optimistic themed scenarios offer the greatest potential for any of the 
scenarios tested so far. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
  
 
INSTALLED 
BASE 
MARKET 
SHARE (%) 
TOTAL 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
ADDIT. 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
TOTAL 
SUBSIDY 
(£M) 
TOTAL 
LOST 
FUEL 
DUTY 
(£B) 
ANNUAL 
CO2 (Mt) 
TOTAL 
CO2 
(Mt) 
2020 2050 
BAU Base 
ICEV 98.26 74.62 73.71 
n/a 
 
n/a 12.75 51.58 2690.14 PIHEV 1.43 20.66 14.44 
BEV 0.32 4.72 3.28 
CM Base 
ICEV 98.26 99.14 89.91 
n/a n/a 2.09 55.08 2746.63 PIHEV 1.43 0.70 1.25 
BEV 0.32 0.16 0.27 
CMSUB1 
ICEV 97.60 74.15 72.88 
 
 
+11.65 51.51 -61.03 PIHEV 2.05 21.05 15.16 13.92 1533 
BEV 0.36 4.79 3.39 3.12  
CMSUB2 
ICEV 97.46 74.24 73.01 
 
 
+12.45 51.51 -61.68 PIHEV 1.48 20.87 14.73 13.49  
BEV 1.06 4.89 3.69 3.41 1833 
CMSUB3 
ICEV 97.77 74.25 73.06 
 
 
+11.56 51.53 -60.18 PIHEV 1.83 20.96 14.97 13.72 923 
BEV 0.41 4.79 3.40 3.13 201 
CMSUB4 
ICEV 97.80 74.29 73.12 
 
 
+11.55 51.53 -59.90 PIHEV 1.76 20.92 14.89 13.65 575 
BEV 0.44 4.79 3.41 3.14 335 
CMST1 
ICEV 97.21 75.29 73.42 
 
 
+11.70 51.68 -60.02 PIHEV 2.28 20.11 14.67 13.43 2228 
BEV 0.51 4.59 3.33 3.06 488 
CMST2 
ICEV 97.33 60.47 63.51   
+31.38 46.81 -133.47 PIHEV 1.95 20.19 14.74 13.49 941 
BEV 0.71 19.33 13.18 12.91 243 
CMST3 
ICEV 97.40 42.54 52.56   
+61.43 38.24 -241.55 PIHEV 1.57 11.81 9.63 8.38  
BEV 1.03 45.65 29.24 28.96 500 
CMST4 
ICEV 97.40 42.49 52.54   
+61.48 38.22 -241.74 PIHEV 1.57 11.79 9.62 8.37  
BEV 1.03 45.72 29.27 29.00 500 
Table 4.5: Conditional marketing with subsidy scenario results  
Lost fuel duty and total CO2 emissions for CMSUB1-4 and CMST1-4 are presented in 
relation to CM Base. 
 
Comparing CMSUB1 and CMSUB2, supporting BEVs only would require subsidies 
for almost twice as long as supporting PiHEVs only for market success. As such, 
this would cost twice as much for similar emission savings. CMSUB3 and 4 would 
appear to suggest that supporting both platforms can achieve market success at 
lower cost (both in terms of subsidies and fuel duty loss), with little difference in 
emission reductions. CMST1, which also considered the decrease in ICEV costs, 
showed that an extra 2 years of subsidies would be required to overcome this set-
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back, during which time an extra £1.8b in subsidies are incurred. Even if PiHEV 
operating costs also decreased (not shown in table) with oil prices (by 4% assuming 
80% of driving is powered by petrol as in the emissions rating), an extra year of 
subsidies is needed to tip the market, costing £0.7b. In all, these scenarios would 
suggest that, in the failing case demonstrated here, subsidies are pivotal in making 
EVs attractive enough to tip the market into success. This is not the case in the 
BAU scenario where subsidies could benefit those who would purchase an EV 
anyway, but it is difficult to predict which of these will be the case. 
 
CMST2-4 have the greatest impacts on shares of any of the scenarios, and CMST 
3 and 4 can result in EVs capturing over half the market by year 40. For CMST3, 
this is at a significant cumulated loss in fuel duty of nearly £61b. Shown in Figure 
4.9, this appears to increase exponentially over time (with EV uptake), and is in the 
region of £3.4b per annum by year 40. This is a 46% decrease in annual revenue, 
or 70% over the 40 year period. A method of applying revenue preserving tax to 
recoup this loss was described in Section 4.2.4, specifically Equation 4.7. For 
CMST3, this (undiscounted) annual tax would be around £330 per vehicle for BEV 
and £352 per vehicle for ICEV/PiHEV in year 40, also shown in Figure 4.9. Recall 
CMST4 is simply CMST3 with that tax applied. We see in Table 4.5 that this 
revenue preserving tax makes very little difference to total sales and market shares 
of vehicles, with a slight favouring being towards the BEV, suggesting little impact 
on purchase behaviour. However, if this were only applied to ICEV/PiHEV as an 
increased fuel duty (not included in table), it would be in the region of £671 a 
vehicle by year 40, which could increase BEV share by 2%. The acceptability of a 
vehicle miles travelled (VMT) tax is however, under much debate. An increase in 
VED (as replicated here, albeit based on mileage), or mechanism to tax electricity 
as a fuel may be more appropriate. 
 
Figure 4.9: Lost fuel duty revenue (CMST3) and revenue preserver taxes (CMST4)  
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Despite the successful market shares obtained in CMST2-4, there is only a 
reduction in annual CO2 emissions (compared to the failing case) of 15% (CMST2) 
and 30% (CMST3 and 4) by year 40, which is again, far off the government target 
of decarbonisation of the fleet. It is however similar to findings in another study that 
predicted a 50% shift to AFVs would lead to a 23% reduction in emissions (Kwon, 
2005). In fact, when looking at cumulated emissions, there is only a reduction of 4.9 
and 8.8% compared to the failing case baseline. To put this into context, it should 
be recalled that there is a constant fleet and vehicle WTW emissions in the model, 
so the maximum reduction would be 65% with 100% BEV installed base. These 
findings are optimistic when compared to IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2oC 
Scenario (2DS)87 (IEA, 2012a). In this, the IEA report the need for global sales 
shares of 2% BEV and 4% PiHEV by 2020, and 22% BEV and 34% PiHEV by 
2040. Sales shares in the model under CMST3/4 are 4.7% BEV and 6.2% PiHEV in 
2020 and 65.0% BEV and 11.4% PiHEV in 2050. However, these cases are not 
wholly comparable as this case study is only concerned with the UK fleet and does 
not include HFCVs whereas the 2DS requires a 17% HFCV market share in 2050 
with mass deployment beginning in the 2020’s.   
 
Recall that the CM base scenario (which was illustrated against the BAU in Figure 
4.4), lead to complete market collapse of EVs by year 40. As ICEV then accounts 
for over 99% of the installed base of vehicles, annual emissions are higher than the 
BAU case. However, in each of the subsidy scenarios, the EV market has been 
recaptured and in each case there are emission savings compared to CM base in 
the region of the BAU subsidy scenarios. Looking at abatement costs, due to the 
market failure in the failing case, cost per vehicle is much more reasonable than the 
best case in the BAU scenarios (SUB10), as there are more CO2 emissions in the 
CM base than the BAU base. Even in the most costly un-themed case, CMSUB2, 
using again Equation 4.9, abatement costs due to subsidies are £108 per vehicle 
and £30 per tonne CO2, which were £1256 and £190 for SUB2, the least costly 
scenario under BAU. If fuel duty loss is included within the abatement costs, for the 
cost per vehicle is in the region of £753 (around 20% that of SUB10) and £211 per 
tonne CO2 (around a third of SUB10). The subsidy abatement costs are even lower 
                                               
87 “The 2DS describes an energy system consistent with an emissions trajectory that recent 
climate science research indicates would give an 80% chance of limiting average 
global temperature increase to 2°C. It sets the target of cutting energy-related CO2 
emissions by more than half in 2050 (compared with 2009) and ensuring that they 
continue to fall thereafter. Importantly, the 2DS acknowledges that transforming the 
energy sector is vital, but not the sole solution: the goal can only be achieved provided 
that CO2 and GHG emissions in non-energy sectors are also reduced”  (IEA, 2013b). 
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for CMST2-4 due to the great success in EV uptake and emission reduction, being 
as low as £13 per vehicle and £2 per tonne CO2 under CMST3. However, when 
including the fuel duty it is more in line with the abatement costs of SUB10, being 
£1658 per vehicle and £256 per tonne CO2. As CMST4 has a revenue preserving 
tax in place however, that fuel duty loss has been recouped, making it a much more 
attractive option. 
 
In summary, the conditional marketing tests, when compared to the BAU tests, 
highlight the importance of the baseline. The BAU tests would suggest that 
subsidies are an expensive method of increasing EV uptake by only a small 
amount, perhaps only subsidising many people who would have purchased EV 
anyway. Under a failing case however, when marketing would be removed if a 
sales threshold was not reached, subsidies are required to tip the market into 
success. In many ways, it may be more realistic that manufacturers would withdraw 
expensive marketing campaigns if they are not providing suitable returns. This 
could suggest that subsidies are a necessary Fiscal Measure if government wishes 
to ensure a sustainable EV market. Further to this, the final tests have 
demonstrated the sensitivity to vehicle attributes, and although progress in these is 
notoriously difficult to predict accurately, even with moderate advances, significant 
EV market shares could be obtained with capped subsidy budgets. However, these 
shares come at the considerable loss of fuel duty revenue, and the government 
would need to consider ways of addressing this potentially major impact on public 
money. 
 
4.4.3 Regulation Scenario Testing 
 
The final model exploration to be carried out involved replication of a Regulation 
scenario. The manufacturer Regulations that are of interest to this study are the 
mandated reduction of fleet average tailpipe CO2 and technology quota of LCVs 
(particularly EVs). As this model was specifically focused on the demand side of the 
EV market, there were no direct factors relating to manufacturers decisions built 
within it, and as such it was not possible within this simple model to constrain 
availability of EVs and ICEVs: both options were always available for the customer 
to choose between them. The fact that EVs are available means that there is an 
implicit regulatory effect in the BAU baseline forcing manufacturer to produce (and 
market) the vehicles, and recall from Section 4.2.5 that some emission reductions 
over the time period were assumed. Further to this, replication of Regulation being 
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in place could be approximated by altering the CO2 emissions and the EV 
marketing effect in a manner that would be expected should a manufacturer be 
responding to Regulations. For this, further assumptions were required, as it is 
equally unlikely that no technological improvements would be made over the 40 
year timeframe. Although these are essentially sensitivity tests, they can be 
approximated to policy scenarios for the purpose of this research. 
 
The scenarios designed to test the impact of Regulation, based on the BAU 
baseline, are presented in Table 4.6. Scenarios REG1 and 2 reflect a reduction in 
the emission factor of ICEVs from 115g/km to 105g/km or 95g/km (9% or 18%) at 
the end of the time period. These reflect emission reduction targets. In this case, no 
technology quota is assumed. It should be noted here, as mentioned in Section 
4.4.1 where sensitivity to EV emissions were explored, that these changes in 
emissions are not connected to vehicle choice in the model, nor do they alter any 
vehicle attributes such as costs or fuel efficiency. Due to this, REG1 and 2 are the 
same as BAU base, and the interest is in seeing the impact of the enforced 
manufacturer emission reductions may have on overall carbon emissions.   
 
Although within the model it is not possible to enforce technology quotas as such, 
as it is assumed that all vehicles are available throughout the period, the EV 
marketing effect was doubled to represent an increased effort from manufacturers 
to promote EV in meeting such quotas. Although it is recognised that this is 
essentially arbitrary, and technology quotas tend to be based on vehicle production 
rather than sales, it was felt that this will give some indication of the impact of 
Regulation. To represent this, REG3 represents the BAU base scenario but with 
imposed marketing for EV. Both emission reduction and marketing are applied in 
REG4 and 5, the only difference being that REG5 also had subsidies in place, 
taken from the most optimistic BAU scenario (SUB10).  
  
SCENARIO 
ICEV 2050 
Emissions (g/km) 
EV Marketing 
Effect (year
-1
) 
Subsidies 
BAU 115 0.025 n/a 
REG1 105 0.025 n/a 
REG2 95 0.025 n/a 
REG3 115 0.05 n/a 
REG4 105 0.05 n/a 
REG5 105 0.05 £5000 for both PiHEV and BEV 
Table 4.6: Regulation scenarios 
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Table 4.7 presents the results from these scenarios. It can be seen that greater 
emission reductions have been achieved than under the BAU Subsidy scenarios, 
but no REG scenario is as successful as the most optimistic themed subsidy 
scenarios under conditional marketing.  
 
Table 4.7: Regulation scenario results  
Lost fuel duty and total CO2 for REG1-5 are presented in relation to BAU base. 
 
REG1 and 2 achieved a 7 and 14% (resp.) reduction in annual total CO2 emissions 
from BAU. When comparing this to the reductions of EV emissions (Section 4.4.1), 
where even in the most favourable scenario the reduction was less than 5%, this 
would imply that Regulation, focusing on fleet emissions of ICEV, may be more 
successful than introducing EVs if the goal is reducing emissions. Obviously this is 
reflective of the low share of EVs in the BAU case as they are not affected by 
specific changes in emissions. The reduction in the conservative case is similar to 
SUB6, which came at much higher cost for both subsidies and fuel duty – however 
this model does not capture what the cost to industry would be to make the 
efficiencies. The impact of EV marketing on BAU, as shown in REG3 increased 
shares moderately, but made very little difference to annual CO2 emissions. This 
perhaps further reinforces the suggestion that reductions in ICEV efficiencies have 
a greater impact than the introduction of EVs on emissions. However, it must not be 
forgotten that these emissions are dependent on the assumptions in the model, and 
 
INSTALLED 
BASE MARKET 
SHARE (%) 
TOTAL 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
ADDIT. 
SALES 
(x10
6
) 
TOTAL 
LOST 
FUEL 
DUTY 
(£B) 
ANNUAL 
CO2 (Mt) 
TOTAL 
CO2 
(Mt) 
2020 2050 
BAU Base 
ICEV 98.26 74.62 73.71 
n/a 12.75 51.58 2690 PIHEV 1.43 20.66 14.44 
BEV 0.32 4.72 3.28 
REG1 
ICEV 98.26 74.62 73.71 
n/a n/a 47.96 -83.41 PIHEV 1.43 20.66 14.44 
BEV 0.32 4.72 3.28 
REG2 
ICEV 98.26 74.62 73.71 
n/a n/a 44.34 -166.83 PIHEV 1.43 20.66 14.44 
BEV 0.32 4.72 3.28 
REG3 
ICEV 94.07 71.65 68.40 -5.30 
+6.96 51.15 -29.93 PIHEV 4.85 23.07 18.75 4.31 
BEV 1.08 5.28 4.27 0.99 
REG4  
ICEV 94.07 71.65 68.40 -5.30 
+6.96 47.67 -108.32 PIHEV 4.85 23.07 18.75 4.31 
BEV 1.08 5.28 4.27 0.99 
REG5 
ICEV 90.60 71.10 66.58 -7.13 
+18.18 46.69 -133.34 PIHEV 7.67 23.51 20.23 5.79 
BEV 1.72 5.39 4.61 1.33 
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the EV shares (particularly BEV) are still very low. The only difference between 
REG3 and REG4 is the impact on emissions, and again a significant contribution 
(compared to REG3) from ICEV efficiencies is observed, as an 8% reduction in 
annual emissions. Finally, when subsidies are also included in REG5, there is a 
marginal increase in EV share, and a 2% decrease in annual emissions compared 
to REG4. On top of this, although REG 5 seems to make quite an impact on market 
share in the short term compared to REG4, by 2050, the difference is very small, 
and the lost fuel duty has increased by over a quarter.  
 
Although it should be remembered that these tests have been merely illustrative of 
Regulation, and that without manufacturer feedback the results should not be read 
as definitive, they do however highlight the importance of targeted efforts to 
decrease ICEV emissions, and that Fiscal Measures (in the form of subsidies) 
applied early on may have initial success alongside manufacturer Regulation. 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The development and exploration of this case study has contributed to the detailed 
understanding of some key processes in the uptake of Electric Vehicles within a 
simple model. The case study built upon an existing base model (Struben and 
Sterman, 2008) with an important socio-technical diffusion process by transferring it 
into a UK context.This was achieved through introduction of a suitable customer 
choice model, relevant vehicle attributes and calibration to predicted BAU trajectory. 
Further improvements were the inclusion of specific EV platforms of BEV and 
PiHEV, accounting for price-volume effect, and by calculating new outputs of loss in 
fuel duty revenue and reduction in annual CO2 emission. Of additional benefit to the 
understanding of the conditions required for EV uptake, a conditional marketing 
scenario was designed. The model was then explored through two broad lines of 
testing, sensitivity to key parameters, and policy and technology scenarios. There 
was a specific focus on the impact of Fiscal Measures (in the form of subsidies) and 
manufacturer Regulation, which have been identified as the policies of most interest 
in this research. 
 
Once a BAU baseline had been determined it was subjected to sensitivity tests of 
key input parameters into the model. As there was confidence in the suitability of 
many of the attributes this narrowed the field down to three areas of focus. Knowing 
the importance of the social exposure loop, Word-of Mouth was tested. It would 
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appear that due to the higher incidence of non-EV drivers in the early years, the 
results are highly sensitive to the magnitude of the “contact effectiveness” with 
these people and exerts a significant influence on all drivers Willingness to 
Consider an EV. This was also indentified by Struben and Sterman who noted its 
influence on tipping points, and other studies that drew attention to the impact of 
consumer attitude on uptake (Janssen et al., 2006; Walther et al., 2010). Although it 
may seem obvious, a policy implication is that any marketing or awareness 
campaigns need to be specifically focused at non-EV drivers. Although there are 
numerous studies that are designed to identify and attract first adopter groups to be 
subjected to niche marketing for EVs (Morton, 2013; Schuitema et al., 2013; Tran et 
al., 2013), this finding may highlight the importance of general awareness as a 
supporting mechanism to Willingness to Consider. This finding would also imply 
that the experts surveyed in Chapter 3B may underestimate the impact of “Raising 
Awareness” policies on market penetration (if they did indeed take this into account 
in their assessments). 
 
Further sensitivity testing involved concerns about the average life of vehicles. The 
findings suggested that mandatory scrappage schemes of ICEVs may favour 
uptake of EVs, as reduced ICEV life could increase installed base of EV by over 
one third. Conversely if EV life is shorter, then preferences would be reduced, 
though this was not as strong as an impact as reduced ICEV life. However, without 
a fully operational model of a second-hand car market and understanding of 
embedded emissions, it is uncertain if this would favour overall emission reductions. 
Indeed, as noted by other studies, scrappage schemes may increase vehicle miles 
(as travelling costs are reduced) and potentially increase emissions (Brand et al., 
2013). Additionally, although the impact of reducing EV life was slight, being able to 
ensure (or give confidence in) a lengthy battery life of EVs may be necessary if a 
successful transition is to occur.  
 
The final sensitivity test did not involve EV uptake but considered what impact a 
wider energy policy of decarbonisation of the electricity mix would have. With a 
small BEV market share in 2050 in the BAU baseline tested here, even in the case 
of fully emission free electricity there would be less than a 5% reduction of CO2 
emissions (though recall that this is with a relatively low BEV installed base). As 
BEV have more emissions in their life cycle phase than ICEV (as detailed in the 
literature review), it would appear to be the case that BEVs are required to achieve 
a significant market share alongside decarbonisation of electricity in order to realise 
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significant CO2 reductions. In future work, testing pathways leading to larger shares 
may be required to test the contribution of EVs to carbon reduction targets. 
 
Under the BAU baseline there seemed to be limited evidence that subsidies would 
be a useful policy tool for accelerating the uptake of EVs in the long term and 
reducing carbon emissions. The most optimistic scenario would have an annual 
saving of less than a fifth of a Mton of CO2 in year 40, at an abatement cost of 
£190/tCO2. Though this was in line with other reports of abatement cost, the actual 
amount is disappointing. However, these tests did highlight how important the 
interrelation between PiHEV and BEV take up is, as they are mutually reinforcing. 
The case for subsidies was much stronger under conditional marketing scenarios 
where carefully timed subsidies could tip a failing market into a successful one. This 
concurs with findings in the literature review that suggested that timing of subsidies 
is important (JTRC, 2010; Janssen et al., 2006), and may only work under 
optimistic scenarios (Kohler et al., 2010), or under specific conditions (Struben and 
Sterman, 2008).  
 
This is however, in contrast to the finding of another study that reported that 
feebates on purchase taxes greatly accelerated low carbon vehicle uptake (Brand 
et al., 2013). 88 The reference scenario in Brand et al, resulted in a lower EV uptake 
by 2050 to the BAU baseline (approx 13%), and their “medium” feebate resulted in 
an approximate 30% EV market share by 2050, more similar to the BAU described 
here. Their most ambitious scenario, offering a higher level of rebate, led to a 50% 
market share by 2050, and in both cases the vast majority of EVs were BEV. This 
result is more in line with the results of the themed scenarios, which also resulted in 
similar emission reductions over the same period. A comparison with Brand et al.’s 
model may not be wholly appropriate, as in the first instance such feebates (and 
particularly the ambitious, longer-term and detailed schemes designed by Brand et 
al.) are not quite the same as the purchase subsidies considered here, and 
                                               
88 The model used in this study is the UK Transport Carbon Model (UKTCM). This is not a 
system dynamic model, but is instead database driven. It covers the whole transport 
system, and independently models transport demand, vehicle stock, and impacts on 
energy, emissions and the environment. There are over 600 vehicle technologies 
considered within the model. Scenario and policy variables, based on socio-economic 
and political developments are input exogenously (Brand, 2010). While it is more 
detailed in some respects, the model studied in this Chapter contains social diffusion 
processes and willingness to consider effects, models the changes within the model 
itself and the choice model is more detailed in terms of attributes. The medium feebate 
was in place over the full time period for all vehicles and imposed a top tax of £4000 on 
high emitters and rebate of £2000 to low emitters, effectively resulting in a similar 
subsidy to this study, but also an electric fuel duty on top. 
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secondly the model had different background assumptions. It would, however, 
appear that the BAU here is more optimistic than Brand et al.’s reference scenario, 
which was more comparable to the failing market in this study than the BAU, where 
subsidies did make a significant impact.  Other changes in attributes that would tip 
the market into success were generally unrealistic or subject to volatile oil price 
assumptions. A possible exception to this is of the achievement of 15% BEV fuel 
availability, should there be the accelerated deployment of public ‘fast charge’ 
stations, but this may still be insufficient for those without access to home charging.  
 
As the BAU baseline is likely unrealistic in its current marketing assumptions 
(manufacturers will not wish to market EVs indefinitely), a failure is more likely, 
which could be a strong case for subsidy support. In these cases, when a subsidy is 
brought in it can tip an otherwise failing market into success, though at extra cost of 
subsidies and loss in fuel duty revenues. There is a danger that if a market was not 
going to fail, then subsidies may be provided to those who would have bought EVs 
anyway, which was also concluded by an earlier study, based in Canada (Chandra 
et al., 2010). A recent UK report suggested that a significant amount spent on the 
Plug-in Vehicle Program has only benefited a “handful” of motorists (HoCTC, 2012). 
Further to this, the Chief Executive of Jaguar Land Rover has also recently spoken 
out against subsidies that are “only for the rich” (Neate, 2013), as the high up-front 
payment and access to off-street parking are required to purchase an EV.  It is 
however, (as already stated) very difficult to predict which would be the case in 
actuality. Making an assumption that these people are likely to be more affluent (as 
they can afford higher BAU purchase prices), this could have important ethical 
implications regarding appropriate spending of public money, as the marginal 
impacts on uptake and emissions does not suggest the poorer have benefited or 
carbon reduction has been successful.  
 
When considered in conjunction with an (optimistic) improvement in technical 
attributes (CMST2-4), EVs may be able to secure over half of the market by year 
40, though at the loss of over £3b p.a. of fuel duty revenue. This is a similar finding 
to a recent report commissioned by the RAC Foundation and Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, that suggested a £3b annual loss in fuel duty revenue by 2030 (Johnson et 
al., 2012). 89 Recall from the literature review, that the ICCT warned that 
governments need to be mindful of such impacts (Kodjak et al., 2011). In addition, 
                                               
89 The reported value was £9bn undiscounted and assumes LCV penetration and ICEV 
efficiency targets are met. 
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Brand et al., (2013) also recognised the challenge that this may create. At this 
point, should a revenue preserving tax be brought in, in the region of £350/vehicle 
there is little difference in sales and BEV is marginally favoured. As previously 
implied if this is based on average mileage, it may be politically unacceptable, and 
should it be applied as form of carbon tax (just on ICEV and PiHEV) even more so. 
One reason for this is that drivers on low incomes tend to drive less so would be 
unfairly penalised. Despite this, questions should be raised regarding the 
acceptability of introducing such a tax on EVs, as this would increase the operating 
costs. Low operating costs are one of the (current) advantages of an EV and to 
alter this after encouraging purchase may be unfair, particularly if the decision to 
purchase an EV was made on economic grounds related to overall ownership 
costs. The government should look at other methods of recouping these losses, 
such as distance based charging, justifying that the revenue is necessary and it is 
an appropriate cost for car owners (as opposed to the general population). 
 
The final stage of testing was an attempt to replicate Regulation of the vehicle 
industry. As this model does not include manufacturer response, these tests can 
therefore only be taken as indicative. Reduction of fleet average tailpipe emissions 
could result in greater CO2 reductions than even the most optimistic BAU subsidy 
scenario. Increasing the promotion of EVs (as a proxy for technology quotas) 
appeared to make little difference in the future, but at a higher cost, though this may 
be related to a low BAU EV market share, as sensitivity tests suggested that social 
exposure would have a greater influence. Combining a subsidy scheme with 
Regulation would appear to make a greater impact than subsidies alone in the 
BAU, but the extra benefits were not significant compared to the impact of 
Regulation alone.  This may be a case for investing in ultra fuel efficient ICEV, but 
as these tests did not account for full manufacturer dynamics, such a strong 
conclusion may not be drawn. 
 
From the above discussion, the key findings of this Chapter can be summarised: 
 Social exposure of EVs to ICEV drivers may exert a strong influence on EV 
uptake, so Raising Awareness Policies may be integral to creating a 
successful EV market.  
 Subsidies do not help under BAU baseline tested here, and lead to high 
carbon abatement costs – but bearing in mind that this assumed constant 
marketing, it may be that the conditional marketing scenario is more realistic, 
where subsidies were important in making a difference. Despite this, they are 
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still not effective enough without advancement in technology that should be 
brought about by supply side policies and infrastructural provision. 
 In most of the scenarios tested here, there was only a small market share of 
EV, and this meant that there were only marginal impacts on emissions, even 
if electricity was zero carbon. This may suggest that a tipping point, beyond 
which EVs make a suitable impact, is yet to be identified. If it is not realistic, 
then this may be a case against the introduction of EVs. It is not clear if such 
a task would be possible, as great care would be needed to ensure that this 
was not essentially arbitrary, especially bearing in mind the complexities of 
accounting for life cycle emissions as discussed in the literature review. 
Regulation of manufacturers was not fully tested in this model, but there was 
an indication that reducing ICEV emissions may make a greater impact on 
overall carbon emission than EV introduction – though this finding is sensitive 
to the low EV market share in that scenario and further tests within a more 
robust model which includes manufacturer dynamics would be required to 
explore this. 
 Even with a low EV uptake, there could be a high loss in revenue from fuel 
duty, which could have grave consequences to the UK economy. Assuming 
that this duty is set at an appropriate level that represents the externalities of 
the fuel use, then some other method of taxation may be required, but this 
should be proportional and the government should consider the impact of 
such changes on the worst-off. If the income is a revenue for the government, 
the case to find a new source from car ownership is however less strong, and 
may require review of other taxes in society. 
 
In closing, comment would now seem appropriate on weighing up the suitability of 
this model and its findings, as this should inform or identify requirements for a 
second case study. Firstly, this was a deliberately simple model, focused on the 
demand side of EV uptake and long term impact on government costs. Due to the 
simplicity, there were many assumptions that had to be made, both about present 
and future factors. As this model was over a relatively long timescale of 40 years, 
these assumptions may well be vulnerable to criticism. During testing it was clear 
that there is a great deal of sensitivity to all of these assumptions, therefore 
confidence and defence of chosen values is important in model understanding and 
interpretation of findings. Again, as this was a simple model, many factors were 
exogenous, and so perhaps important feedback processes were not included.  
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Being aware that this is the case is perhaps more important than including these 
factors, as it allowed the specific focus on those processes that were included. Not 
included in this model were processes of the automobile manufacturer, including 
endogenous pricing effects of the vehicles and response to Regulation. To address 
this research gap, this is a key feature in the second case study. In addition, this 
study did not address the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three. Although 
CO2 reduction can be identified, the simplicity of the model prevented identification 
of any specific sections of society, so identification of impacts or inequalities was 
not possible. In the second case study the automobile market can be disaggregated 
between segments of vehicle size with separate attributes, in order that the 
distributional impacts may be identified.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: MODELLING CASE STUDY TWO 
Whereas the first case study in the previous Chapter was an exercise of exploration 
and understanding, Case Study Two (CS2) of this research builds on the findings of 
the first and incorporates the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three. An 
existing model was adapted to suit the research needs, as identified in the literature 
review (Walther et al., 2010). This is a much more in-depth and complex model 
than that used in Case Study One (CS1), with a number of advantageous features. 
It builds on a similar social diffusion process as CS1, and demand-side policies may 
be simulated through a consumer choice model (in this study, subsidies as an 
example of Fiscal Measures are again the focus). In addition, the reaction of the 
automobile manufacturer to the supply-side policy of Regulation is modelled. 
Furthermore, the Walther et al., model has the possibility of including multiple LCV 
platforms and segments of vehicle market with associated endogenous attributes to 
allow for study of distributional impacts and thus assessment of policies within the 
ethical framework. The key outputs of this model that need to be identified and 
understood in order for the tested policies to satisfy the established ethical 
framework are GHG emission reductions, vehicle market shares and vehicle 
ownership costs. 
 
This case study is set out in a slightly different way than the previous one. Although 
this Chapter also commences with a description of the base model, as the model is 
much more complex than the one in CS1, a high level overview is provided and 
only the most important elements are described in detail. Due to the model 
complexity, this model has not been adapted to the UK, therefore no calibration has 
been carried out. Also there is no sensitivity testing. Therefore, following the detail 
of the base model, baseline and scenario development are explained. CS1 was 
mainly concerned with sensitivity testing whereas the focus of this case study is to 
assess and compare policies within the ethical framework that has been developed 
and evaluated in Chapter Three of the thesis. Due to this, findings are presented in 
terms of the outputs of interest to the ethical framework. The final Section presents 
a discussion and conclusion, focusing on the model limitations, comparison to CS1 
and finally assessment of the policies within the ethical framework.  
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5.1 Description of Base Model 
The base model selected for this case study considers the policy Regulation, over a 
short time-scale of 2010 to 2020. It was presented in a 2010 journal paper (Walther 
et al., 2010), and was initially developed by one of the paper authors for their PhD 
thesis (Wansart, 2012). It is a detailed and complex system dynamic model of the 
Californian Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) and Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) 
Regulations aimed at manufacturers. These were explained in the literature review 
(Section 2B.3.3) and require a reduction in average fleet GHG emissions of new 
vehicles and the introduction of ZEVs as a certain percentage of their fleet. To 
avoid confusion between LEV and ZEV, from here on the LEV Regulations will be 
referred to as the GHG Regulations. They are of interest to this work as they are 
similar to the European Fleet Average Emission Regulation.  
 
The complexity of the model is partly due to the nature of the Regulations, in 
particular the ZEV classification and credit accounting system, which includes some 
feedbacks between the make-to-stock production supply chain and manufacturer 
behaviour when motivated by regulatory penalties. 90  Further to this, sixteen 
different vehicle models are offered through four powertrain options (ICEV91, HEV, 
PiHEV and BEV) and four segments based on vehicle weight and size (extra small 
(XS), small (S), medium (M) and large (L)).  In the model, ZEV refers to HEV, 
PiHEV and BEV due to their classification in the ZEV regulations (which is 
explained later). It should be noted that ZEV and LCV are not interchangeable, as 
LCV can include low carbon ICEV.  
 
On the demand side, the model links together a diffusion model with the same 
social diffusion process as CS1 (Struben and Sterman 2008) including interaction 
with drivers of all 16 vehicle types, and discrete choice theory, utilising an 
established detailed customer choice model by Brownstone and Train (1998).   
 
A key reason in choosing this model as a case study, in addition to the focus on the 
manufacturer, is because the level of detail within the vehicle market allows for 
identification of potential GHG emissions reductions and the deduction of impacts 
on segments of society desired in order to incorporate the proposed ethical 
                                               
90 It should be noted that the model assumes an aggregate manufacturer response so that 
individual manufacturer responses are not included. 
91 As with the previous case study these are assumed to be conventionally fuelled (in this 
case Walther et al., specify gasoline, but for simplicity are referred to as ICEV). 
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framework. Recall that the focus of concern is to prevent unfair burdens on the 
worst-off (as defined in Chapter Three). As the vehicle segments are directly related 
to purchase price, it is assumed that they can be used as proxy indictors for 
segments within society, through making a broad assumption that the less well off 
purchase smaller vehicles due to price constraints related to both purchase and 
running costs. Although no literature was identified that confirmed that low-income 
households bought smaller cars, there was evidence to suggest that high-income 
households favoured larger cars (Baltas and Saridakis, 2013; Choo and 
Mokhtarian, 2004), though there was some evidence that medium sized cars are 
seen as a value-for-money alternative (Baltas and Saridakis, 2013). However, many 
studies do suggest that those most sensitive to costs have the lowest willingness to 
pay towards vehicle ownership (Brownstone et al., 2006; Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 
2007, Santini and Vyas, 2005).  
 
It is accepted that this assumption is a simplification, and in reality vehicle size is 
not a direct indicator of income, as people have specific needs or tastes towards 
vehicle size that are unrelated to income. In addition, many of the less well off may 
purchase a vehicle on credit rather than in one upfront sum or will be in the second-
hand car market. This is if indeed they can afford a car at all as more than a third of 
lowest income quintile households in California do not own a vehicle, compared to 
less than 5% of the two highest quintile households (BLS, 2013). Much literature 
considering low-income car use focuses on the cultural/infrastructural constraints 
that induces forced car ownership, rather than the type of vehicle purchased (Currie 
and Delbosc, 2011; Lucas, 2011). As this ownership is forced, and specific needs 
vary widely so are difficult to capture, it is felt that it is not unfeasible to assume that 
the greatest influence on choice will be cost for the low-income. However, this is 
just a proxy indicator in the absence of the availability of a more detailed model 
which can capture these effects, so this approach is defended as a starting point 
that could be built upon in future work.  
 
An important note is the purpose of the base model, as it has been adapted and 
applied for a slightly different purpose for this case study. Walther et al. were 
interested in the challenges for the manufacturers in meeting the two seemingly 
conflicting GHG and ZEV Regulations of improving efficiencies of conventional 
vehicles whilst introducing less competitive (e.g. higher purchase price, shorter 
range, lack of charging infrastructure) alternatives. There is a high interdependence 
between these, as pointed out by Walther et al. (2010, pp.242-243):  
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On the one hand, the reduction of fuel consumption of conventional vehicles in 
order to meet GHG requirements leads to a higher attractiveness of 
conventional vehicles in contrast to ZEVs. Thus it becomes more challenging 
to meet ZEV requirements. On the other hand, the more ZEVs are introduced 
and sold, the less GHG emissions of conventional vehicles have to be 
reduced. Furthermore, ZEV regulations comprise an important feedback loop 
that determines future ZEV requirements: mandatory ZEV sales depend on 
total sales of conventional new vehicles that were sold 4, 5 and 6 years ago. 
Thus higher sales of conventional vehicles due to decreased fuel consumption 
leads to higher mandatory ZEV sales, making fulfilment of ZEV regulations 
even more challenging. Conversely, higher ZEV sales will result in lower sales 
of conventional vehicles and thus lower future ZEV requirements.  
 
Complicating this challenge further are the significant uncertainties regarding 
consumer acceptance and technological development, and the balancing of both 
short and long term objectives. A further challenge in developing a model that 
accounts for all of these interacting elements is ensuring that feedbacks between 
supply and demand dynamics are sufficiently captured. Although there are civil 
penalties in place for non-compliance with the targets set by the regulations, the 
manufacturers do have some freedom in the strategy they choose to adopt in order 
to meet the targets.  
 
With the focus on the manufacturer, Walther et al., assess various strategies in 
meeting these regulations, in an attempt to identify the option with minimal penalties 
incurred. In doing this, a pragmatic approach, based on outcomes, is adopted that 
considers only one aggregate manufacturer covering the state. Profit levels and 
returns are set at typical rates to avoid the unrealistic dynamics of a monopoly. 
Despite this, the interaction between manufacturers may be relevant as each will 
adopt their own approach (based on their individual wider business plans and 
desired market) and if manufacturers all acted identically the competition dynamics, 
which drive the free market, may be hindered and as such innovation would stall. 
This model limitation should be recalled when interpreting any results.  
 
Walther et al., establish three broad options for manufacturers to meet regulatory 
requirements, which are: 
 Improvement of current ICEV efficiencies. This is a continuation of much of 
current R&D, that has led to historic efficiency improvements and engine 
downsizing;   
 Introducing a new “Extra-Small” vehicle segment.  Such an approach may be 
novel in the States, where the “sub-compact” is not widely available and 
larger vehicles are generally favoured (Auto Alliance, 2013), as opposed to 
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Europe where small vehicles are favoured and vehicle downsizing is already 
occurring (ACEA, 2012), and; 
 Switching to low carbon fuels and powertrains. This option also will aid with 
meeting ZEV Regulations. In designing the focus of the overall strategy, 
manufacturers must also make decisions on the attributes of any new 
platforms, and the timing of their introduction. 
 
As this model is much more complex than CS1, it will be described in terms of four 
high level modules as identified by Walther et al. These modules are not equal in 
their complexity, but represent four specific areas of interest.  Where appropriate, 
further detail will be provided on processes specific to this research. The model, 
illustrated in Figure 5.1, comprises of four modules and a number of exogenous 
parameters.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Structure of the model (Walther et al., 2010, p.244) 
 
The Regulations module is designed to calculate credits and civil penalties through 
sales (from the Customer module) and emissions (from the Industry module). 
These outputs feed in to the Industry module and combine with purchaser 
behaviour (from the Customer module) to predict adjustments in vehicle purchase 
prices, fuel consumption and emissions, taking into account learning through 
experience. ZEV adjustment impacts are also calculated in this module, taking into 
account targets, actual sales, vehicle range, and costs of new technologies. Vehicle 
demand is calculated in the Customer module, as a function of population and 
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income, with a purchase probability based on customer awareness (through 
marketing and word of mouth) and vehicle availability and utility, feeding into the 
choice model. Both the Customer and Industry modules feed into the Infrastructure 
module, which models the interdependence of market share and network effects.  
 
The structure and dynamics of the four modules, as developed and described by 
Walther et al., are presented in the following Sections. Due to the complexity and 
commercial sensitivity of the model, it was not appropriate to comprehensively 
describe the model in more detail. These descriptions are interpretations of Walther 
et als., work, based on the paper and through experience of using the model. Any 
assumptions detailed in this Section come from Walther et al., but where sources 
are available they are provided. Vehicle attributes were determined by Walther et 
al., in conjunction with Volkswagen. Unless otherwise stated, module, group and 
parameter titles are those used by Walther et al. 
 
5.1.1 Industry Module 
 
At the heart of the model is the reaction of the manufacturer to the regulations, 
which requires adjustment of vehicle characteristics. These are demonstrated in 
Walther et al.’s diagrams92 presented in Figure 5.2 for the GHG Regulations and 
Figure 5.3 for the ZEV Regulations. Within this, there are five aspects to this 
module which will be described in detail:  
 
 Vehicle Attributes; 
 Production Costs; 
 Pricing and Cash-flow; 
 Battery Costs and Capacity, and; 
 Production and Sales. 
 
                                               
92 These are simplified illustrations of the larger model. 
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Figure 5.2: Adjustment of ICEV (conventional vehicles) to GHG Regulations (adapted 
from Walther et al., p.246) 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Adjustment to ZEV Regulations (adapted from Walther et al., p.247) 
 
Production Costs 
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Unit production costs consist of fixed and variable costs, which are accounted for in 
loops B2 in Figure 5.2 and R4 in Figure 5.3. The fixed production cost is $5000 per 
vehicle for all segments. The variable production cost is the variable unit production 
cost plus the battery cost per vehicle for each vehicle. The initial variable production 
cost is shown in Table 5.1. The cost increases due to a GHG adjustment cost and 
decreases at a fractional rate of 3% per year (suggested by industry experts), 
representing economies of scale and improvements in production efficiency. Battery 
costs are discussed later under Battery Costs and Capacity. 
 
  PRODUCTION COSTS ($) 
  XS S M L 
U
N
IT
 ICEV 3,500 6,500 11,000 20,000 
HEV, PiHEV, BEV 8,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
B
A
T
T
E
R
Y
 HEV 900 1,200 1,500 1,500 
PiHEV 2,100 2,700 3,600 4,500 
BEV 3,000 4,500 9,000 21,000 
Table 5.1: Initial variable production costs  
 
 
The GHG adjustment cost is the cost to the manufacturer to reduce the fuel 
consumption in order to meet targets, but decreases with experience (R1, R2 and 
R3 in Figure 5.2). The equation for GHG adjustment is shown in Equation 5.1. The 
parameters included here were based on regression analysis data from the EU 
Joint Research Centre who carried out an extensive economic study on different 
technical concepts to reduce ICEV GHG emissions (Smokers et al., 2006). 
Production costs influence both purchase price and manufacturer costs, and is 
reflected in loop B2 in Figure 5.2 (See also: Pricing and Cashflow). In the model, 
only XS vehicles incur additional unit production costs as this is a new segment in 
the market. 
 
                          
         
         
  
Equation 5.1 
   
  is the target emission reduction of vehicle i 
   is a regression parameter for segment x: 0.007, 0.007, 0.0055, 0.0025 (XS,S,M,L) 
   is a regression parameter for segment x: -0.1, -0.1, -0.11, -0.027 (XS,S,M,L) 
   is a regression parameter for segment x: 22, 22, 18, 18 (XS,S,M,L) 
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Pricing and Cashflow 
Industry profit is the difference between revenue and costs discounted to Net 
Present Value. Total costs to the industry come from production, marketing and 
retail store costs, and civil penalties incurred from the GHG and ZEV Regulations 
(loops B3 and B4 in Figure 5.2). Unit production costs have already been 
discussed, and marketing and retail store costs are fixed costs influenced by 
vehicle availability and production rate and civil penalties are discussed in the 
Regulation module. Marketing costs are $1M for each 0.01 of marketing 
effectiveness and retail store costs are set at $1000 per unit in stock. Revenue 
comes from vehicle sales, so is dependent upon purchase price. Purchase price, 
shown in Figure 5.4, is influenced by production costs, a desired overall profit 
margin of 0.1 and the desired ZEV market share to meet ZEV requirements, with 
adjustments occurring via anchoring and adjustment (thereby biased to previous 
price). 
 
Figure 5.4: Influences on purchase price (adapted from model) 
 
Purchase price is calculated by an initial purchase price (Equation 5.2) that is then 
adjusted (Equation 5.3) to meet a target purchase price. The target purchase price 
is the product of purchase price and the price adjustment to production costs, 
desired profits and desired market share, calculated using Equation 5.4, Equation 
5.5 and Equation 5.6. Note that the profit weighting favours new technologies, the 
market share weighting favours BEV and the production costs weighting favours 
non-BEVs. The target purchase price is bound by a range between a maximum 
(which is five times the initial purchase price) and minimum (80% of the current 
purchase price). The purchase price for each vehicle (powertrain/model) in each 
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time period is then multiplied by the sales rate to calculate the total revenue to the 
manufacturer. The desired market share is influenced by desire to avoid ZEV 
penalties, as if a ZEV target is not met an increased market share can lead to a 
decrease in purchase price (loops R1, R2 and B1 in Figure 5.3).   
 
                           (   
   
  
) 
Equation 5.2 
PM is the target profit margin (1.1) 
UC is total unit production cost per vehicle. 
NPC is the non-production cost: unit costs without production (marketing, retail store and 
penalties shared between expected unit sales). 
AS is the initial expected average sales (1.4 x 10
6
) 
                                    
            
       
 
Equation 5.3 
PPtarget is the target purchase price 
PP is the purchase price 
tadjust is the adjustment time (0.5 years) 
 
                                       (
  
 
   ) 
Equation 5.4 
Wp is the weighting for profit margin (ICEV: 1, HEV, PiHEV, BEV: 0.1) 
Rd is the desired total revenue 
R is the total revenue 
 
                                             (
 
  
   )    
Equation 5.5 
ZEVG is if vehicle is a Gold ZEV (ICEV, HEV, PiHEV: 0, BEV: 1) 
Wm is the weighing for market share (0.1) 
M is the market share 
MR is the market share requirement (For BEV: 2009-11: 0.11; 2012-2014: 0.12; 2014-17: 
0.14; 2018-20: 0.16)  
 
                                   (
       
  
   )  
Equation 5.6 
Wc is the weighting for production costs (ICEV, HEV, PiHEV: 0.5, BEV: 1) 
UC is the total unit cost per vehicle 
PP is the purchase price 
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Vehicle Attributes 
Vehicle attributes that are of interest are the ICEV, PiHEV and HEV fuel 
consumption, as they lead to unit GHG emissions, and the BEV vehicle range, as 
that determines availability, partial utility and ZEV classification. Loop B1 in Figure 
5.2  represents the reduction in fuel consumption to meet GHG emission targets, 
and this is shown in more detail in Figure 5.5.  The unit emissions are based on a 
55:45 split of City:Highway emissions from the fuel consumption under those 
conditions and emission per gallon of gasoline, as shown in Equation 5.7.  
       
Figure 5.5: Calculation of motor fuel consumption for ICE-based vehicles (adapted 
from model) 
 
                      (      )        ((               )     )  
       (               )     ) 
Equation 5.7 
MFC is the motor fuel consumption for city or highway in gallon/mile 
EF is the CO2 gasoline emission factor for city or highway in g/gallon 
CF  is the conversion factor from CO2 to CO2 equivalent (1.176) 
 
It is the motor fuel consumption that is responsible for the emissions, and this is 
adjusted by the manufacturer to meet the regulatory targets, based on the 
necessary relative CO2 emissions reductions (see Regulations module for further 
detail on this). So, in the model the change in motor fuel consumption is influenced 
by the target fuel consumption, itself the product of motor fuel consumption and 
necessary relative CO2 emissions reductions. Initial motor fuel consumption is 
0.018, 0.028, 0.029, 0.036 gallons/mile for XS, S, M and L respectively. The motor 
fuel consumption is taken as the highway consumption and the city consumption is 
assumed to be 25% higher than highway. There is also an assumed improvement 
in consumption from ICEV to HEV and HEV to PiHEV of 0.005 gallon/mile.  
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The BEV has a constant CO2 equivalent (based on electricity generation) assumed 
by the authors to be 130g/mile. The BEV range is calculated using Equation 5.8. It 
is determined by the battery capacity, making the assumption that the energy 
consumption of the electric motor is constant (see Battery Costs and Capacity). The 
maximum battery weight in vehicle and energy consumption are both constant and 
endogenous, taken from a 2010 report on electric powertrains (Kromer and 
Heywood, 2007). The 0.8 term refers to the fraction of usable battery capacity.  
 
          
             
  
 
Equation 5.8 
ED is the battery energy density (kWh/kg) 
WMAX is the maximum battery weight in a vehicle (kg) (const.) 
EC is the energy consumption of electric motor (kWh/mile) (const.) 
 
Battery Costs and Capacity 
Battery costs are influenced by battery production and capacity, as shown in Figure 
5.6. They are assumed to develop by reducing unit cost per kWh, which follows a 
standard experience curve (R4 in Figure 5.3), and increasing energy density (loop 
R3 in Figure 5.3). Energy density follows an S-shaped technology development 
curve with a maximum of 0.22 kWh/kg (the theoretical maximum for Li-ion 
batteries). The increase in battery capacity over time influences the range of an EV, 
which in turn impacts on availability, desirability and purchase price, captured by 
loop R5 in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Battery Costs and Capacity (adapted from model) 
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The battery costs per vehicle, calculated using Equation 5.9 are dependent on unit 
costs and battery capacity, itself a product of energy density and the maximum 
battery weight. 
 
               (         )   (         (
    
         
)
    
) 
Equation 5.9 
ED is the battery energy density (kWh/kg) 
WMAX is the maximum battery weight in a vehicle (kg) (const.) 
BUCinit is the initial battery unit costs (250 $/kWh) 
Ecum is the cumulated production of battery energy (kWh) 
Ecum,init is the initial cumulated production of battery energy (1 x 10
6
kWh) 
 
Production and Sales 
The supply chain of the automobile industry is modelled as make-to-stock, as it is 
usual in the U.S. to buy direct from a dealer (not shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 
5.3). Within this the production capacity, order backlog and retail stock are included 
and waiting customers are also modelled, so that if a demanded vehicle is not in 
stock, they will wait a time (one month on average) before making a new decision. 
This in effect captures supply and demand dynamics with a realistic time lag, 
allowing for disequilibrium between sales and demand so a manufacturer can push 
towards a minimum production rate of 150,000 PiHEV and HEV and 50,000 BEV 
vehicles a year. Total demand is then calculated using Equation 5.10. Further detail 
on this is not directly relevant to this case study so for details see Walther et al.  
 
             ∑
   
   
     
Equation 5.10 
WC is the number of waiting customers for vehicle i 
WTa is the average time until waiting customers cancel first choice (0.083) 
FD is the fixed demand for vehicles (140,000) 
 
5.1.2 Regulations Module 
 
The GHG and ZEV Regulation module can be seen as comprising of the two 
separate, but interacting systems for the two regulations, as shown in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7: GHG and ZEV Regulation requirements (Walther et al., 2010, p.245) 
 
GHG Regulations 
The accounting structure for the GHG Regulations is implemented as an ageing 
chain (as the stocks and flows of credits are age-dependent – recall they are valid 
for five years). Credits (measured in g/mile) are calculated for a time period from 
the difference between the fleet average emission and the exogenous target 
emission (as shown in Table 5.2), multiplied by the number of new vehicles. Fleet 
average emissions are calculated from the unit GHG emissions (see Industry 
module) for each powertrain/model combination and the number of each of those 
vehicles sold in the time period (see Customers module).  GHG credits (which may 
be positive or negative depending on whether or not targets are met) are cumulated 
over each year and then get older, and after five years penalties are calculated at 
$5000 for every negative g/mile. These penalties then feed into the pricing and 
cashflow of the manufacturer (see Industry module). 
 
Year Fleet Average Emission Target (g/mile) 
2009 323 
2010 301 
2011 267 
2012 233 
2013 227 
2014 222 
2015 213 
2016 205 
 
Table 5.2: Fleet average emission targets (CARB, 2012) 
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ZEV Regulations93 
Within the ZEV Regulations, there are four categories of ZEV (Gold, Silver, Silver 
Plus and Bronze) depending on their degree of zero emission, which are eligible for 
different proportions of credits, shown in Table 5.3. Target ZEV credits are 
calculated on the average of the preceding three-year Gold (fully zero emission) 
ZEV sales multiplied by a general percentage requirement (2009-11: 0.11; 2012-
2014: 0.12; 2014-17: 0.14; 2018-20: 0.16) and minimum percentage requirement 
for Large Volume Manufacturers (LVM) for each ZEV type.  
 
ZEV 
Classification 
Description Powertrain 
ZEV Credits per 
vehicle sold 
Gold 
Fully Zero Emission 
Vehicle (ZEV) 
Fuel Cell or Battery Electric 
Vehicle 
See Table 5.4 
Silver Plus 
Electric Advanced 
Technology Partial 
ZEV 
Plug-in Hybrid Electric 
Vehicle 
2009: 0.92, 
2010: 0.87, 
2015: 0.77 
Silver 
Advanced Technology 
Partial ZEV 
Conventional Hybrids 
Electric Vehicle 
2009: 0.4, 2012: 
0.35, 2015: 0.3 
Bronze Partial ZEVs 
Super Ultra Low Emission 
ICEV94  
0.2 
Table 5.3: ZEV credits for main classifications (CARB, 2009) 
 
Actual ZEV credits are based on new vehicles produced and sold, with specific 
credit allowances for different classes of ZEVs (from the industry module) that are 
based on powertrain and range, shown in and Table 5.4. 
 
Gold 
ZEV 
type 
Definition 
Credits per 
produced 
ZEV 
Additional credits per 
sold ZEV 
2009-2017 from 2018 
Type V 
EV with 300 or more mile range of 
fast refuelling capacity 
1 6 2 
Type IV 
EV with 200 or more mile range 
and fast refuelling 
1 4 2 
Type III 
EV with 100 or more mile  range 
and fast refuelling or 200 mile BEV 
1 3 2 
Type II EV with 100-200 mile range 1 2 2 
Type I.5 EV with 75-100 miles range 1 1.5 1.5 
Type I EV with 50 to 75 miles range 1 1 1 
Type 0 EV with less than 50 mile range 0 1 1 
NEV 
Neighbourhood Electric Vehicle: 
Low speed vehicle certified as ZEV 
0 0.3 0.3 
Table 5.4: ZEV credits for Gold ZEVs (adapted from Walther et al., 2010) 
                                               
93  The European Average Fleet Emission Regulations have similar provisions in that 
manufacturers are awarded GHG credits for LCVs that are sold, though LCV 
production is not mandated. 
94 90% cleaner than average new ICEV – not included in this model.  
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ZEV credits are modelled using an aging chain (as with GHG credits), with civil 
penalties calculated after 3 years of $5000 per deficit credit between target and 
submitted credits. Any deficit in credits may be made up through extra allowances 
from excess partial ZEV Credits from previous years, based on their zero emission 
vehicle miles travelled (VMT) and a fleet average Non-Methane Organic Gas 
(NMOG) requirement.  From this, g/mile ZEV credits can count towards overall 
credits, and are delayed by 2 years. Accounting for this, ZEV penalties can be 
calculated using the (simplified) Equation 5.11. 
 
                            [
((        )        )   (        )
    
] 
Equation 5.11 
CT is the total required credits for that year (based on previous sales and ZEV requirement) 
CZEV is the total credits from ZEVs from ZEV sold and produced that year  
NMOG is the fleet average NMOG requirement in each year 
CGM PZEV is the amount of credits in g/miles from partial ZEV credits which were excess in 
previous year but can contribute allowances relative to the NMOG requirement. 
 
5.1.3 Customers Module 
 
The Customer module determines demand by considering total demand and 
probability of purchase. This probability is based on awareness and a choice set. 
Purchases are made relative to the probability of choice on the available sets of 
vehicles. Choice sets are determined through homogenous purchase decisions for 
each powertrain. It is based on a mean household income, and so different 
segments of society are not accounted for. There are three aspects which combine 
to create the customers module. These are choice set generation, utility of 
automobiles and vehicle market share, which are shown in the simplified diagram 
Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.8: Customer demand for new vehicles (adapted from Walther et al., 2010, 
p.248) 
 
Choice Set Generation 
Customer awareness of a powertrain is based on the same Struben and Sterman 
(2008) model as CS1, influenced by marketing effectiveness of a powertrain (loop 
B1 in Figure 5.8), word of mouth with other drivers (R1) (EV and non-EV) and 
forgetting the powertrain (B2). Marketing effectiveness is dependent upon vehicle 
availability, and once each new model is introduced it has a marketing effect95 of 
0.03 that persists throughout the time period. ICEV has a constant marketing 
effectiveness of 0.01. The contact effectiveness between drivers varies as in Table 
5.5. 
 
Current 
Powertrain 
Contact effectiveness of being aware of other powertrain on others 
ICEV HEV PiHEV BEV 
ICEV 1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
HEV 0.9 1 0.5 0.3 
PiHEV 0.9 0.3 1 0.3 
BEV 1 0.5 0.5 1 
Table 5.5: Contact effectiveness between drivers 
 
Utility of Automobiles 
The utility of each vehicle is based upon preference parameters from a standard 
MNL model (Brownstone and Train, 1998) and vehicle characteristics (developed 
with the automobile manufacturer Volkswagen), as displayed in Table 5.6. There 
are a number of variable attributes that are responsible for the change in utility of 
each vehicle over time, which differ between policy scenarios: 
 
                                               
95 The Bass model external influence coefficient, relating to the population becoming aware 
of the powertrain from marketing and based on estimates from previous studies. 
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 Purchase price was described in the Industry module Section; 
 Range is static for conventional vehicles and progressive with battery 
capacity for electric motors (also described under Industry module); 
 Fuel or energy consumption is also linked to battery capacity; 
 Fuel station availability, which is described in the Infrastructure module 
Section and for EV increases with installed base and vehicle range; and 
 Other attributes were chosen to be fixed by model developers. 
 
  P R A V RP C FS EV 
ICEV 
XS 10 250 1.9 90 1 0.03 1 0 
S 14 300 2.3 100 1 0.04 1 0 
M 19 350 2.8 110 1 0.045 1 0 
L 30 400 3.5 130 1 0.05 1 0 
HEV 
XS 16 250 1.9 90 0.7 0.025 1 0 
S 19 300 2.3 100 0.7 0.035 1 0 
M 25 400 2.8 110 0.7 0.04 1 0 
L 31 450 3.5 130 0.7 0.045 1 0 
PiHEV 
XS 18 250 1.9 90 0.6 0.02 1/0 1 
S 20 300 2.3 100 0.6 0.03 1/0 1 
M 28 400 2.8 110 0.6 0.035 1/0 1 
L 35 450 3.5 130 0.6 0.04 1/0 1 
BEV 
XS 19 48 2.8 80 0 0.18 0 1 
S 23 65 3.0 100 0 0.2 0 1 
M 33 120 3.2 110 0 0.24 0 1 
L 49 240 3.5 130 0 0.28 0 1 
Preference 
Parameter 
-0.185 0.35 -0.716 0.261 -0.444 -0.768 0.413 -0.719 
Table 5.6: Initial vehicle attributes and preference parameters  
P: Price96 (10
3
$), R: Range (miles), A: Acceleration (ms
-2
), V: Velocity (mph), RP: 
Relative Pollution (dimensionless), C: Fuel or Energy Consumption 97  (gal/mile, 
kWh/mile), FS: Fuel Station Availability (dimensionless), EV: Electric Vehicle (binary). 
 
Vehicle Market Share 
The vehicle market share is determined from a choice probability for every vehicle 
available when a choice is made, based on the vehicles available at that time. The 
conditional choice probability is based on the vehicle utility and perceived vehicle 
availability, as shown in Equation 5.12. These have been calculated in the model 
for every possible vehicle combination. The probability of the possible choice set 
being the customers is calculated separately, based upon the fractional awareness 
of the powertrain, again for every possible combination. The vehicle market share is 
then the sum of all possible combinations of conditional choice probability multiplied 
by the choice set probability. By linking the fractional awareness and vehicle utility, 
                                               
96 Preference parameter is for Price/Income. Partial utility is for the purchase price divided 
by average household income which is given as $51,563 from the 2005 US Census. 
97  Preference parameter is for operating cost. Operating cost is determined by fuel 
consumption multiplied by fuel price. 
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diffusion and discrete choice theory may be linked mathematically. Once calculated 
the vehicle market share then feeds into vehicle demand in the industry module. 
 
                                   
         
  
∑(            )
 
Equation 5.12 
VAp.i is the perceived vehicle availability of vehicle i 
Ui is the utility of vehicle i 
 
5.1.4 Vehicle Stock and Infrastructure Module 
 
The vehicle stock and infrastructure module, shown in Figure 5.9, captures the 
network effects (loop R1) between installed base of alternative powertrains and the 
refuelling/recharging infrastructure. This module captures a commonly 
acknowledged ‘chicken and egg’ problem. As recharging infrastructure increases, 
EV become more attractive, increasing the installed base and thus demand for 
recharging infrastructure. This can continue until saturation, through loop B1, which 
itself is dependent on range and recharging with respect to refuelling time 
 
Figure 5.9: Infrastructure module (adapted from Walther et al., p.249) 
 
Installed Base 
Installed base is modelled as a standard ageing chain, with an average life span of 
11 years. A certain portion of vehicles are discarded from each age stock up to the 
rest age, based on survival probability of 97% for 0-5 years and 87% for 6-10 years. 
Thus, total discard rate is calculated using Equation 5.13, which then feeds into the 
total demand, as described under Production and Sales in the Industry module.  
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Equation 5.13 
IB is the installed base of each age stock of vehicles 
 
Refuelling/Recharging Infrastructure 
Availability of refuelling and recharging contributes to the utility of each vehicle and 
to range dependent availability of BEV. In the model this is based on recharging at 
a recharge station similar to a ICEV fuelling station. Fractional availability refers to 
the availability of EV recharging station compared to gasoline refuelling stations 
(which have a constant availability of 1). The target number of recharging stations is 
then determined by Equation 5.14, for which the only variables are installed base 
and vehicle range. 
 
                          
∑       (
         
        
)
   
 
Equation 5.14 
IBi is the installed base of each EV model 
DVMT is the daily average vehicle miles travelled (100 miles) 
RTi is the recharge time (PiHEV = 0.1 hrs, BEV = 0.5 hrs) 
Ri is the range of each EV model 
DHRi is the daily total hours required for recharging (12 hours) 
RUs is the recharging units per station (4) 
 
5.1.5 Initial Model Scenarios 
 
Walther et al., use their model to understand the impacts of strategies for meeting 
the GHG and ZEV Regulations separately, and then on meeting them together. 
Although it is not necessary to discuss their findings for this case study (this has 
already been presented in the literature review), the strategies employed in their 
study were used to develop the baseline scenario in this case study.  
There were three GHG strategies, as presented in Table 5.7. It was found that only 
the combined strategy (GHG3) met requirements for every year. GHG1 meets them 
only in some years but does not incur civil penalties (due to the five year 
accumulation period – see Section 5.1.2), and GHG2 only meets the requirements 
in the first year, incurring large civil penalties overall. This suggests that customer 
behaviour may have a high impact, as GHG3 reduces customer choice the most.  
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Strategy Description 
GHG1: Vehicle adjustment Gradual reduction of CO2 in each model.98 
GHG2: Fleet adjustment Change in fleet by introducing XS segment vehicles. 
GHG3: Combined adjustments Implementing GHG1 and GHG2 together. 
Table 5.7: GHG strategies (Walther et al., 2010) 
 
Four strategies were tested against the ZEV regulations, as in Table 5.8. Each 
strategy phased in HEV and PiHEV in the years given in the table, with or without 
BEV, which was dependent on minimum range and/or infrastructural requirements. 
 
Powertrain Segment 
ZEV1: 
Conservative 
without BEV 
ZEV2: 
Conservative 
with BEV 
ZEV3: 
Aggressive 
without BEV 
ZEV4: 
Aggressive 
with BEV 
HEV 
XS 2014 2014 2012 2012 
S 2012 2012 2011 2011 
M 2009 2009 2009 2009 
L 2010 2010 2010 2010 
PiHEV 
XS n/a n/a 2016 2016 
S n/a n/a 2015 2015 
M Re>60 miles Re>60 miles 2012 2012 
L Re>75 miles Re>75 miles 2013 2013 
BEV 
XS 
n/a 
I>50% 
n/a 
R>50 miles 
S I>60% R>70 miles 
M R>200 miles R>150 miles 
L R>400 miles R>300 miles 
Table 5.8: ZEV strategies (Walther et al., 2010)  
(Re = Electric Range, I = Infrastructure coverage, R = Total Range)  
 
All of these strategies resulted in high civil penalties, with only ZEV4 being close 
(and in the final year exceeding) the ZEV requirements. This would suggest that the 
accelerated introduction of both full and plug-in hybrids in as many segments of 
possible and early introduction of BEV are key to success. This is to overcome 
market inertia from customer low awareness of new technologies and to help build 
the infrastructure required for BEV. This would make sense intuitively as it will 
create awareness and be more likely to meet needs of customers, but is also likely 
to be most costly. Finally, compliance with both GHG and ZEV regulations and 
interactions between strategies is investigated through applying GHG1 with ZEV4 
and GHG3 with ZEV4. It was found that the best GHG strategy made meeting ZEV 
requirements more difficult due to the impact of the sale of extra small (XS) ICEV 
on the sale of ZEVs in that same segment. Thus joint compliance would need a 
reduction of all ICEV emissions and to establish a new XS ZEV vehicle segment.  
                                               
98 Fractional reduction is equal across all vehicles (i.e. larger vehicles require absolute 
emissions reducing to a larger extent than smaller vehicles). 
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5.2 Extensions to the Base Model 
In general the model as it was (‘off the shelf’) was a close fit to the requirements of 
the case study. Although, ideally, a UK based model would have been preferred, it 
was not realistic to calibrate the model to the UK and European regulations as the 
complex detail of the model was very specific to the California regulations. The two 
sets of regulations are, however, broadly similar and California and the UK have 
similar population demographics and car ownership, with California being about 
two-thirds of the size of the UK. Culturally, both states value civil liberties, recognise 
anthropogenic climate change and have comparable relationships with the 
automobile. One major difference is the price of fuel, which will affect any payback 
period for an LCV, as discussed later. Due to these similarities, the findings in terms 
of ethics and policy are assumed to be transferable. However, a few small 
amendments were made to the model in order to retrieve the information required 
for the investigation and to allow the introduction of subsidies as an alternative 
policy.  
 
Firstly, it was made possible that the GHG and ZEV penalties were able to be 
“turned off” in order to  create a “no penalty” baseline, representative of a ‘Business 
as Usual’ scenario without Regulation in place, as Walther et al. did not consider 
this scenario. Recall, in the ‘Pricing and Cash-flow’ part of the model, the civil 
penalties incurred by any regulatory credits that are not met feedback into the total 
costs of the manufacturers. As the manufacturer has a target profit margin of 0.1, a 
desired total revenue is based on total costs in line with this target profit margin. 
The desired revenue then feeds into a price adjustment to meet the desired profits, 
and also on a weighted profit margin for each powertrain. This then feeds into the 
target purchase prices. A “no regulation switch” simply prevented any incurred 
penalties from feeding into total cost and thus affecting purchase prices. This 
assumes that the manufacturer is purely motivated by maximisation of profits. 
Within the baseline, new ZEV models are brought in (see later), and vehicle 
adjustment of ICEV emissions (Walther et al.’s GHG1) is not carried out. However 
XS segment ICEV are included without Regulation (GHG2), as they are already 
available and gaining market momentum in California (Krisher and Durbin, 2013; 
Lloyd, 2011). 
 
 
215 
  
Secondly, a reduction of BEV and PiHEV purchase cost at certain times to imitate a 
rebate/subsidy was included. This subsidy was added to the partial utility of 
purchase price and income that fed into the choice model that calculated the utility 
for each vehicle. All exogenous input data and endogenous feedback equations 
remained as developed by Walther et al., with the exception of the vehicle 
availabilities described in the next Section.  It was not the purpose of this research 
to significantly develop or expand the model, but to use it as a base to establish and 
run scenarios of interest in exploring the proposed ethical framework, a focus not 
taken by the original modellers.  
 
5.3 Model Baseline Development 
 
In addition to the baseline having the penalties “turned off” and XS ICEV being 
available, a decision had to be made as to when the ZEV models would become 
available. A number of options were considered, based on those developed by 
Walther et al., and described in Section 5.1.5; 
 
 No ZEV introduced other than a medium sized HEV in 2009 (as this model is 
already well established in the current market place); 
 Conditional introduction of PiHEV and BEV and fixed introduction of HEV to 
mirror the ‘conservative’ scenarios, and; 
 A fixed year introduction of all ZEVs to mirror the ‘aggressive’ scenarios. 
 
Option 1 was discounted as it is clearly unrealistic as there are already both PiHEV 
and BEV models available in the market place. Option 2 is a ”Conditional Baseline”, 
and the Walther et al., Scenario ZEV2 (see Table 5.8) was  applied. Scenario ZEV4 
was used as a base for Option 3, the “Fixed Baseline”. The fixed introduction dates 
selected for this differed slightly from ZEV4, to reflect actual observations in vehicle 
introductions since Walther et al., built their model. For HEV, the conservative 
introduction was used, as no S or XS models are yet widely available. The 
aggressive introduction dates of PiHEV were seen to be reasonably accurate so 
were used.  BEV introductions were not fixed by Walther et al., so fixed dates were 
based on actual and predicted dates from manufacturers. The resultant ZEV 
introductions are presented in Table 5.9. 
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Powertrain Segment Conditional Baseline Fixed Baseline 
HEV 
XS 2014 2014 
S 2012 2012 
M 2009 2009 
L 2010 2010 
PiHEV 
XS n/a 2016 
S n/a 2015 
M Re>60 miles 2012 
L Re>75 miles 2013 
BEV 
XS I>50% 2011 
S I>60% 2012 
M R>200 miles 2013 
L R>400 miles 2015 
Table 5.9: Baseline vehicle introductions   
(Re = Electric Range, I = Infrastructure coverage, R = Total Range) 
 
The Conditional Baseline best represents a ‘Do Nothing’ scenario, and compares 
favourably with other predictions for California, shown in Table 5.10, so can be 
used as a baseline for market share and emission impacts. However, it cannot be 
used for direct comparison to the policy scenarios’ impact on vehicle costs because 
new vehicle models are introduced in response to Regulation and Subsidies, which 
makes it difficult to compare with the Conditional Baseline, where models are not 
available at the same time as in the scenarios. Hence, the Fixed Baseline is used 
as the baseline for assessment of cost impacts, as this overcomes the effect of 
vehicle availability. Interestingly, the Fixed Baseline PiHEV prediction is similar to 
one of the other predictions in Table 5.10.  
 
Table 5.10: ZEV market share projections in 2020 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 
2020 SALES MARKET SHARE (%) 
PiHEV BEV PiHEV + BEV 
Californian Plug-In Electric Vehicle Collaborative 
(Turrentine et al, 2010) 
N/A N/A 2 – 6 
US Department of Energy 
(Balducci, 2008) 
N/A N/A ~ 10 
Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG, 2009) 
29 2 31 
Conditional Baseline 9.34 1.91 11.25 
Fixed Baseline 22.1 16 38.1 
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It is recognised that the Fixed Baseline is not realistic as manufacturers are much 
more likely to carry out a conditional production strategy than to develop and 
release models at fixed times without any government intervention. Indeed, the 
Fixed Baseline allows the manufacturer to accumulate negative profits in the model. 
This illustrates a typical “chicken and egg” type problem that can’t be fully captured 
in the model baseline as government policies are required to assure manufacturers 
of the viability of producing new models. In effect, the Conditional Baseline shows 
what would happen if no real effort were made to introduce new models, while the 
Fixed Baseline allows the filtering out of policy impacts while accounting for the 
effect of introducing new models at fixed times in anticipation of government 
intervention or customer preferences, but not compelled by Regulation.  
 
Whilst trying to determine the most appropriate inputs for the baseline, different 
levels of marketing were applied with the view that if the manufacturer is not 
motivated by policy to promote the ZEVs as strongly then the marketing 
effectiveness could be lower. It was found during these tests that the marketing had 
a much stronger effect than any of the policy variables (similar to CS1). As this was 
not the current focus of the work, the marketing effect used by Walther et al., was 
retained in all scenarios. In future work it would be prudent to explore these effects 
in more detail as they could be representative of Raising Awareness policies. 
5.4 Model Testing99 
Three policy scenarios are tested, all of which have the same fixed introduction of 
models as the Fixed Baseline. A Fiscal Measures policy type is tested in the 
Subsidy scenario, replicating the current Californian Rebate scheme of $1500 for 
PiHEV and $2500 for BEV for a 6-year period. The second is the Regulation policy, 
which the model was originally designed around, and there are complex dynamics 
associated with sales dependent credits and penalties as explained above. Under 
Regulation, manufacturers are assumed to meet GHG targets through increased 
fuel efficiency in all vehicle classes. Finally, the two policy scenarios were combined 
into a Both Policies scenario. All input parameters are shown in Table 5.11. 
 
 
 
                                               
99 Throughout this chapter, all scenarios are identified in the text by capitalisation and 
italicisation. 
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INPUT 
PARAMETER 
SCENARIO 
Conditional 
Baseline 
Fixed 
Baseline 
Subsidy Regulation 
Both 
Policies 
M
o
d
e
l 
A
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
 (
y
e
a
r)
 ICEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
2010, 2000, 
2000, 2000 
2010, 2000, 2000, 2000 
HEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
2014, 2012, 
2009, 2010 
2014, 2012, 2009, 2010 
PiHEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
N/A, N/A,    
R(60), R(75) 
2016, 2015, 2012, 2013 
BEV 
(XS, S, M, L) 
I(0.5), I(0.6), 
R(200), R(400) 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2015 
Penalties on NO    NO YES 
Subsidy 
($) 
PiHEV NO 1500 NO 1500 
BEV NO 2500 NO 2500 
Subsidy Duration N/A 2011-2017 N/A 2011-2017 
Table 5.11: Scenario input parameters 
 
When developing the scenarios, it was felt appropriate to understand what influence 
subsidy strength may exert on ZEV market penetration in this model. A number of 
scenarios were tested, relative to the fixed baseline, shown in Figure 5.10. These 
were the 6 year unlimited budget as used in the model scenarios, a capped $45m 
budget, a  higher subsidy of $8000 for both PiHEV and BEV, and an unlimited (and 
unrealistic) budget for current subsidies that continues through to 2020. It was 
found that there is very little difference between any of these scenarios by 2020. 
The largest variation between scenarios was realized with the artificially high 
subsidy, which yielded an increase in both BEV and PiHEV market shares, mainly 
at the expense of HEV, but as soon as the subsidy period ended the market share 
returned to almost the same trajectory as the other scenarios. This is because the 
learning effect on price is not enough to outweigh the removal of the subsidy. Note 
that there is also very little difference from the fixed baseline and this is discussed 
in more detail later (Section 5.5.2). As there appeared to be little difference between 
the subsidy options, the current subsidy amounts and regime of 6 years was 
retained in the modelling scenarios. 
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Figure 5.10: PiHEV and BEV market share of sales under different subsidy scenarios 
5.5 Findings 
There were three outputs of interest to this study, in relation to the ethical 
framework. These were the GHG emissions, the market share and the ownership 
costs and how these vary between segments. Further to this, the impact on overall 
costs may provide further indication of policy impact. In this Section, the focus of 
ZEVs is on PiHEV and BEV. Although the ZEV Regulations classify HEV as a ZEV, 
the approach is taken that as HEV aligns more with ICEV. This is because they are 
more established in the market, and provide less emission reduction potential and 
ZEV credits than PiHEV and BEV.  
 
5.5.1 GHG Emissions 
 
Significant reductions in GHG emissions are witnessed by 2020 under all policy 
scenarios compared to the Conditional Baseline, as seen in Figure 5.11 which 
shows the average fleet GHG emissions (including emissions from tailpipe and/or 
electricity production). Under the Subsidy scenario this is a reduction of around 35 
gGHGmile-1 and under the Regulation and Both Policies scenarios, the reduction is 
around 80 gGHGmile-1. Assuming an average annual mileage of 15,000 miles per 
year100 and a lifetime of 10 years,101 this would equate to total savings of between 
34 and 168 Mt GHG (2 and 30%) respectively from all new vehicles produced 
during the time period. The biggest emission reductions are made when Regulation 
is in place, and there is little extra reduction gain when subsidies are included in the 
                                               
100 From registered cars (CDMV 2009) and mileage (TSI 2009) in California.  
101 The model assumes an average vehicle life of 11 years (Walther et al. 2010). Here, 10 
years is assumed so that the calculations are on the conservative side. 
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Both Policies scenario. This perhaps indicates that subsidies are ineffective, which 
is discussed more fully in the next Section. Regulations are successful because 
manufacturers are set a specific level to aim for within the model, and thus most 
emission reductions come from efficiencies made with ICE-based Vehicles rather 
than introduction of ZEVs. The Subsidy scenario does not meet current GHG 
targets by 2020, as there is no motivation for manufacturers to make efficiencies in 
ICEV, HEV or PiHEV, and so emission reductions only come from the introduction 
of PiHEV and BEV. As the price volume effect does not make any difference to the 
prices after the subsidy is removed in 2017 (as described in Section 5.4), there is 
practically no difference between the Fixed Baseline (which has the same models 
available and no ICEV efficiencies) and the Subsidy scenario by 2020. The Fixed 
Baseline is a useful way of separating out the effect of new model introductions and 
the added impact of Regulations on existing powertrains – so the change from 
Fixed Baseline to Regulation could be viewed as the Regulation impact over and 
above the impact of the introduction of new models without Regulation.   
 
  
Figure 5.11: Average fleet GHG emissions for the policy scenarios 
 
5.5.2 Market Shares 
 
Figure 5.12 shows that compared to the Conditional Baseline, the policy scenarios 
result in more successful BEV and PiHEV new market shares. Under the 
Conditional Baseline, ICEV + HEV retains an almost 90% market share, which is 
reduced by nearly half with policies in place. The Regulation policy was more 
successful than the Subsidy policy, yielding 9.5% more PiHEVs and 17.8% more 
BEVs by 2020, compared to the Conditional Baseline (not shown in figure).  
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Figure 5.12: Market share of sales of BEV + PiHEV 
 
Similar to the emission reduction findings, as shown in Table 5.12 there is only a 
1% difference in market share between scenarios with and without subsidies in 
place.  Although the Fixed Baseline is not wholly realistic (as explained earlier), this 
could suggest that the introduction of models at specific times is more important 
than the Subsidy policy being in place. More importantly, this is also related to the 
chicken and egg problem of government policy and manufacturer response 
mentioned in the baseline development (Section 5.3). However, the increase due to 
Subsidy is also relatively small when comparing between Both Policies and 
Regulation. Yet looking at the difference in shares in the last year of Subsidy 
(2017), they are almost 10% greater in those scenarios with subsidies in place. In 
fact, this is the peak of the impact and when subsidies are removed, then the share 
of sales will drop as customers have to pay the full price as under other scenarios. 
Although this finding may initially suggest that subsidies are not effective, what it 
may indicate is that subsidies need to be stronger or applied for longer than those 
tested here to ensure that the learning curve is sustained and prices reduced in the 
long term, as concluded in Section 5.4 where different subsidy regimes were tested, 
and a similar finding to CS1.  
 
The finding here, therefore, is that the subsidies in the tested scenarios are not 
useful by 2020 when Regulation is in place. However, if having subsidies in place 
encourages manufacturers to introduce models (e.g. compared to the Conditional 
Baseline), then they can be thought of as successful - though perhaps not directly 
due to the reduced purchase price. This may perhaps be comparable to the failing 
market case in CS1. These findings do not mean that subsidies should be 
disregarded, but suggest further understanding is needed around the impact on 
manufacturer strategies for developing new models earlier. 
222 
  
SCENARIO 
SALES MARKET SHARE (%) 
2017 2020 
PiHEV BEV PiHEV BEV 
Fixed Baseline 12.6 9.4 22.1 16.1 
Subsidy 13.1 10.4 22.4 16.2 
Regulation 13.7 11.3 24.2 19.0 
Both Policies 14.8 12.1 24.8 19.3 
Table 5.12: Market share of sales of PiHEV and BEV in 2017 and 2020 
 
Changes in segment market shares are shown in Table 5.13, and it would appear 
that having either of the policies in place will push the market into the XS/S 
segments rather than the M/L segments favoured in the baseline scenario.102 This 
may be a cause for concern, and an indication that customers with legitimate claims 
for larger cars may be forced to downsize to a car that does not suit their needs, 
and are thus disadvantaged by the introduction. More of a concern however, there 
are now more people in the worst-off segment. The effect of fixed introduction of 
vehicle models is even more obvious, as there is no difference between the Fixed 
Baseline and Subsidy scenarios. With Both Policies in place, the market share 
becomes very slightly more biased to Medium or Large vehicles than in Regulation 
alone, perhaps suggesting that a subsidy may help people to purchase a large 
vehicle if they need one, or avoid becoming worst-off. This conclusion may be 
overly optimistic as the difference here is only 0.1%, and within the model purchase 
decisions are related to preferences, which do not distinguish between want and 
need. There appears to be little difference between preferred segments within each 
powertrain (not shown), which roughly follow the overall segment shares. 
 
SCENARIO 
SALES MARKET SHARE (%) 
XS S M L 
           2009 0 24.6 41.3 34.1 
2
0
2
0
 
Conditional Baseline 14.1 17.6 33.6 34.8 
Fixed Baseline 16.2 19.9 31.4 32.5 
Subsidy 16.2 19.9 31.4 32.5 
Regulation 25.8 49.3 22.7 22.2 
Both Policies 25.7 49.2 22.8 22.3 
Table 5.13: Segment market share of sales (%) 
 
As the California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project has been in place for three years at 
the time of writing this thesis. The success of the scheme in reality can be 
compared to the model. It should, however, be recalled from the discussion in 
                                               
102 Purchase price, travelling costs and range are the variable attributes feeding into vehicle 
utility, and therefore the choice model (see Section 5.1.3 for details). As partial utilities 
of travelling costs and range change only marginally, this means that the greatest 
influence is purchase price, so it is a reasonable assumption that the increase in 
purchase costs have forced the change in vehicle market shares. 
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Chapter Three that modelling is not a perfect replication of reality, and also that this 
research is not focused on market predictions but in identifying and analysing the 
relative impacts and influences of policy interventions, therefore this comparison is 
purely illustrative. By early 2013, 10,036 BEV and 9,234 PiHEV rebates have been 
issued (CCSE, 2013). In the model, numbers are only available for year ends, but 
after the third year of subsidies under Both Policies, 8,765 BEV and 3,411 PiHEV 
have been sold. Although BEV sales are similar, with the model slightly under-
predicting, PiHEV are a third of real sales. These discrepancies could be due to the 
model having different dates of vehicle availability than in reality and slightly 
different time scales, as in the fourth year of the subsidies in the model we see the 
market really take off with sales of over 20,000 PiHEVs and nearly 30,000 BEVs. 
This comparison could be revisited in 2014 to see if this has occurred in actuality. 
 
5.5.3 Ownership Costs 
 
To further understand how certain sections of society may be affected by the LCV 
policies, attention now turns towards the changes in purchase prices over the time 
scales, shown in Table 5.14, where for simplicity, only the Fixed Baseline and Both 
Policies scenarios are given.  
 
VEHICLE 
SEGMENT 
PURCHASE PRICE ($) % DIFFERENCE 
between Fixed 
Baseline and Both 
Policies in 2020 
2009 
2020 
Fixed 
Baseline 
Both 
Policies 
Average 19,964 22,079 25,580 15.8 
ICEV 19,964 21,014 26,958 28.3 
HEV n/a 19,880 23,481 18.1 
PIHEV n/a 21,769 23,809 9.37 
BEV n/a 28,861 29,302 1.53 
XS n/a 13,432 15,048 11.9 
S 12,799 16,172 20,698 28.0 
M 17,749 21,683 25,340 16.8 
L 27,649 30,365 34,413 13.2 
Table 5.14: Weighted average powertrain and segment purchase prices 
 
The majority of the price changes witnessed (relative to 2009) comes from the 
introduction of ZEVs that are at a higher cost to begin with (due to being an 
immature technology with high battery costs). However, under the policy scenario, 
purchase costs of ICEV also rise significantly due to the cost of reducing GHG 
emissions, which are passed on to the customer. The average overall price is 16% 
higher in 2020 under Both Policies than Fixed Baseline. This is concerning as it 
impacts everyone, including the worst-off. The price differential between the policy 
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and no-policy scenario for the ICE-based vehicles are much greater than those of 
BEV, which does not have additional costs related to GHG Regulations, is 
experiencing reductions in battery costs as experience builds, and has biased 
weightings in price adjustments (see Section 5.1.1, Pricing and Cashflow). 
 
What is also of concern from the point of view of this study is the price differential 
between segment sizes. Within the model, in order to meet GHG requirements, it is 
assumed that the manufacturer subjects each segment to the same relative 
reduction in emissions as the Regulation is based on fleet average targets. In 2020, 
the Small segment weighted-average purchase price has increased 
disproportionately compared to other segments, leading to a downsizing to XS-
segment and dis-incentivising downsizing from M and L segments. Consequently, 
the greatest price increases compared to a no-policy scenario are in the small ICE-
based vehicles, which are potentially the most affordable form of LCV for families. 
These figures refer to new vehicles, which are most likely to be bought by more 
affluent members of society, and their decisions will then pass onto the second-
hand car market, reducing choice for these customers, who represent the majority 
of society, as (in the UK) less than 10% of car sales are new vehicles to private 
customers (SMMT, 2013a). However, as it is assumed that segment sizes are 
related to income, and XS segment increases the least, then this would suggest 
that the poorest in society may be the least affected by the Regulation. The impacts 
of this in relation to the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three are 
considered further later in this Chapter (Section 5.6.2). 
 
BEV Payback Period 
To understand the type of payback time that a typical driver may expect when 
purchasing a BEV over a conventional vehicle, the details for a Medium segment 
vehicle of each powertrain in 2013, under Both Policies were taken from the model, 
and payback time was calculated using Equation 5.15. Note this calculation uses 
undiscounted values of running costs so the payback period is an underestimate. 
 
                  
                
(                )    
 
Equation 5.15 
PCs, is Purchase Cost segment, powertrain ($) (M, ICEV = 25,2567.94; M, BEV = 29,549.29)  
RCs,p is Running Cost segment, powertrain ($/mile) (M, ICEV = 0.0523; M, BEV = 0.0359) 
AM is average annual mileage (15,000 miles) 
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This optimistic method gives a payback period of 16.2 years, which means that it is 
unrealistic for a driver to change powertrains if motivated by economic reasons 
alone in the US. However, although purchase costs in the model are similar to UK 
prices, running costs are not. For ICEV, HEV and PiHEV, running costs are based 
on fuel costs alone, and these are approximately two fifths of UK petrol prices, and 
for BEV electric costs are approximately half of current UK electricity prices.103 
Adjusting for this, the payback time in the UK could be in the region of 4.5 years, a 
much more attractive proposition to the car buyer. 
 
5.5.4 Carbon Abatement Costs 
 
Finally, abatement costs were calculated for each policy measure, using cumulated 
discounted costs for customers, government and industry, and compared against 
the Fixed Baseline. Recall that this baseline was used as it allows for the filtering 
out of policy impacts, but is a hypothetical scenario showing an extreme situation 
where the manufacturer produces the new ZEV models without government 
intervention. As such these results may be pessimistic, but the main interest is in 
the comparison between policy scenarios. Whilst the Fixed Baseline would imply 
costs for manufacturers related to the introduction of new models, the costs which 
are of interest here are those additional costs related to Regulation or Subsidies. 
Though this does not account for the costs of new models per se, it does give the 
effect of policy scenarios. Abatement was calculated using Equation 5.16 to 
Equation 5.20, a similar method to that used in CS1, the EC “GHG TransPoRD” 
project (Schade et al., 2011) and the well established McKinsey MAC curves 
(McKinsey, 2007). 
 
                      
       
          
         
Equation 5.16 
CFB is the NPV of Costs under Fixed Baseline 
CP is NPV of Costs under Policy Scenario 
TEFB is total GHG Emissions from new vehicles under Fixed Baseline 
TEP is total GHG Emissions from new vehicles under Policy Scenario 
 
 
 
                                               
103 This is based on publically available prices (AA 2013; EIA 2013a,b).  
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           ∑ (   ( )     ( )       )
 
 
Equation 5.17 
EFi (t) is emission factor (gGHG/mile) of new vehicles i in year t 
NV i (t) is the number of new vehicles i sold in year t 
AM is the annual mileage (15,000 miles) (see previous footnote) 
l is the vehicle lifetime (assumed to be 10 years). 
 
                                       
  
∑ (      ( )     ( )) 
(   ) 
    ∑
∑ (    ( )     ( )    ) 
(   )    
 
   
  
Equation 5.18104 
PCS,i(t) is the purchase cost of new vehicle i after subsidy in year t ($)  
RCi(t) is the running costs of new vehicle i 
r is the discount factor (0.02)105 
t is the number of years since 2009 
x is the year of vehicle life up to 10 years 
              
                      ∑
 ( )
(   )  
  
Equation 5.19 
S(t) is the overall spend on subsidies at time t 
 
                     ∑
  ( )    ( )
(   )  
 
Equation 5.20106 
IS(t) is the overall industry spend at time t 
IR(t) is the overall industry revenue at time t 
 
Table 5.15 shows the discounted costs and emissions of all vehicles bought up to 
2020, for the policy scenarios compared to Fixed Baseline and corresponding 
abatement costs are shown in Table 5.16. For reference, the abatement costs for 
customers and industry from Conditional to Fixed Baseline are in the region of 
500$/tGHG. Both parties experience costs because although average purchase 
prices increase, not all production costs are passed on to customers. All the 
scenario abatement costs are in line with the general range of abatement costs 
presented in Table 5.17 from the EU GHG TransPoRD project referred to in CS1. 
                                               
104 This includes purchase cost and ten years of running costs. 
105 This is consistent with the US discount factor at the time the model was developed. 
106 Industry costs are the negative of profits. 
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SCENARIO 
COSTS ($b) Emission 
Reduction 
(MtGHG) 
Users 
Government Industry Overall 
Purchase Running 
Subsidy -0.95 -0.16 1.18 0.13 0.20 0.97 
Regulation 50.66 -25.78 0.00 -1.05 23.83 134.95 
Both Policies 49.38 -25.87 1.35 -0.93 23.92 135.57 
Table 5.15: Discounted costs and emission reduction  
(by 2020 cf Fixed Baseline) 
 
SCENARIO 
CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS ($/tGHG) 
Users Government Industry Overall 
Subsidy -1142.40 1216.12 137.37 211.09 
Regulation 184.35 0.00 -7.78 176.56 
Both Policies 173.40 9.95 -6.88 176.46 
Table 5.16: Carbon abatement costs of policies  
(by 2020 cf Fixed Baseline) 
 
Abatement Measure 
Abatement Cost ($/tCO2)107 
User Authority Social108 
Max Min Max Min Max Min 
Universal Policy Measures 
(e.g. feebate, vehicle 
maintenance) 
47.9 -795.6 263.9 -217.2 149.8 -794.5 
Urban Policy Measures (e.g. 
public transport, infrastructure) 
1629.7 -1536.8 4157 -2010.2 3361.4 -795.6 
Car technologies (e.g. 
electrification, downsizing) 
140.2 -685.3 Not reported Not reported 
Table 5.17: Carbon abatement costs (Schade et al., 2011) 
 
With Subsidies, users effectively benefit by $1142 per ton of GHG removed, but at 
the expense of 1216 $/tGHG from Government and 138 $/tGHG from Industry. This 
is because the emission savings from the policy of Subsidy alone are relatively 
small compared to the Fixed Baseline and many users are being subsidised to 
purchase vehicles that may have been purchased anyway. User abatement costs 
for feebates109 were much less beneficial in the GHG TransPoRD report (Schade et 
al., 2011), which were -86 €/tonCO2 or -144 $/tCO2, possibly due to the reference 
scenario used or the differences between feebate and subsidy levels in the studies. 
The government abatement cost is approximately 60% greater than that of the most 
costly scenario in CS1 (459 £/tCO2 = 734 $/tCO2), and nearly five times that of the 
GHG TransPoRD authority abatement cost for feebates (170 £/tCO2 = 267 $/tCO2), 
which were also mentioned in CS1.110  
                                               
107 Converted from €/tCO2. 
108 Authority + User. 
109 Feebates are slightly different than subsidies as they are related to purchase tax rather 
than direct purchase price reductions (i.e. increased costs for high emitters and rebates 
of that for low emitters), but this is the closest comparison found in literature. 
110 Although CS1 and GHG TransPORD consider CO2 and CO2 equivalent (resp.) rather 
than GHG, it is assumed that any difference will be minimal. 
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The Policy options of Regulation or Both Policies yield user abatement costs that 
are very close to the User abatement costs for road technology improvements in 
Table 5.17, and even more so to another EU study that reported user abatement 
costs due to the Fleet Emission Regulations of 175 $/t CO2 (Schroten et al., 2012). 
Under the Regulation only scenario, users bear 184 $/tGHG whereas government 
have no direct costs and Industry benefit by 8 $/tGHG. Whilst these values appear 
reasonable per ton of GHG removed, the users incur an additional spend in the 
region of $50b on purchasing vehicles and only save around $26b from fuel savings 
under the Regulation policies.  
 
With Regulation in place, the manufacturers have passed on the cost of technology 
improvements to the consumer and see an increase in their profits of around $1b 
(or 8%) from selling the higher priced vehicles. Industry has a $130m (1%) 
decrease in profit under Subsidy only. This may explain why manufacturers are not 
bringing in these models without policies in place. While the overall change in costs 
for consumers is small when subsidies are applied, they are benefiting only a small 
share of the consumers, most seeing a significant increase in purchase prices. 
Thus combining policies distributes cost burdens only at the margin but does lower 
overall abatement costs.  
5.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
This Chapter has described the development and testing of a complex model that 
has built on the findings of the first case study. The model, which is based in 
California over the short time period 2009-2020, considers conventional ICEV and 
three pro-electric models, HEV, PiHEV and BEV. The first step in this study was to 
develop the base model in order to create two baselines that reflect a no policy 
situation. One of these illustrates an introduction of LCVs based on minimum range 
and infrastructural requirements that results in similar market share to other studies 
by 2020, and the other reflected the fixed introduction of LCVs at certain times in 
order to make direct comparisons to the impacts of policy scenarios.  
 
Three policy scenarios were tested, which were Subsidy (as an example of Fiscal 
Measures), Regulation and a combination of the two (Both Policies). These policies 
were chosen to be tested as they are currently the most high profile and were found 
in Chapter 3B to have the most potential for bringing about distributive injustice 
within society. Once baselines and scenarios were established, a comparative 
study of policy approaches to LCV uptake was carried out. The outputs of interest 
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were the relative impact on GHG emissions and the opportunity for car ownership 
(through market shares and costs of ownership), which would be needed to assess 
them within the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three.  
 
It was found that although all scenarios results in emission reductions compared to 
the Conditional Baseline, the greatest emission reductions were achieved when 
Regulations were in place, and that the Subsidy scenario did not offer any 
additional savings to the fixed introduction of vehicles. This is because the most 
substantial emission reductions come from efficiency in ICE-based vehicles. 
Changes in sales market shares of powertrains showed that subsidies had not been 
in place for long enough for price learning effects to occur, but may be thought of as 
a successful policy if they encourage manufacturers to produce vehicles which they 
otherwise wouldn’t. It did seem to be the case though, that there was very slight 
increase in EV share when Both Policies were in place compared to Regulation 
only, which coincides with the recommendation of the IEA mentioned in the 
literature review that manufacturer standards would be more effective if they were 
alongside policies to stimulate demand (Onoda, 2008).  
 
It was assumed that vehicle size segments, which have distinct average prices, 
were an appropriate proxy for segmenting society into four income brackets, and 
that the change in market shares and ownership costs in these segments could be 
used to understand impacts on inequality. Taking this as the case, having the 
policies in place have resulted in much greater shares in the XS and S segments, 
an indication that they have made people worse off (as more people are now in 
these ‘poorer’ segments). In terms of ownership costs, the overall average vehicle 
purchase price is almost 16% more expensive when Both Policies are in place than 
under the Fixed Baseline. This has important implications for affordability of 
vehicles, particularly for the worst-off. ICE-based vehicles increase more in price 
than BEV because of the Regulations, which is concerning due to the infrastructural 
and cultural lock-in and the fact that these are the more affordable vehicle types. 
However, HEV and PiHEV are most affordable now, which may be advantageous in 
the development of an affordable pro-electric fleet. In addition to this, average Small 
segment vehicles are nearly 30% more expensive, almost double the overall 
average difference between the two scenarios. This is particularly concerning 
because as more people are in the Small segment they may be at risk of becoming 
amongst the worst-off. A payback period of purchasing a medium sized BEV over 
an ICEV was calculated and found to be over 16 years, which would not motivate 
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such a purchase. However, adjusting for UK running costs, a much more 
reasonable time of 4.5 years was estimated. 
 
Finally, carbon abatement costs were calculated to understand the effect of the 
policy scenarios. It was revealed that although Subsidy abatement costs are much 
greater than those reported elsewhere, due to the effect of the fixed introduction of 
vehicles, when Regulation is in place the costs are more in line with other studies. 
More importantly, when Both Policies are implemented together, costs burdens are 
distributed marginally more evenly between customers, government and industry, 
and lower overall abatement costs. 
 
5.6.1 Reflection against Case Study One  
 
Although this case study is not directly comparable to the first case study, as it was 
not possible to calibrate the model to the UK, there are some general observations 
that can be made, as the UK and California are similar, as described in Section 5.2.  
CS1 served a different purpose, in terms of building skills with a focus on sensitivity 
testing and long term impacts, which allowed for deeper understanding in the 
development of this case study. In future work, it may be appropriate to carry out 
some of the sensitivity tests from CS1, on vehicle lifetime, energy mix and word of 
mouth, within this model over a longer period. As the first case study was simpler 
(in terms of modelling), the impacts of the sensitivity tests were readily identifiable, 
which would not be the case here. Decreasing the ICEV lifetime was found in the 
first case study to have a potentially beneficial impact on EV uptake. In this case 
study, the vehicle lifetime was already the same as the decreased lifetime in CS1, 
but all vehicles were assumed to have the same lifetime. Modelling a scrappage 
scheme policy scenario may assist the manufacturer in meeting the Regulation as 
there is greater turnover of vehicles, and therefore more vehicles can be sold to 
qualify for ZEV credits (though this neglects the embedded emissions). Unlike CS1, 
this model did not consider any loss in government revenue from fuel duty, a 
consideration for future model developments.  
 
Regarding the findings related to subsidies, it was found in this model that subsidies 
appeared to make little long term impact on the uptake of LCVs if the vehicles were 
already available, though had the potential for making a greater impact if they were 
kept in place for longer. This is a very similar finding to the previous case study and 
Brand et al., (2013), who found feebates beneficial in LCV uptake when they were 
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in place for a long period, but also decreased overall fleet due to increased 
purchase costs overall. Their most ambitious feebate scenario quadrupled take up 
by 2020 compared to the reference scenario. If this reference scenario is more 
comparable to the Conditional rather than Fixed Baseline, this would suggest a 
similar finding, as subsidies increase 2020 market share by four times the 
Conditional Baseline.  
 
No conditional marketing was carried out in this case study because this would 
have further complicated the model. If a failing market were created in this model, it 
would be expected that the beneficial effect of subsidies tipping a failing market into 
success would be repeated. Although the abatement costs of subsidies proved to 
be much greater in this study (in the region of £800/tCO2 as opposed to £460/tCO2), 
it should be recalled that the first case study is set over a period of 40 years so 
these may not be realistically comparable. Comparison to the Regulation tests is 
not appropriate as in CS1 they were simply an exercise in observing the impact of 
changing emission factors and were not able to capture manufacturer response or 
include costs of technology as they did in this case study. 
 
5.6.2 Assessment against the Ethical Framework 
 
Recall the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three was based on two claims: 
 
CLAIM 1: In order to limit the harms of climate change, there is a strong case 
in favour of coercive policies that promote the introduction of low carbon cars 
– even if these policies may limit people’s opportunity for car ownership. 
 
CLAIM 2: In the short-term, many people are somewhat locked-in to car 
ownership for access and mobility. As such, policies should not allow 
additional unfair burdens on those who are already amongst the worst-off in 
society, or result in a different group of people being similarly disadvantaged.  
 
In practise, this means that a policy that allows coercion for the uptake of low 
carbon cars is permissible, as long as unfair burdens on the worst-off are 
prevented, limited or rectified.111 In the model, the success of policy interventions in 
reducing GHG emissions is used to assess if Claim One has been met. The impact 
on car ownership through changes in market share and purchase cost is identified 
in order to assess if further intervention is required to satisfy Claim Two. 
                                               
111 Recall from Chapter Three, that concern for the worst-off also considers those in danger 
of becoming the worst-off and only car owners are considered, though anything that 
benefits the worst car owners will also benefit the non-car owning worst-off.  
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Ideally, it would have been possible to replicate scenarios more strongly 
representative of coercive policies. An example of a stronger coercive policy would 
be one that greatly increases the price differential between ICEV and ZEV by 
placing premiums on ICEV as well as subsidies on ZEV, or targeting running costs 
as well as purchase costs. As the model has a short time scale, in early days it may 
be that weaker coercive polices are more appropriate as market share builds up.  
However, the model has shown that Regulation (which is coercive on the supply 
side, not the demand side), has lead to the increase in purchase price of all vehicle 
types (relative to the no-policy baseline), arguably making it a form of coercion 
towards drivers (albeit brought about by intervention with manufacturers rather than 
directly to the public). The Regulation policy did however, bring about reductions in 
emissions (against both baselines), thus satisfying Claim One, even though the 
purchase cost increases may limit opportunity for ownership.  
 
The Subsidy policy may be a soft form of coercion as it does not force people away 
from ICEV but rather, it attracts them towards ZEV. Even if it is not coercive, 
however, it still may only be permissible if it results in an emission reduction. 
Although there is no reduction in emissions relative to the Fixed Baseline, as 
stipulated, this was only introduced to show the extra impact policy interventions 
would have in addition to the fixed introduction of vehicles. Thus, in terms of 
emission reductions, if we compare against the Conditional Baseline, then emission 
reductions are achieved, therefore it is permissible.  
 
In order to assess adherence to Claim 2, it is necessary to establish what impact 
the policies may have on the worst-off. This is identified in the model by the impact 
on the market share and purchase price of the four vehicle segments, representing 
the opportunity for car ownership, and the interest is specifically in the XS and S 
segments.  Although only the Fixed Baseline and Both Policies are shown in Table 
5.14, under the Subsidy policy, there is a negligible difference in purchase price to 
the Fixed Baseline and under Regulation there is a negligible difference to the Both 
Policies scenario (similar to the impact on market share) at the end of the modelling 
period, though there was a reduction in purchase price when subsidies were in 
place. This suggests that subsidies may have little impact on share or prices, and 
therefore do not directly affect the opportunity for ownership, though this finding is 
specific to the subsidy duration.  
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The findings when Regulation is in place indicate an increase in purchase price 
across all segments alongside an increase in market share of the smaller vehicles. 
This is particularly concerning as S segment has increased disproportionately more 
than then other segment, suggesting that L segment (remembering that they are 
proxy for most well off) may be favoured by the policies. Although the category 
containing the worst-off (XS) are least affected, the fact that any increase has 
occurred suggests that they have been made even worse off, and so for Claim 2 to 
be satisfied, compensatory measures will be required. Furthermore, the fact that the 
S segment are disproportionately affected means that there are more people in 
danger of becoming amongst the worst-off, and as the market share in XS segment 
is greater under Regulation than in the Fixed Baseline, it would seem to be the case 
that there are more people in the worst-off segment. Of course, it could be that 
other factors, such as preferences, have caused this downsizing but the 
interpretation of these findings is constrained by the model design and assumptions 
regarding segmentation.  
 
Regarding Claim 2, the finding is that Regulation and Both Policies have caused 
additional burdens on the worst-off in society, or made others equally worse off. As 
such, compensatory measures would be required in order for the policies to satisfy 
the ethical framework. As suggested in Chapter Three, this could come from some 
form of exemption, or through intervention with further regulation to ensure that not 
all costs are passed on to customers (or at least not the poorest). 
 
In summary, although these policies successfully result in emission reductions 
which benefit the whole of society, Subsidies may only benefit the more well off who 
are likely to have access to private charging and can afford a more expensive EV in 
the first place, but in the long term may benefit the less well off as an affordable 
used EV market develops. Regulation, on the other hand, increases the cost of 
vehicle ownership, and as the least well off are most sensitive to price changes 
(and therefore car-poverty), they risk being impacted the most, especially as Small 
segment vehicles increase disproportionately. Both of these concerns are 
somewhat dependent on residual values in the used car market, which wasn’t 
included in this research. 
 
There are some further caveats to these findings. Firstly, as people are not able to 
drop out of the market in this model, individual movement between segments is not 
identifiable, and so it is possible that those who are unfairly burdened by the 
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policies, have not been accounted for. Despite this, the assumption that just viewing 
the changes is an appropriate measure still stands. Secondly, for simplicity, only 
aggregate segment or powertrain market shares were considered regarding 
purchase prices. It may be that, by looking more specifically at the 
powertrain/segment combination, further insight may be gained, especially as not 
every powertrain is available in every segment at all times, so this may distort 
apparent purchase prices. This is why the Fixed Baseline was used to compare the 
impact of policies as the vehicles are available at comparative times. Finally, only 
the end of the time period was considered in detail. Picking a point in time when 
subsidies were in place may lead to a different conclusion, depending on what 
impact the subsidies have on size segment prices and market shares. 
 
5.6.3 Model Limitations and Development Potential 
 
There are numerous model criticisms that it may be beneficial to address in future 
work. Firstly, the time scale may be too short to make any definite policy 
recommendations, however, nearly all vehicles at the start of the period will be 
replaced, as an average life of 11 years is assumed. In further defence of this, it 
needs to be reiterated that this model is not being applied in a strictly predictive 
capacity, but to understand the impact of certain policy interventions.  Although it is 
accepted that the timescale may be too short to fully assess the impact within the 
ethical framework (as the concerns regarding protection of the most vulnerable may 
be more pertinent when LCVs are more widespread and a second-hand car market 
has been established), the policy impacts can still be seen to give a feel or 
indication of the longer term effects. What is more, a shorter timescale may allow 
the consideration of a level of detail which is unobserved on a longer time scale 
such as that applied in CS1. As this model was carried out starting in 2009, and at 
the time of writing, the mid-decade is being approached, it may allow for some 
comparison to real world experiences. This can help to improve future models, or 
adapt this one for purpose.  
 
Two significant omissions were acknowledged in the introduction of the thesis, 
being fleet and used vehicles. Recall that fleet sales account for approximately half 
of all new car sales and the used car market is more than twice the volume of the 
new car market (SMMT, 2013a). In the model it is assumed that cars are bought 
new, privately and retained for the entire lifetime, which is clearly not the case in 
real life for the vast majority of car owners. Although the findings from this research 
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remain applicable despite this, as any learning from the impacts arising from LCV 
policies can be transferred to both the fleet and used markets, there are limits to 
this and implications have to be considered. Fleet buyers are “more likely to 
consider the total cost of ownership and practical issues” (Element Energy, 2013). 
As such, they may be more amenable to EV than private buyers, due to the low 
running costs. On the other hand, company vehicles are driven twice as far as 
private vehicles and purchasing decisions are complex but poorly understood 
(Nesbitt and Sterling, 2002). Therefore, policy tailoured specifically to encourage 
fleet buyers to consider the benefits of LCVs is required. As fleet accounts for half 
of new vehicles this would mean that the technology transition could look quite 
different to this model. Therefore inclusion of a fleet choice model and 
disaggregation of the market would be useful in future, but of the little research in 
this area, a great deal of inconsistency between fleet managers has been identified 
(Hutchins and Delmonte, 2012). Used car buyers may also make different purchase 
decisions, but as little evidence of research in this area was identified in the 
literature review, it is an area that requires further study. It is particularly concerning 
for this research as the used car market is more likely to include those most 
vulnerable to car-poverty. 
 
It was also a concern that in the model the automobile industry was represented by 
one aggregate manufacturer. Newer models have been identified which capture 
competing manufacturers within the automobile market (Boksberger et al., 2012) 
that could improve the model to some degree. However, it is uncertain if this would 
in actuality just make the model more complicated and cloud out some of the more 
important details and findings. Further to this, within the model, it was found that 
under certain scenarios that the manufacturer could experience (in some case quite 
large) negative profits, yet does not adapt to this within the feedback processes. 
This is an unfortunate limitation to modelling, in that unrealistic behaviours are 
allowed to occur. In the real world, the company would go bankrupt and drop out of 
the market, yet this is not possible in this model as it represented the whole 
industry. This may be another advantage of Boksberger et al.’s, model, which did 
allow bankruptcy, and had multiple manufacturers.  
 
Within the ethical framework an important output is the reduction of GHG emissions 
from policy interventions, and it is not certain if the unit emissions in the model are 
wholly accurate. Tailpipe emissions are related to fuel efficiencies of ICE-based 
vehicles that are based on standard test cycles. Although this is how emissions are 
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currently accounted for in policy and reporting, there is growing interest and move 
towards more realistic emission reporting, based on ‘real-world’ emission tests. For 
BEV the emission is a standard and set amount for all segments (as set out in the 
ZEV Regulations), and although similar to the findings in the literature review, it is 
unlikely that all segments would be the same (as heavier cars require more power 
to overcome inertia), and the emission rating itself is sensitive to electricity 
generation mix. Due to the small time scale, this may not make much difference to 
the results, but should be considered if this model is developed in the future. 
Further, as suggested in the literature review, the most beneficial way of measuring 
the emissions would be to use life cycle emissions. Although the problems related 
to developing a standard method for doing this are many, as highlighted in the 
literature review, moving towards this way of reporting would more adequately 
capture any realistic emission savings, especially if one recalls the high embedded 
emissions in EVs. Additionally, this may allow a better representation of the 
emissions related to non-conventional ICE fuels (which will be used in ICEV, HEV 
and PiHEV), such as biofuels and CNG. Finally, as PiHEV are a relatively new 
technology, there is no standard in reporting their emissions, as the pure electric 
drive contribution is under-researched. In the model a percentage of the ICEV 
emissions were assumed but there was no accounting for the emissions from 
electricity when recharged, though this may be implicit in the ICE contribution.  
 
Although the model was set up to understand manufacturer strategies to the GHG 
and ZEV Regulations, there was no intrinsic motivation captured within the model 
for a manufacturer to reduce GHG emission or encourage uptake of ZEV. Their 
responses are merely a reaction to meeting targets, as the model is set up to 
respond in this way in order to minimise penalties. Because of this, it does allow for 
some increases in ICEV emissions in later years following the reductions, as targets 
are still met when ZEV shares increase under certain scenarios. This may partly be 
due to GHG targets being constant for the final few years, and should they be 
tightened in reality, this could prevent GHG emission rises. Although this is quite 
likely an accurate reflection of manufacturers response, it also goes to show that 
such regulations, although successful in meeting targets, are not successful in 
bringing about real institutional change in ways of thinking or core business virtues 
(though any change in this is not captured in the model). Although there may be 
arguments as to if it is political acceptable to do so, the growing public interest in 
companies that are socially responsible (in a true sense rather than being seen to 
be so), may motivate such change.  
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On the demand side, the model does not capture any ‘rebound effects’ that may 
occur if reduced running costs lead to increased mileage (Atkins, 2009). This could 
erode up to a third of fuel savings from Regulation type measures, but empirical 
estimates have been found to be very sensitive to assumptions about other vehicle 
attributes, household car ownership and gasoline prices (Linn, 2013). This has 
implications not only for congestion and safety concerns (which are outside the 
remit of this research), but also because the benefits of reduced energy and carbon 
may not be realised. Rebound effect could be captured in future model 
development through fuel price elasticities, and could be important as recent 
research suggests that lowest mileage households exhibit largest elasticities and 
rebound effects (Froundel et al., 2012). Possible policy options to overcome such 
impacts could be similar to those discussed elsewhere, such as road pricing or 
taxation based on miles travelled. 
 
The vehicle attributes within the model were developed by the original authors in 
conjunction with an automobile manufacturer, however, it is not clear if these are 
entirely realistic. For instance, a Large BEV is available with a range nearly 350 
miles by 2015, and this is not currently predicted by any manufacturer. As such 
results could be biased. Another attribute criticism is that both fuel and electric 
prices are constant. Although the same was assumed in CS1, as recognised in that 
discussion, this may not be the case in real life. Fuel prices are predicted to rise, 
particularly in the US. Likewise, electricity prices are set to rise as fossil fuel 
supplies dwindle and expensive alternatives are used or demand increases. Again, 
the short time scale of this particular model may not make much difference, but as 
longer scale research is carried out this needs to be incorporated. Further to this, 
any introduction of fiscal measures on running costs would need to be reflected in 
fuel prices.  
 
Although the model included a module on infrastructure, this was not as extensive 
or integral as other modelling studies (e.g. Kohler et al., (2012)), so future modellers 
should perhaps take more account of these. One further concern with the charging 
infrastructure was that charging was assumed to be fast charging taking only half 
an hour, and charging location was not explicitly considered. As many lower income 
drivers may not have access to home charging (as discussed in Chapter Three), 
they may be under represented in the model. Remembering that these people may 
again be amongst the worst-off, this could be concerning so should be addressed in 
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future model development. Such extensions could be beneficial when building a 
Facilitating Adoption policy scenario. 
 
This model has assumed a constant vehicle fleet and drivers do not choose to 
leave the vehicle market. This may be unrealistic, especially under the Regulation 
scenario where prices rise significantly. Actual trends would suggest it is possible 
that the market may grow further, though car ownership is starting to plateau or 
even reduce in younger portions of society. Due to this, it was not possible to 
capture if someone was priced out of car ownership, a pivotal element in the ethical 
framework. Additionally, it means that people leaving the car market out of choice 
(to change mode or join a car club for example) are not captured. This is important 
in the context of wider low carbon transport policies that require a significant modal 
shift. As the time scale is short this may not be relevant, and modal shift is not the 
focus of this thesis, but the point is worthy of recognition. 
 
An obvious limit of the model was the inability to identify specific societal segments, 
in relation to income, access or mobility. As previously noted, vehicle segments 
were taken as a proxy for income, but this may not be wholly realistic. Although 
recognised as a constraining assumption, in future model development a consumer 
choice model that included such segmentation would be required in order to 
improve assessment within the ethical framework.  
 
The model was not initially designed with a no-policy baseline. Although the 
baseline implemented in the model served the purposes that were required to 
identify impacts of policy interventions, it is not certain that the baselines were 
appropriate. Firstly, the Conditional Baseline is likely to be pessimistic. Due to the 
minimal infrastructural and range requirements set out by the original authors, many 
ZEV models did not become available in the timeframe, or only near the end. 
However this may reflect the time that the model was developed and availability 
would appear to be more optimistic now. Another reason may be that the minimal 
requirements themselves were unrealistic, as previously remarked. It does not look 
likely that a BEV battery with 200m range would become available in the near future 
(although this may be overcome by rapid charging or battery swaps, which is not 
considered in the model). On the other hand, the Fixed Baseline is certainly over-
optimistic. The availability of the models had a much greater impact than the policy 
interventions (due to the structure of the model, if a ZEV model was available and 
unconstrained by production capacity, people would purchase them), hence the 
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reason that it could only be used as to differentiate policy intervention. The 
significant impact of vehicle availability does however concur with Yeh (2007) as 
reported in the literature review. Further, artificially making the model available does 
not accurately reflect technological process. In conclusion, in future model 
development it will be necessary to develop a suitable and realistic baseline 
alongside any model improvement.  
 
Similar to the previous case study, marketing was found to have a strong effect and 
similar to model availability, a much stronger effect than policy intervention. 
Although this could be used in the future to replicate different policy scenarios, such 
as one for Raising Awareness, further understanding of the parameters and their 
suitability for use would be needed. Again they are similar to the previous study in 
that they were developed from consumer technologies which may not be similar 
enough to automobiles (in terms of cost, commitment, durability or emotional 
reasoning), to be appropriate. Further to this, marketing was applied individually to 
each segment and was constant as long as the model type was available, making it 
potentially artificially high. This helps explain why when any model was available it 
sold, though the nature of choice models means that there will always be some 
sales unless utility is infinite. 
 
5.6.4 Summary of Findings 
 
The conclusion of this Chapter is therefore that Regulations on the manufacturer 
are more successful in reducing GHG emissions and increasing LCV uptake than 
Fiscal Measures (in the form of subsidies) for the consumer. However, both of 
these may cause issues of injustice, as both options may favour the richest in 
society. Regulation forces an increase in purchase price of cars across the fleet, 
and disproportionately so for the Small segment. Subsidies may be beneficial only 
to those who were able to purchase an LCV anyway, at a cost to the public in terms 
of a carbon abatement cost. Despite these issues, if the opportunity for car 
ownership for the worst-off can be protected (in support of Claim 2), then these 
policies are permissible within the ethical framework developed in Chapter Three. 
This would suggest that interactions between policies should be considered, and 
designed to complement each other. For example, as it was found that 
implementing both policies together can ease distributional issues, designing 
policies together in this way would be advantageous. 
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6  CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
In this final Chapter, the conclusions from the previous Chapters are brought 
together. First of all, the fulfilment of research objectives is established. Following 
this, policy recommendations are presented and then a modelling and appraisal 
framework for policies is proposed, based on the method used in this thesis. Next, 
there is a review of suggestions for future research. The Chapter then concludes 
with a final summary, which describes the high-level conclusions and the novel 
contribution of the research. 
6.1 Main Conclusions 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate an approach to modelling Low 
Carbon Vehicle (LCV) uptake policies, which incorporates an ethical framework that 
identifies distributional impacts. This involved interdisciplinary study combining 
technological review, policy appraisal, modelling techniques and applied ethics. The 
challenges in doing this were in considering claims related to issues of justice that 
may arise from the introduction of LCVs, the permissibility of the role of models 
within policy appraisal, and the practical implementation of ethics within the 
modelling process. In achieving this, an ethical framework for LCV policies was 
developed and implemented alongside a system dynamic model of LCV uptake, 
allowing scenario analysis and policy appraisal.  
 
A review of literature provided the focus of the research. It was concluded that 
Electric Vehicles (EVs) had the greatest potential of all LCVs in reducing passenger 
car emissions, but have significant barriers to adoption that need to be overcome 
within the next decade. The range of policies being implemented to do so were 
categorised into five generic areas and the policies of Regulation (aimed at the 
manufacturer) and Fiscal Measures (aimed at the customer) were identified as 
currently being given the most attention. Although there have been numerous 
modelling studies of LCV uptake to understand preferences and diffusion, few 
combine both approaches using system dynamics. Of those that do, none are UK-
based, none explicitly consider ethical issues and few directly compare supply and 
demand side policies. Finally, despite the growing debate regarding climate and 
transport ethics, there is little philosophical literature that specifically considers the 
transition to LCVs or addresses the permissibility of modelling in policy appraisal. 
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An ethical framework for LCV policy appraisal was proposed in Chapter Three (Part 
A). It was argued that it is permissible for governments to use coercive policies for 
the introduction of LCVs, due to the potential harms of climate change, even if that 
limits the opportunity for car ownership, but also that provision should be made to 
ensure that such policies do not amplify existing, or create new inequalities that 
burden the worst-off or result in a different group of people being similarly 
disadvantaged.112 Special consideration for vulnerable groups, such as the poor 
and the disabled, is required in the short term due to a cultural and infrastructural 
lock-in of car ownership to ensure equitable levels of accessibility and as a form of 
mobility. It was suggested that if an amendment was required, it could be achieved 
by tighter market regulations, tax exemptions or fiscal support, analogous to 
existing public policy in other areas. These arguments were broadly supported in 
the evaluation of the framework presented in Part B of that Chapter, which also 
suggested that the high profile policies Regulation and Fiscal Measures may cause 
the greatest negative impact on the opportunity for car ownership. 
 
Also in Chapter Three, in a comparison to existing philosophical criticisms of Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA), it was argued that there are limitations to modelling that 
must be recognised. This is no reason for rejecting its application, however, as 
modelling is an important tool in policy appraisal when used correctly and in 
awareness of its limitations. The implication of this means that both modeller and 
policy-maker need to clearly identify objectives, needs and burdens, and 
communicate model boundaries and parameters.  
 
Modelling skills and understanding of policy sensitivities were developed in a 
relatively simple UK case study model (CS1) in Chapter Four. There was only a 
small EV market share in all but the most optimistic cases, meaning that reducing 
ICEV emissions makes a larger impact on overall emissions than EV introduction. 
Despite this, any shift to an LCV fleet will have a significant impact on government 
revenue, regardless of the emission reduction achieved. Social exposure to EVs 
was found to be important for uptake, which would indicate the importance of 
Raising Awareness polices not investigated in this research. The key finding, 
however, was that subsidies, as a form of Fiscal Measures are only effective in an 
otherwise failing market. 
 
                                               
112 Recall in this work that the concern is for anyone who may be most disadvantaged 
compared to other people at any point of the timeframe. 
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The findings of Chapter Four were built upon in a second case study (CS2)   in 
Chapter Five. This model allowed study of both Regulation and Fiscal Measures (in 
the form of subsidies), and captured the complex business processes of an 
automobile manufacturer, as well as social diffusion feedbacks and the 
identification of approximate income-based societal segments. Regulation was 
shown to be more successful in reducing emissions than subsidies, but through 
ICE-based emission reductions rather than BEV introduction. It was revealed that 
interrelationships between policies are important feedback mechanisms to 
understand in policy appraisal. A policy aimed at the supply side has important 
impacts on demand side as costs can be passed on. In this study, the costs were 
unevenly spread out across the fleet, with the poor experiencing the worst impacts, 
as the cost of smaller ICE-based vehicles increase the most. This identification of 
impacts on societal segments is pivotal in appraising the permissibility of a policy, 
as argued in Chapter Three. Therefore, although aggregated policy models are 
useful, to really understand the distributive impacts of a policy, a disaggregated 
model with recognised specific groups is essential. Such models may be more 
useful for comparing policy options, than being used purely as a predictive tool, but 
importantly should be used in conjunction with other appraisal approaches and 
alongside ex-ante ethical evaluation of policies. 
 
The research outlined above sought to understand policies that satisfy an ethical 
framework that seeks to strike a balance between climate change concerns and 
protecting special claims for car ownership from the worst-off. In response to this, 
policy recommendations are made in the next Section of this Chapter, and then an 
alternative policy modelling and appraisal framework is proposed, based on the 
experience of this research. 
6.2 Policy Recommendations 
As suggested by the ethical framework, real world policies for LCV uptake would 
greatly benefit by accounting for distributional impacts as well as focusing on 
carbon reductions, with provisions made to protect vulnerable groups where 
necessary. Three policy options were studied in this research. These were: Fiscal 
Measures on the demand side, Regulation on the supply side, and a combination of 
Both Policies. Chapter Five concluded that these were permissible within the ethical 
framework as long as there is provision to protect the worst-off from impacts on the 
opportunity for car ownership. 
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6.2.1 Fiscal Measures 
 
In both case studies, it was found that under Business as Usual (BAU) conditions, 
Subsidies as a form of Fiscal Measures made little difference to LCV uptake (and 
related emission reductions), as the price reduction did not overcome strong 
preferences towards conventional vehicle technological attributes. Subsidies were 
only successful in increasing uptake significantly under a failing market, in which 
case they are pivotal. This has morally relevant implications as under a BAU 
scenario there is a significant cost to government that effectively subsidises the rich 
who would probably have made the purchase anyway, and the worst-off do not 
directly benefit at all. As it is not possible to be certain about the BAU uptake in 
reality however, and it can be assumed that manufacturers would not retain high 
levels of marketing for sustained periods, then to ensure LCV penetration Subsidies 
should be supported. Furthermore, it has been argued, that such policies need to 
be in place, to ensure manufacturers of government commitment to a low carbon 
fleet in order to encourage them to produce the vehicles (though this is an 
assumption made for the purposes of the model). As Subsidies lead to emission 
reductions against a failing baseline, and there was no evidence to suggest that the 
policy as tested in this research could burden the worst-off, then it is permissible 
within the ethical framework.  
 
It should be recalled that significant portions of the worst-off will not find an EV 
appropriate due to lack of access to private infrastructure or being able to afford 
one even under Subsidies. Although the model findings suggest that the worst-off 
are not unfairly burdened by Subsidies, and so are permissible, supporting a policy 
that only benefits the better off for a potentially small reduction in emissions does 
not seem wholly appropriate. In addition, indirect burdens have not been 
addressed. Consideration of these concerns in more detail would also require a 
more thorough empirical consideration within the ethical framework of permissible 
levels of pain. Within this work, the view was taken that the only unacceptable 
outcome in this respect was a reduction in the current level of the worst off. Other 
approaches or extensions of this work could adopt different distributive principles as 
defined by Khisty (1996), or a more severe view on allowing luxury emissions 
(Odenbaugh, 2010), our responsibilities and obligations towards climate change 
(Hourdequin, 2010; Garvey, 2008), or the moral significance of our individual 
actions (Hillar, 2011).  
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As such, a feebate scheme (based on vehicle emissions and personal income) or 
means-tested subsidy would be more appropriate to promote fairness, but these 
were not examined in this research. As it was found, however, that the success of 
Subsidies is also dependent on the period of implementation, further study is 
required to understand if a longer period than considered here could indirectly 
benefit the less well off by bringing forward the development of economies of scale 
and a second-hand EV market, as well as accelerating public charging 
infrastructure. This latter point regarding the co-dependence between uptake and 
infrastructure, which was remarked upon in the literature review though not fully 
represented in either model, would make Subsidies even more important under 
failing market circumstances. This is especially so if, as also mentioned in the 
literature review (JTRC, 2010), Subsidies have been offered too early before 
vehicles are sufficiently developed.  
 
6.2.2 Regulation 
 
It was found in Chapter Five that in the short term, Regulations for overall fleet 
average emission target and mandated introduction of LCVs have greater potential 
for reducing GHG emissions than Subsidies. They also, however, increase the 
purchase price of all vehicles and disproportionately increase that of small vehicles. 
As vehicle size segments were assumed to be related to income, this therefore has 
the greatest negative impact on the poorer segments of society, though it is 
accepted that using vehicle size as a proxy of income is a simplification. Indeed, the 
model findings suggest that the XS segment, which contains the worst-off, was 
larger under the policy. Although the purchase price of XS segment vehicles 
increased the least, the fact that purchase price has increased for them at all would 
make the policy impermissible without amendment. Further to this, ICE-based 
vehicles experienced a greater increase in purchase price than BEV under the 
Regulations. Though significant emission reductions were achieved, as ICE-based 
vehicles are the most affordable form of vehicle, in the short term the poorest in 
society are at risk of car-poverty also requiring amendments or further regulation. 
Due to this, within the Regulations manufacturers should be prevented from 
passing on significant costs to the most affordable vehicles, transferring any 
legitimate costs towards larger or luxury vehicles in the fleet. 
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It was also found in Chapter Five that under Regulation once emission reduction 
targets are achieved, if they are overshot, the manufacturer can allow them to 
increase again. Although this may be a modelling issue, it does highlight the 
weakness of an average fleet emission target, as it does not encourage continual 
improvement. This is in addition to allowing high emitting vehicles within a fleet. To 
avoid this occurring, Regulation should be altered so that rather than an average 
fleet emission target, targets should be based on capping the upper bound or range 
of emissions and that rewards for over-attaining targets are implemented in addition 
to penalising deficits. Should this be related to fiscal incentives, there is a concern 
of what is the true motivator for change (and if that matters). If having polices in 
place simply encourages the manufacturer to produce vehicles they would not 
otherwise produce, this is a legitimate reason for the policy (assuming costs are 
acceptable). 
 
6.2.3 Combining and Comparing Policies 
 
Although the full dynamics of the Regulations were not captured in the CS1 model, 
the tests related to Regulations suggested that reduction of ICEV emissions are 
more successful in reducing overall emissions than subsidising EVs, though this is 
due to the low EV share in these scenarios. However, this finding is consistent with 
CS2, where subsidies alone did not meet fleet average emission targets, and with 
the findings of the IEA mentioned in the literature review that regulatory emission 
standards were important in emission reductions (Onoda, 2008). This finding is 
particularly pertinent when considered in terms of the carbon abatement costs 
calculated in CS2. These suggested that not only did Subsidies have a greater 
overall abatement cost than Regulation, but also that customers would benefit at 
the expense of all tax payers, whereas under Regulation customers bear the 
greatest costs whilst industry benefits.  
 
When Both Policies were combined the burden on the tax payer is reduced. There 
was greater success in both LCV uptake and emission reduction alongside reduced 
abatement costs, both overall and for government, compared to Subsidy alone. 
Customers no longer benefit and industry does, with reduced impacts compared to 
Regulation alone, meaning costs are more equally distributed between customers, 
governments and industry. Customer abatement costs were calculated over all 
customers in this work, rather than focusing on specific segments, leaving the 
argument that Subsidies offered under Both Policies are still only assisting the 
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better off to purchase an EV. Furthermore, there was only a marginal increase in 
emission reductions and marginal decrease in overall abatement cost when 
Subsidies are offered in addition to Regulation. Despite this, the important point to 
note is that Subsidies are more cost effective when combined with Regulation than 
when offered alone. Although undesirable for industry, having Subsidies in place 
with Regulation reduces the industry profit compared to Regulation alone, because 
although both costs and revenue are greater with Subsidies in place than 
Regulation alone, production costs have been increased more by the introduction of 
Subsidies than revenue has. Even though the impact on purchase decisions from 
Subsidies have only marginally increased EV uptake, customers have benefited 
compared to Regulation as a smaller portion of costs have been passed on. 
Overall, these findings suggest that although combining policies does not result in 
significant high level impacts, it does mutually reinforce positive aspects of single 
policies, and has potential to reduce some negative impacts if applied wisely. 
 
6.2.4 Principals of Policy Design 
 
It is the recommendation of this research that, based on the findings summarised 
above, the policies which have been modelled in this study are appropriate short-
term mechanisms, but would only be permissible if they are implemented together 
and monitored subject to the following conditions: 
 
Ensure Affordability 
If, as expected, the trend of increasing vehicle purchase prices continues into the 
second-hand car market, then there will be more people counted amongst the 
worst-off. They may have to keep an older, less efficient vehicle for longer than 
otherwise, which could counteract GHG concerns (subject to vehicle use and 
embodied emissions) and have running cost implications for the owner. Further to 
this, they may no longer have the opportunity for car ownership due to higher 
average costs. The most affluent in society are the most likely to be purchasing new 
cars and are also most likely to be able to bear these higher purchase costs. If 
prices do rise, however, then some will move to the second-hand car market, 
reducing the new car market. This could have many knock on effects such as 
increased residual values. Therefore, as part of the concern for the worst-off, to 
ensure a sustainable and affordable car market in the short term, purchase prices 
of the cheapest vehicles must not be allowed to rise too rapidly. Fiscal Measures 
must be carefully designed that encourage responsible choices (biased towards 
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LCVs), and manufacturers must be prevented from passing excessive costs on to 
customers. Different ownership models, such as car clubs (which are already 
becoming popular in some areas), should also be given greater support, but these 
were not directly considered in this study.  
 
Protect the Vulnerable 
Segments of society with special claims for car ownership need protection from 
increases in purchase price or decreases in utility. In order to achieve the emission 
targets and introduce LCVs, it was discovered in the model that market shares of 
ICEV will be reduced greatly from what they are today. Though this is desirable, as 
the aim is to reduce emissions, even if it is assumed that such a significant change 
in purchase habits in just over a decade is realistic, it is unlikely that LCV attributes 
will have improved sufficiently to equal ICEV, particularly in terms of costs. Under 
this assumption, those segments who have most reliance on car ownership or are 
most sensitive to changes in costs will be most impacted. This is because they may 
be priced out from owning a vehicle suiting their needs or have to bear high costs 
because of their needs by the introduction of these policies. Thus, they would 
qualify for protection from the negative impacts on mobility which are indicated 
within the model, through amendments in regulations. These amendments should 
be analogous to existing policies, such as those suggested in Chapter Three, 
including welfare benefits similar to fuel poverty schemes or tax exemptions similar, 
and access regulations similar to equality laws. For instance, provision could be 
made that forces manufacturers to bias production costs, so that those purchasing 
smaller (cheaper) vehicles would not be unfairly burdened when they contribute 
less in terms of emissions. However, this would also have specific implications for 
those who legitimately require a larger vehicle (e.g. people with wheelchairs), and 
so would need further assistance, similar to the current ‘Motability’ scheme.  
 
Distribute Burdens 
This research found that customers bore the highest costs of the market 
transformation when Regulation is in place compared to BAU. Although customers 
should expect to bear some costs, as it is not argued that car ownership outweighs 
climate change obligations, costs should be more equally shared, particularly by 
industry who pass on a significant amount of their incurred penalties to the 
customer (though this was an assumption in the model). The Subsidies tested here, 
which reduced customer costs, were not strong enough to make a noticeable 
impact to market share, meaning that those wealthier people who would have 
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bought an EV anyway have benefited from public money. In addition, the EV owner 
also benefits from low running costs. This situation is analogous to the feed-in tariffs 
offered with solar panels that, due to their high purchase price and the need to own 
your own home, are only accessible to the wealthier members of society. In both 
these cases, the tax payer is subsidising the well off at the expense of the less well 
off (or those without access) to bring down production costs of a technology which 
will, it is argued, benefit the whole of society in the longer term. When considering 
the impact on revenue that was highlighted in CS1, subsidising EVs could further 
impact the least well off as government income is reduced. The revenue preserving 
tax proposed in Chapter Four could not only prevent this, but also prevent the well 
off from benefiting disproportionately. The ethics of this as a policy approach is 
questionable though, as it reduces payback times that could have been a purchase 
decision factor. Other options to reclaim the income (if justifiably needed) could be 
related to electricity use or vehicle mileage, but any overhaul of vehicle taxes must 
be carefully designed, and remain emission-related. 
6.3 Modelling and Appraisal Framework Proposal 
The final objective of this research to be met is to propose an alternative modelling 
and policy appraisal framework for LCVs that other researchers or policy makers 
could adopt. As such, a four step approach is recommended, following the method 
which was carried out in this research. This framework is transferable to other forms 
of transport policies, or similar situations where there are conflicting policy concerns 
between societal and individual impacts. The four steps are: 
 
1. Identify existing and potential ethical issues  
This includes the reason for the drivers of the policy (which was climate change in 
this study), and what direct and indirect impacts the policy could have on 
distributive justice (e.g. in this study they were explored in Chapter Three and 
include direct limits on opportunity for car ownership and indirect impacts on 
accessibility and mobility). Further to this, it must be recognised that this needs to 
be carried out in a real world situation, where there are existing injustices. Of 
course, there will likely be quite different types of ethical issues to consider in other 
cases than this study. 
 
2. Defend an approach to justice 
In this study, the focus was on identifying policies that could prevent (or minimise 
the occurrence of) the worst-off from becoming even more worse off or another 
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group becoming amongst the worst-off. This was defended in Chapter Three, where 
the obligation to minimise the harms of climate change (through the harm principle 
and tragedy of the commons) and the protection of those vulnerable to changes in 
the opportunity for car ownership (through special claims and analogous policies) 
was argued for. Other approaches are also legitimate, such as the six principles of 
distributive justice described by Khisty (1996) mentioned in the literature review. 
The validity of these arguments would be strengthened if also evaluated by peers. 
 
3. Develop a model which captures identified ethical issues 
Importantly, this means that a disaggregated model, which is able to represent 
different, and relevant, segments of society, is required. Further to this, users need 
to be aware of the assumptions, boundaries and limitations of the model, as argued 
in Chapter Three. The modeller and policy-maker must both be confident that 
identified issues are demonstrable.  
 
4. Recognise that the model should not be used in isolation 
As pointed out in Step 3, one of the arguments developed in Chapter Three was 
that modellers and policy makers should be aware of the limits and application of 
models in order for them to be permissible for policy appraisal. In particular, there 
are limits to the extent that the complexity of real-world systems can be captured 
within a model and that ethical issues can be included in any model (due to the 
non-empirical nature of ethics and the empirical focus of models). In recognising 
these limitations the alternatives would appear to be to either attempt to include 
ethics within the model or accept that models are prevented from capturing ethics 
and continue with current practises, of ex-ante or parallel ethical appraisal of the 
model and policies. In this research, both approaches have been adopted, as 
neither adequately captures the full importance or integration of ethical appraisal 
within the process. It should also be the case that other policy appraisal 
approaches, such as CBA, should not be neglected but also carried out alongside 
modelling and ethical evaluation to ensure a holistic and robust policy decision. 
 
This framework is an improvement on existing practices that do not appreciate the 
importance of incorporating explicit ethical evaluation as a central focus of policy 
appraisal. This can lead to policy decisions that increase existing inequalities and 
burden those already worst-off in society. Furthermore, by also emphasising the 
importance of recognising the limitations of models and their application within the 
appraisal process, this approach overcomes issues of over-reliance or mis-
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interpretation that can lead to inappropriate policy decisions that do not achieve 
expected outcomes. By employing this framework, a policy-maker or researcher 
can develop a greater appreciation of ethics, risks, benefits and uncertainties 
related to specific scenarios, prompting more informed, confident and successful 
policy decision-making. 
6.4 Future Research 
The appraisal framework proposed in Section 6.3, may be adopted by other 
researchers with different interests in the field of LCVs by altering the stipulations, 
boundaries and assumptions of this research. An obvious example of this is to go 
deeper into the concerns relating to biofuels, which has already attracted much 
attention (NCB, 2011). Perhaps one interesting limit to remove would be the 
timeframe. This is because other morally relevant factors will emerge in the mid and 
long term, as other powertrains (such as HFCV) become available, and modal shift, 
car ownership models or wider transport attitudes evolve. In addressing this, one 
could begin from the arguments presented here. Likewise, the arguments regarding 
climate change could be explored more fully should one wish to enter the 
established debate in this area with a particular focus on transport. Further to this, 
consideration of car ownership (particularly the rapid development and increase 
thereof) in developing countries would be interesting to consider in relation to the 
arguments presented here as the “status quo” in these regions will differ. Finally, 
the framework is not necessarily limited to LCVs, or even transport, but can be 
expanded to consider the wider energy system, due to the competing nature of 
lifestyles locked-in to carbon-intense technology and obligations to mitigate climate 
change, or even any type of public policy that has conflicting issues of distribution.  
 
Improvements to the model were discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Exploring 
these model limitations and suggested amendments would lead to a model that 
more accurately reflects the dynamic nature of technological development and 
demand response, and so be able to be used to identify more appropriate policy 
recommendations. The most important of these will now be highlighted. 
 
Automobile industry and car markets 
A more realistic automobile market would greatly improve the model. Firstly, within 
the ethical framework, recall that the attention is on those who are amongst the 
worst-off in society. CS1 considers the impact on the poorest in society, with the 
focus on purchase costs. Yet it is normally only the most affluent in society who can 
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purchase new rather than second-hand cars. Further to this, many new cars are 
actually purchased as fleet cars, something that is not considered at all within this 
study. Also, many people do not buy cars (new or second-hand) with one up front 
purchase cost, but buy them on credit, choosing to pay back monthly, or 
(particularly in the US) on some sort of lease or hire-purchase scheme. These 
different forms of paying are not captured in the model or fully recognised in the 
ethical framework. Such payment schemes are though likely to cost more than 
outright payment (due to interest on loans), which is morally relevant (although well 
accepted in current practice). The interaction between new and second-hand cars, 
and the responses of both manufacturer and customer would be very relevant to 
include but unfortunately no system dynamic model that explicitly considered the 
second-hand car market was identified in this research. As there is no significant 
LCV second-hand market yet, this may not be a problem, but should be accounted 
for if the ethical framework is amended to consider a longer term. Additionally, the 
influence of competing manufacturer strategies was neglected in the models, which 
were set up to mimic an aggregate manufacturer rather than be representative of 
the automobile industry with individual players. This has been attempted in another 
recent work (Boksberger et al. 2012). 
 
Emissions and scenarios 
Within any model expansion, it would be more accurate to include GHG emissions 
as “Well to Wheel” or life cycle emissions, rather than tailpipe only. This is a move 
currently being given much consideration by the EU for fleet emission regulations 
(EC 2012b). In this study only two policies were considered, and future work should 
involve more complex scenarios. Larger models should be able to cope with 
mimicking different or multiple policy options, such as the UK Transport Carbon 
Model developed through UKERC (Brand et al., 2012) or the JRC EU TIMES 
energy system model, which has recently been expanded to include transport.113 
Furthermore, future models would need to consider potential rebound effects that 
occur from lower running costs. 
 
Segments and indicators 
The model would be greatly improved by the development of a choice model with 
more appropriate segments that can be readily identified in regards to the impact of 
the policy on the opportunity for car ownership. As far as it is known there is no 
such model publically available (though commercially sensitive models may do so), 
                                               
113 The author will be working with this model in a post-doctoral position from late 2013. 
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though it is likely that an amalgamation of existing models would approximate 
segments more effectively than those used in this model. Psychology based 
methodological approaches have begun to be applied for market segmentation and 
it may be that this could be utilised to refine the segments within a choice model 
(Anable, 2005; DfT, 2010; Element Energy, 2013; Morton, 2013). Once segments 
are identified, it may be beneficial to consider how willingness to consider 
parameters within the model may vary between such segments and also how these 
may vary over time. 
 
As opportunity for car ownership comprises of both vulnerability to car-poverty and 
car-utility, it is recommended that segment vulnerability to car-utility (the 
accessibility and mobility a car provides an individual), which was not represented 
in CS2, should be captured in order to fully reflect the framework concerns. 
Although it is not certain how this could be achieved, it would need to be based on 
reliance on car ownership due to limitations in personal mobility (through e.g. 
disability, location or commitments), in comparison to segment vulnerability to car-
poverty, which was represented in CS2 by income.   
 
The actual assessment of policies would be made more efficient if specific ethical 
indicators could be developed within the model that highlighted the permissibility of 
the policies114. Should segments be developed that capture the vulnerabilities to 
car-poverty and car-utility, and it is possible to combine these with outputs in the 
model of the impact on cost and utility of car ownership, then policy assessment 
could be much more in line with the ethical framework developed. Developing a 
robust approach for achieving this will raise both ethical and empirical issues. For 
instance, ethical dialogue will be required to justify the definition of equity within the 
indictor (for example, minimising the equity gap versus preventing reduced 
opportunity for the worst off), and once this is determined, there will be issues 
around measuring and quantifying such factors, as data may be limited or subject to 
interpretation based on judgement rather than repeatable methods. 
6.5 Final Summary 
The concern of this work was that governments are obliged to reduce GHG 
emissions due to climate change, but policies to achieve this via new passenger 
                                               
114 An attempt to do so was made by the author in some separate work to this thesis that 
was awarded a Youth Prestige Grant at the 2013 World Conference in Transport 
Research. 
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cars could increase inequality in society. Arguments were developed that supported 
these concerns and identified groups with specific claims for car ownership in the 
short-term, making an important timely contribution to growing philosophical 
debates regarding climate change and transport, as well as filling a research gap 
with an ethical framework for LCV uptake policies that recognised the limitations of 
modelling in policy appraisal.  
 
A unique approach was then taken that combined that ethical framework with a 
system dynamic model of such policies, comparing and combining supply and 
demand side policies. It was found that putting regulatory penalties in place would 
achieve the greatest GHG emission reductions but this also imposes large costs on 
customers, which are disproportionate across market segments. Subsidies tested 
here reduced user costs at the expense of public money, were not as successful in 
reducing emissions and unless they are introduced within a failing market, they only 
benefit the more affluent in society. However, when combined, the positive aspects 
of single policies are mutually reinforced and some negative impacts are reduced. 
This appears to defend a claim that governments are indeed obliged to introduce 
such policies on both the supply and demand sides, but also that stronger policies 
and co-ordination are needed for the substantial reductions required. As the 
opportunity for car ownership was found to be affected by LCV policies, some policy 
amendments will be required, which can be analogous to existing public policies 
such as tax exemptions. These must be targeted towards the worst-off to ensure 
that they are not unfairly burdened.  
 
From this, three key policy recommendations have been made. Firstly, there must 
be provision in the policy to ensure affordability of car ownership (due to the 
societal and infrastructural lock-in of car-dependence) for the worst-off in society. 
Following this, policies must seek to protect those with special claims towards car 
ownership and are therefore most vulnerable to changes in the opportunity for car 
ownership. Finally, policy makers should be aware of where the costs related to 
policy interventions are falling, between customers, government (through the 
general tax payer) and industry, and try to ensure that burdens are fairly distributed. 
 
Drawing from the research that has been carried out, a modelling and appraisal 
framework has been proposed, which will allow future researchers and policy 
makers to explore other issues related to LCVs, and is also transferable to other 
areas of public policy. The four steps in this process are 1. Identify existing and 
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potential ethical issues; 2. Defend an approach to justice; 3. Develop a model which 
can capture the identified ethical issues, and; 4. Recognise that the model should 
not be used in isolation. This framework improves upon existing practices that do 
not fully appreciate the importance of integrating ethical evaluation into the policy 
appraisal process and offers a new perspective on the limitations of modelling. 
 
The novel contribution of this research is the argument for the implementation of 
ethics within a model for policy appraisal, with a specific focus on LCVs. This was 
achieved within the limits of the study. An improved modelling and appraisal 
framework was proposed, where it was recognised that there are limitations to 
being able to combine ethics and modelling. This is due to the complexity of real-
world systems and the incompatibility between non-empirical ethical evaluation and 
empirical modelling. Despite the limitations, the proposed framework will allow 
future researchers, automobile manufacturers and policy makers explore ethical 
issues not only related to LCV policies, but also other areas of public policy, 
particularly related to transport and energy. Through following the framework, policy 
decision-making will be more informed and holistic, reducing the occurrence of 
poorly designed policies that fail to achieve their purpose or burden the worst-off.   
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